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This thesis presents a comprehensive account of the complex relationship between 
the British government and the domestic military-naval arms industry from the 
armistice in 1918 until the period of rearmament in the 1930s. Challenging 
traditional „declinist‟ assumptions, it offers a multifaceted interpretation of the 
industry‟s strengths and weaknesses and its place in national security. In this 
regard, British governments always prioritised national interests over the private 
armament manufacturers‟ particular concerns and never formulated a specific 
policy to help them adjust to peacetime conditions. Indeed, the wartime 
experience of industrial mobilisation – the mass production of war material by 
ordinary firms – made specialist arms producers appear less important in supply 
planning: a view that proved more important than disarmament and retrenchment 
in damaging state-industry relations and, together with Britain‟s liberal economic 
traditions, helped to foster an enduring but exaggerated sense of relative 
weakness. Faced with the government‟s apparent indifference, the overextended 
arms industry underwent comprehensive internal reorganisation, led by Vickers 
and supported hesitantly by the Bank of England. This reduced the overall number 
of manufacturers but it also brought modernisation and a comparatively efficient 
nucleus for emergency expansion. Internationally, British firms retained a large 
share of the global arms market despite rising competition. Policymakers rarely 
accepted widespread public criticism that private armaments manufacture and 
trading were immoral but believed that the League of Nations‟ ambition to 
enforce all-encompassing international controls posed a far greater risk to British 
security. Although the government imposed unilateral arms trade regulations to 
facilitate political objectives, and was forced to address outraged popular opinion, 
neither seriously damaged the manufacturers‟ fortunes as the country moved 
towards rearmament. Indeed, the arms industry was never simply a victim of 
government policy but instead pursued an independent and ultimately successful 
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At the start of the twentieth century the British armaments industry consisted of a 
small number of huge undertakings that produced bespoke items for governments, 
including massive guns, colossal gun-mountings and exceptionally hard armour 
plate. Such manufacture required the capacity to create and forge complex alloys 
combined with the dedicated plant and skilled labour to engineer these metals and 
other component parts into finished products. In terms of harnessing available 
technological potential, Clive Trebilcock has suggested that the ability to 
manufacture gun-mountings in 1910 was roughly comparable to the production of 
spacecraft in the 1980s.
1
 The government could not afford to maintain such 
advanced facilities on the basis of its own defence requirements but instead relied 
on private industry, which was able to supplement its income by selling weapons 
to other countries‟ armed forces. As a result of their unique specialist capacity, the 
firms viewed themselves as vital components of Britain‟s maritime supremacy 
and imperial defence.
2
 Yet although the manufacturers flourished before and 
during the Great War, the conflict also brought about major changes to their 
subsequent fortunes, structure and peacetime relationship with the state. 
  In contrast to the arms industry‟s focus on complex heavy military-naval 
products, the Great War demanded vast quantities of relatively simple items, such 
as shells, which the general engineering industry could mass produce with 
unskilled labour and some adaptation of plant. As a result, the McKinnon Wood 
committee, as part of its investigation of the state-owned Royal Ordnance 
Factories at Woolwich, ominously reported on 22 November 1918 that private 
arms manufacture would likely disappear as a speciality given that wartime needs 
could be met by „the whole of the manufacturing power of the country, which has 
been educated in the supply of armaments.‟3 Furthermore, the committee 
suggested that public opinion would probably insist on the restriction of 
                                                 
1
 Clive Trebilcock, „Science, Technology and the Armaments Industry in the UK and Europe, 
with Special Reference to the Period 1880-1914‟, Journal of European Economic History, vol. 22, 
no. 3 (1993), 569-70. 
2
 Arthur J. Marder, „The English Armament Industry and Navalism in the Nineties‟, Pacific 
Historical Review, vol. 7, no. 3 (Sep., 1938), 251. 
3
 Cmd 229 (1919), Committee of Enquiry into the Royal Ordnance Factories, Woolwich: 
Reports to the Minister of Munitions (March 1919), p.8. 
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peacetime arms production to government factories. Indeed, the League of 
Nations‟ Covenant, signed on 28 June 1919, suggested that the manufacture of 
armaments by private enterprise was open to „grave objections‟ and „evil effects‟.4 
Unpopular and apparently outdated, the industry‟s future appeared especially 
bleak after „the war to end all wars‟. Despite this, the specialist arms firms 
dramatically reappeared in the public and political debates of the 1930s, against 
the background of mounting European and Far Eastern tensions. In September 
1936 the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms 
rejected renewed calls for the arms industry‟s nationalisation and concluded that 
 
the necessities of imperial defence cannot be 
effectively met, in existing conditions, except by the 
maintenance in peace-time of a system of 
collaboration between the Government and the 





However, from 1918 until the onset of rearmament in the 1930s, this „system of 
collaboration‟ was characterised by struggle and stagnation rather than closeness 
and cooperation. Although the McKinnon Wood committee‟s predictions did not 
come to pass, the government offered little help while the arms firms adjusted to 
post-war conditions. In response, the manufacturers came to believe that officials 
cared little about their important specialist capacity or the question of „industrial 
mobilisation‟ for a future war. Indeed, when the government began to plan for 
rearmament in the early 1930s, ministers feared that the arms industry had 
become critically weak.  
This thesis argues that the divergent paths pursued by the government and 
the domestic arms industry between the armistice and rearmament caused each 
side to misinterpret the other‟s position.  The state certainly did not neglect the 
question of industrial mobilisation for a future war, while the private armaments 
industry did not decline to a dangerous level. Instead, the perceptions of weakness 
arose from the fragmented nature of their inter-war relationship, particularly the 
government‟s failure to fully integrate the specialist arms manufacturers into 
                                                 
4
 Article Eight quoted in F. P. Walters, A History of the League of Nations (one vol. edn., 
Oxford, 1960 [first published in two vols., 1952]), p.48. 
5
 Cmd 5292 (1935-36), Report of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and 
Trading in Arms (October, 1936), p.53. 
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wider national defence planning. Although the resultant images of decline 
weakened Britain‟s response to the international crises of the 1930s, the state 
actually possessed significant organisational and industrial resources with which 
to meet these challenges. 
For the purpose of this investigation, the „arms industry‟ is defined as the 
limited number of private „arms firms‟ which maintained expensive 
manufacturing resources with little or no wider commercial application in order to 
produce advanced military-naval weapons systems for governments, particularly 
heavy ordnance, gun-mountings and armour. These manufacturers were especially 
sensitive to changes in their relationship with the state and possessed the most 
pronounced contemporary reputations and corporate identities as armament 
manufacturers. Indeed, the chairman of Vickers Limited, one of the country‟s 
biggest industrial concerns, declared to the company‟s shareholders in April 1927 
that „we are an armament firm, dependent very largely on armament orders‟.6 
Moreover, Vickers‟ merger with Sir W. G. Armstrong Whitworth and Company 
later in that year was specifically designed to amalgamate the two companies‟ 
arms-producing plant into one unit, Vickers-Armstrongs.  
The definition adopted does not include the small arms industry, which 
adapted more easily to peacetime manufacture and had an obvious commercial 
outlet in sporting rifles. Neither does it include the chemical industry, which had a 
considerable civil utility and entirely separate character.
7
 The exclusion of aircraft 
manufacture is perhaps more controversial, as David Edgerton has convincingly 
demonstrated how the British aviation industry during this period was essentially 
an arms-based business.
8
 Nonetheless, aircraft manufacture had a clearly distinct 
identity from traditional forms of armament production. First, it was a new and 
growing industry, composed of a comparatively large number of smaller 
undertakings across the south of England, whereas the predominantly northern 
military-naval firms were at a much later stage of concentrated development. 
Second, the private aircraft manufacturers had virtually no competition from 
                                                 
6
 The Times, 30 April 1927. 
7
 See W. J. Reader, Imperial Chemical Industries: A History, 2 vols. (Oxford, 1970-1975); 
Robert Harris and Jeremy Paxman, A Higher Form of Killing: The Secret Story of Gas and Germ 
Warfare (London, 1982); Kim Coleman, IG Farben and ICI, 1925-53: Strategies for Growth and 
Survival (Basingstoke, 2006). 
8
 David Edgerton, England and the Aeroplane: An Essay on a Militant and Technological 
Nation (Basingstoke, 1991), pp.18-58. 
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government factories, while firms like Vickers-Armstrongs had to compete with 
the Royal Dockyards and Ordnance Factories. Third, although the traditional arms 
firms produced aeroplanes they kept this activity distinct from their military-naval 
business. For example, Armstrong‟s aircraft interests did not form part of its 
armaments merger with Vickers in 1927; while Vickers‟ air subsidiaries were not 
placed under the aegis of Vickers-Armstrongs until the Second World War. 
Finally, the Air Ministry at least had the option of investing more widely in civil 
aviation during the 1920s, an alternative with no equivalent for the Admiralty or 
War Office. Nonetheless, the aircraft firms‟ transition to peacetime conditions 
after 1918 had certain parallels with the traditional arms companies‟ own 
experiences. In this regard, Edgerton‟s essay England and the Aeroplane, by 
shattering some of the enduring myths about Britain‟s alleged backwardness and 
decline in a different sector of defence production, complements the present 
study. 
A tight definition also avoids the semantic controversies which plagued 
contemporary actors. For example, a League of Nations subcommittee came up 
with three competing replies to the question „What is to be understood by the 
expression „armaments‟?‟9 Describing the „arms industry‟ proved equally 
problematic given that, in the era of total war, a definition could feasibly cover a 
country‟s entire productive resources. On 8 November 1933 Sir John E. 
Thornycroft, whose company manufactured gunboats and destroyers, proposed to 
the editor of The Times that „every factory is a potential armament works, 
however peaceful its products appear‟.10 On the other hand, Sir Maurice Hankey, 
the influential Secretary to both the Cabinet and Committee of Imperial Defence 
(CID), suggested in 1936: „There are no armaments firms in this country – not 
purely armaments firms.‟11 Admittedly, no undertaking dedicated its entire 
productive resources to arms production but this comment overlooks the 
manufacturers‟ well-defined self-image, while Hankey and others certainly 
believed in the existence of a distinct armaments industry. 
                                                 
9
 Andrew Webster, „The Transnational Dream: Politicians, Diplomats and Soldiers in the League 
of Nations‟ Pursuit of International Disarmament, 1920-1938‟, Contemporary European History, 
vol. 14, no. 4 (2005), 511. 
10
 The Times, 8 November 1933. 
11
 Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms (hereafter RC), 
Minutes of Evidence (London, 1935-6), p.586. 
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References in the text to „specialist‟ firms designate those companies 
which formed the „arms industry‟ in contrast to „general‟ industrial undertakings, 
which were almost exclusively non-armament factories and certainly could not 
produce larger and more complex weapons. The terms „military-industrial‟ and 
„naval-industrial‟ are used to refer to the arms industry‟s relationship with the War 
Office and Admiralty respectively. „State-industry‟ describes the wider 
connections between the government and the armament firms. The word „supply‟, 
when used in the context of military-naval planning, is used to denote 
procurement from industrial sources, rather than arrangements for logistical 
support. „Arms‟ and „armaments‟ are used interchangeably, while „munitions‟ is 
generally avoided unless the context is clear, as contemporaries often understood 
the term to mean all military stores.
12
 
The historical relationship between the state and the production of 
weapons technology has lent itself to sweeping chronological and geographical 
narratives.
13
 More specific analyses of Britain‟s inter-war arms industry have 
fallen into three broad types. First, contemporary accounts published in the 1930s 
adopted a populist and highly critical tone, accusing the „merchants of death‟ of 
manipulating governments and fostering war. Second, scholars since the 1950s 
have largely described how post-armistice defence cuts and disarmament virtually 
obliterated the specialist arms industry and left the country with a poor industrial 
base for rearmament. Finally, a smaller number of historians have recently begun 
to challenge and revise the dominant paradigm of inter-war decline. The following 
review of these differing approaches not only provides context for the present 
study but also conveys a further sense of the private armament industry‟s unique 
place in domestic and international affairs. 
                                                 
12
 Some of these definitions are drawn from G. A. H. Gordon, British Seapower and 
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Slings and Arrows: Contemporary Critics and the ‘Merchants of Death’ 
 
During the first half of the 1930s a significant body of critical opinion mobilised 
against the private manufacturers of arms. The arguments put forward not only 
became significant factors in the contemporary political and public debates 
surrounding the arms industry but also collectively represent the earliest 
significant published analyses of the inter-war relationship between the British 
government and the specialist firms. The controversy had its roots in the decade 
before 1914, when various liberals, pacifists, radicals and socialists argued that 
the arms industry was dangerously belligerent and exploitative.
14
 For example, 
George Bernard Shaw‟s 1905 satirical play Major Barbara notoriously depicted 
Andrew Undershaft, an amoral millionaire armaments manufacturer who 
repeatedly boasted of his political influence and espoused the „true faith of an 
Armourer‟: 
 
To give arms to all men who offer an honest price 
for them, without respect of persons or principles: to 
aristocrat and republican, to Nihilist and Tsar, to 
Capitalist and Socialist, to Protestant and Catholic, 
to burglar and policeman, to black man, white man 
and yellow man, to all sorts and conditions, all 
nationalities, all faiths, all follies, all causes and all 
crimes.
15
   
 
The Union of Democratic Control (UDC), a broad leftist coalition which called 
for parliamentary control over foreign policy, warned during the Great War that if 
private arms-producing enterprise was left alone in the future, „one of the most 
sinister activities in Europe will be left to cajole, manipulate and corrupt the 
nations into further wars.‟16 Therefore, it demanded the nationalisation of the 
armaments industry and control over the international arms trade as part of the 
                                                 
14
 Clive Trebilcock, „Legends of the British Armament Industry 1890-1914: A Revision‟, 
Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 5, no. 4 (1970), 3; and „Radicalism and the Armament 
Trust‟, in A. J. A. Morris (ed.), Edwardian Radicalism, 1900-1914: Some Aspects of British 
Radicalism (London, 1974), pp.180-81. 
15
 George Bernard Shaw, Major Barbara (London, 2000 [first published 1907]), p.138. 
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 However, in September 1933 the Union observed that the faith 
of the armourer as described by Shaw remained „substantially unimpaired‟.18 
While the UDC‟s call for nationalisation ultimately failed, its warning 
about the dangers of excessive armaments resonated in the post-war world. Many 
statesmen involved in the July crisis subsequently sought to diminish any personal 
responsibility for the outbreak of the war by blaming a range of „great impersonal 
forces‟, such as the naval and land arms races that had occupied the European 
great powers in the years preceding the conflict.
19
 Sir Edward Grey, the Foreign 
Secretary in 1914, famously wrote in his memoirs that „the enormous growth of 
armaments in Europe, the sense of insecurity and fear caused by them – it was 
these that made war inevitable.‟20 Such arguments helped shift the human factor 
away from politicians and towards the private arms manufacturers. These 
mysterious figures, with a pecuniary interest in weapons sales, provided a ready 
scapegoat for a population struggling to find an explanation for over four years of 
industrial slaughter.
21
 Nonetheless, public attention generally drifted away from 
the arms industry during the 1920s, perhaps owing to the big firms‟ financial 
difficulties and the relative sense of calm in international affairs. 
Although the private manufacturers‟ profits improved as Britain moved 
towards rearmament, they also faced renewed and unprecedented levels of public 
criticism. In March 1933 the Confederation Internationale des Associations de 
Mutiles et des Anciens Combattants (which included the British Legion) and the 
Federation Internationale des Anciens Combattants, which together represented 
over eight million ex-soldiers, called for the Conference for the Reduction and 
Limitation of Armaments at Geneva (also known as the Disarmament Conference) 
to suppress private arms manufacture and trade.
22
 In the United States, domestic 
pressure forced the Senate to establish the Special Committee Investigating the 
Munitions Industry, which met between 1934 and 1936 under the chairmanship of 
                                                 
17
 Ibid., p.1. 
18
 UDC, Patriotism Ltd: an Exposure of the War Machine (London, Sep., 1933), p.49. 
19
 Marc Trachtenberg, „The Meaning of Mobilization in 1914‟, International Security, vol. 15, 
no. 3 (Winter, 1990-1991), 148-49. 
20
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21
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Senator Gerald P. Nye, a progressive Midwestern Republican.
23
 The Nye 
Committee hearings, which were connected to rising American isolationist 
sentiment, turned up several personal and carelessly phrased letters, which had 
recently passed between Sir Charles Craven, a director of Vickers, and Lawrence 
Spear, a vice president of the Electric Boat Company, an American shipyard with 
which Vickers had a long-standing submarine production agreement. This 
correspondence appeared to suggest that the firms had fixed prices, bribed and 
deceived their governments, and had tried to play countries off against each other 
to secure larger orders. Regardless of Craven‟s actual intentions, his letters caused 
a transatlantic scandal, but he had to wait until his appearance at the Royal 
Commission in January 1936 to give his side of the story.
24
   
The fourth question of the Peace Ballot (1934-35) asked the British public 
„Should the manufacture and sale of armaments for private profit be prohibited by 
international agreement?‟ Although the guided nature of the ballot‟s line of 
questioning is open to criticism, 90 percent of the 11.6 million participants 
answered „yes‟.25 Indeed, Martin Ceadel has affirmed that „the arms traders were 
at the pinnacle of their long career as the peace movement‟s leading bogeymen.‟26 
Political and popular pressure forced the government to announce the formation 
of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in Arms in 
late 1934, and nearly fifty major organisations representing over two million 
people, including the Trades Unions Congress, National Union of Teachers, 
various church leaders and a large number of peace groups, subsequently sent 
appeals calling for the abolition of private manufacture.
27
 
The large number of condemnatory books and pamphlets published 
between 1932 and 1936 represent an enduring legacy of this controversy.
28
 Many 
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of these works, with titles such as The Bloody Traffic, adopted a sensationalist 
tone and most reflected a strong moral objection to making profits from war. In 
1936 Philip Noel-Baker, a Labour politician who had served as personal assistant 
to the president of the Disarmament Conference, published a comparatively 
measured, yet still highly critical, systemic analysis of private armaments 
manufacture, which drew upon the evidence he had prepared for his appearance at 
the Royal Commission the previous year.
29
 Notably, he eschewed a moralistic 
tone in order to explain more dispassionately his thesis that the manufacture of 
arms for private profit inevitably led to „evil effects‟.30 All the critics‟ arguments 
were largely based on publicly available information, including memoirs, League 
of Nations documents and press reports, as well as personal experiences and 
anecdotes. The authors often referred to the activities of foreign firms and 
governments, or to events occurring prior to 1914, but they also provided enough 
material to form a general critique of the inter-war British arms industry. 
The literature described a suspiciously close relationship between the 
manufacturers and Whitehall, and noted how private firms regularly recruited 
directors who had retired from political or service careers.
31
 The authors argued 
that this cosy arrangement resulted in valuable domestic orders and other forms of 
direct and indirect assistance which meant that the British arms industry trailed 
only France in terms of overall output, and included Vickers-Armstrongs, 
probably the largest single armaments concern in the world. The connections of 
certain Vickers directors with various domestic and international banking interests 
provoked some interest, although the critics made no concrete allegations. The 
Union of Democratic Control reported that Vickers‟ 80,000 shareholders came 
from all walks of life and included Lord Hailsham, the Secretary of State for War, 
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alongside „a noticeably high proportion of clergymen.‟32 Nonetheless, the UDC 
charitably imagined that „most of these persons must be quite innocent of any 
desire to slaughter their neighbours‟, even though the shareholders stood to gain 
from increased arms sales.
33
 No evidence emerged that British manufacturers had 
purchased control of any newspapers but Noel-Baker pointed out that the firms 
advertised on a considerable scale and also took advantage of a number of 
influential „patriotic‟ societies, such as the Navy League, to press for greater 
national defence spending.
34
 He also suggested that „all men‟, both journalists and 




The critics alleged that British firms faced few legislative obstacles to their 
overseas trading activities but did receive considerable diplomatic assistance from 
the government. Moreover, Noel-Baker argued that the manufacturers employed 
methods such as bribery to both obtain and increase the number of arms ordered 
by foreign governments and that they had no qualms about selling to Britain‟s 
potential enemies.
36
 To facilitate these dubious activities, the critics contended 
that the firms maintained various international connections, including interests in 
overseas companies. Vickers‟ long-standing connection with Sir Basil Zaharoff, 
the notorious international arms dealer, prompted further suspicion. The literature 
also provided direct examples of how British manufacturers had supplied 
belligerents in the Far East and South America during the early 1930s, thereby 
flouting the League of Nations‟ efforts to resolve conflict in these regions. 
From rather meagre empirical foundations, the critics conjectured that the 
arms industry‟s natural desire to make profits, coupled with its close political and 
economic connections, represented a dangerous and sinister factor in both 
domestic politics and international relations. For example, Noel-Baker described 
the „major evil‟ of the system as 
 
the steady pressure of an elaborately organised and 
financially powerful vested interest against policies 
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which make for peace and in favour of the increase 
of armaments, whether there is political justification 




Therefore, he did not doubt that the arms firms‟ activities were among the causes 
of Britain‟s rearmament programme in the mid-1930s.38  
Noel-Baker also drew attention to the 1935 biography of the late Lord 
Wester Wemyss, a former First Sea Lord. This claimed that the admiral had 
placed a memorandum before the Admiralty in December 1918 which had 
condemned the arms industry‟s activities as „a subterranean conspiracy against 
peace‟.39 At the Royal Commission in May 1936, Sir Maurice Hankey and Sir 
Oswyn Murray, the Admiralty‟s Permanent Secretary, played down this 
document‟s significance. Hankey, who had known Wemyss since 1908, suggested 
that his colleague had never demonstrated any strong feelings on the subject. 
Moreover, the admiral had neither authored nor initialled the memorandum in 
question, which had merely represented one of several circulating points of view. 
Murray admitted that Wemyss had initially supported calls to nationalise the arms 
industry in late 1918, but had made no subsequent representations to the War 
Cabinet on the issue and had even signed a service memorandum in February 
1919 which strongly objected to nationalisation. Therefore, Hankey and Murray 
argued that this latter document represented his considered and final view.
40
 
Conversely, Lady Wemyss suggested that the Admiralty had pressed her husband 




Whether Wemyss had believed it or not, the critics maintained that events 
since 1918 confirmed the existence of „a subterranean conspiracy against peace‟. 
In particular, they highlighted the case of William Shearer, a lobbyist for 
American shipbuilders between 1926 and 1929. A subsequent senatorial enquiry 
heard that Shearer, largely funded by William Randolph Hearst to spread „Big 
Navy‟ propaganda, had conversed with members of the American delegation at 
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the unsuccessful Geneva Naval Conference in 1927.
42
 However, while lobbyists 
undoubtedly soured the atmosphere and contributed to distorted American press 
reports, historians have concluded that a lack of preparation by the participants 
and political disagreement over the limitation of cruisers proved central to failure 
at Geneva.
43
 Yet, regardless of Shearer‟s actual impact, contemporary critics 
seized upon the self-styled „man who wrecked the conference‟. For example, 
Richard Lewinsohn, an émigré German journalist and political scientist, alleged 
that the armament firms „sent their emissaries to Geneva to fight disarmament 
tooth and nail‟, but could cite only Shearer as a definite example.44  
Although the industry‟s opponents uncovered little to suggest that the 
manufacturers had directly acted against disarmament and found virtually nothing 
to implicate British firms, they simply claimed that this lack of evidence was itself 
proof of a vast and sinister network of connections, which provided many 
opportunities for „unostentatious persuasion and propaganda.‟45 Indeed, Noel-
Baker believed the firms kept their anti-disarmament work as secret as possible, 
and imagined their agents were acting with greater subtlety in light of the Shearer 
experience.
46
 He contended the League of Nations‟ ambitions – international 
cooperation, security and disarmament – inevitably increased the „sales resistance‟ 
faced by the manufacturers and made it unlikely that they would merely act as 
neutral observers.
47
 Based on his personal experience at Geneva, he argued the 
international arms industry‟s „gigantic combinations‟ and „close cartels‟ had 
worked against not only the Disarmament Conference, but also the League‟s 
efforts to resolve peacefully both the Manchurian crisis after 1931 and Italy‟s 
invasion of Ethiopia in 1935.
48
 
 Noel-Baker concluded that Britain „with perhaps the highest standards of 
democracy in the world‟ had not avoided the „evils‟ of private manufacture and 
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called upon the government to nationalise armaments production as an example to 
other states.
49
 Moreover, the UDC contended that if the various governments did 
not demonstrate their sincerity towards international cooperation by abandoning 
their „unholy alliance‟ with the arms industry, it might lead to revolution.50 Other 
authors believed that only the replacement of the entire capitalist system would 
enable permanent peace and disarmament. For example, H. C. Engelbrecht and F. 
C. Hanighen, the American authors of Merchants of Death, contended that: „If the 
arms industry is a cancer on the body of modern civilisation, it is not an 
extraneous growth; it is the result of the unhealthy condition of the body itself.‟51 
Consequently, they suggested that only a fundamental shift in the basic elements 
of civilisation would enable disarmament and end the domination of aggressive 
forces, such as nationalism, capitalism and imperialism, in international politics.
52
 
Fenner Brockway, the socialist author of The Bloody Traffic, called for revolution 
and argued that nationalisation would merely concentrate arms production in the 
hands of wealthy governments and would not address the issue of other groups 
profiting from war.
53
 Along similar lines, Richard Lewinsohn noted how public 
opinion had mobilised against the arms firms, yet had paid scant attention to the 
wartime producers of raw materials and other goods such as „corned beef, military 
cloth, boots, oil and petrol and the thousand other things required by a modern 




In September 1933, Sir Mark Webster Jenkinson, Vickers‟ financial 
director, sent General Sir Herbert Lawrence, the company‟s chairman, a copy of 
The Bloody Traffic, with the note:  
 
You will see that he dishes up again in new 
phraseology the old lies about Vickers and Vickers-
Armstrongs. Anyway, it may amuse you. Please do 
not trouble to return the book. If the weather turns 
colder, it will make good material for your fire!
55
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However, Lawrence felt compelled to address the critics‟ arguments more 
constructively. In April 1935 he refuted claims that the firm wished to foster war 
and declared at its annual meeting that 
 
the Directors and shareholders know to their cost 
the sorrow and suffering which War entails; the 
waste of human life and material; the financial loss 
which posterity has to bear; and the damage which 




Noel-Baker admitted the manufacturers might sincerely detest war, but suggested 
that war nonetheless brought great prosperity to their business.
57
 Conversely, 
Lewinsohn argued that the increase of wartime state controls and threat of 
nationalisation had decreased the desirability of large-scale conflict for the arms 
industry. He suggested the manufacturers now preferred to make profits from 
warlike preparations and manoeuvres, and through technical innovations. Rather 
than actual war, he contended the firms wished to maintain the fear of war, or a 
„precarious peace‟, which caused them to suspect international disarmament or 
any other process that aimed to bring about „a really stable peace‟.58 
The manufacturers were given a chance to defend themselves publicly at 
the Royal Commission in early 1936.
59
 However, their responses under 
questioning were frequently cynical, evasive or flippant and did little to endear 
them to the commissioners. For example, Sir Charles Craven suggested, during an 
exchange with Sir Philip Gibbs, the famous author and journalist, that Vickers‟ 
business was no more dangerous than any other and claimed that he had never 
been injured by a gun but had nearly lost an eye to a Christmas cracker. John 
Alfred Spender, another commissioner, later wrote that he had taken „a much 
lighter view‟ of the industry‟s alleged misconduct before he had heard the 
evidence for the defence!
60
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Until Hankey appeared before the Commission in May 1936, pro-
manufacturer opinion had not articulated itself with anywhere near the same force 
or conviction as the opposing argument. Indeed, Hankey mused that he had „never 
seen the other case really put in full.‟ As a result, he suggested that the eleven 
million people who had expressed their willingness to abolish private manufacture 
via the Peace Ballot had merely acted on „instinct‟ based upon the critics‟ „terrific 
propaganda‟.61 Believing abolition would have disastrous consequences for 
national security and rearmament, Hankey presented the Commission with a 
wide-ranging defence of the arms industry on 8 May. He suggested that private 
firms were indispensable in wartime and provided vital peacetime commercial and 
defence benefits which far outweighed any alleged dangers.
62
 In this latter regard, 
Hankey dedicated an enormously detailed memorandum and a further sitting of 
the Royal Commission to a relentless attack on the critics‟ key contentions, which 
he based on a wide range of official and historical documents. He particularly 
condemned the prejudice and vagueness of the case against the manufacturers, 
and suggested the scope for any sinister influence was negligible.
63
 Hankey 
succeeded in convincing the Commission that the case against the British arms 
industry had not been proved, although the commissioners‟ report criticised the 
practice of bribery by the firms‟ overseas agents.64 Similarly, the Nye Committee 
in the United States also proved that the arguments against the „merchants of 
death‟ only had a limited validity.65 
During the Second World War, Vickers‟ production of the iconic Spitfire 
fighter and the Wellington bomber helped to restore the company‟s reputation and 
also reflected how developments in aircraft technology had supplanted the 
traditional military-naval industries.
66
 In this context, and considering the Royal 
Commission‟s relatively unspectacular verdict, the 1930s outcry became 
somewhat ephemeral and has subsequently received only sporadic historical 
treatment. In 1970 Clive Trebilcock, having taken advantage of newly-opened 
state papers and business archives, presented a revisionist account of the „legends 
and myths‟ which „shrill‟ 1930s critics had propagated about the pre-1914 arms 
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industry. He concluded that any scandals merely resulted from a „group of 
problem-ridden businessmen reacting pragmatically – and sometimes mistakenly 
– to the complex difficulties of their markets.‟67 In 1979 Richard Davenport-
Hines, under Trebilcock‟s supervision, extended this analysis to cover the specific 
allegations relating to the inter-war years. Drawing upon Hankey‟s evidence, 
Davenport-Hines suggested that the 1930 anti-manufacturer campaign represented 
nothing more than escapism from the deteriorating international situation.
68
 
Moreover, his research into company papers suggested that the firms employed 
bribery only in certain overseas contexts when the application of „grease‟ was an 
established practice of the customer. Such lubrication was never used at home, 
and Davenport-Hines suggested that the manufacturers must have found this 
foreign custom an „intolerable nuisance‟, with no appreciable effect on the 
quantity of arms sold.
69
 
Although Trebilcock and Davenport-Hines have stripped away much of 
the caricature and hyperbole of the pamphlet literature, their own relentlessly 
revisionist zeal has consequently presented the arms industry as an almost 
helpless victim of both government policy and the ebb and flow of international 
affairs. Conversely, David G. Anderson has pointed out that, while the Royal 
Commission threw out the most serious charges, it found sufficient evidence in 
the industry‟s testimony to conclude that the system of private armaments 
manufacture did offer considerable scope for abuse. Therefore, the commissioners 
recommended closer governmental oversight of the industry‟s affairs, although 
they rejected nationalisation. Their report steered a middle course between the two 
extremes of opinion, but Anderson has suggested that their relatively limited 
powers of investigation meant they convinced neither side.
70
 Nonetheless, the 
Commission‟s extensive minutes of evidence remain an invaluable resource for 
historians, providing examples of a wide variety of critical, industrial and 
departmental opinions. Moreover, although the 1930s outcry was based on a 
vastly exaggerated notion of dangerously intertwined state-industry relations, it at 
least began a process of enquiry into the realities behind the allegations. 
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Decay and Decline: Post-1945 Interpretations of Inter-War Arms Production 
 
In an ironic parallel to the public clamour against the private manufacturers, the 
government became increasingly concerned about the domestic arms industry‟s 
ability to produce the weapons required by the armed forces. The Chiefs of Staff 
annual review for 1932 described how the „decay of our armament industry‟ had 
contributed to Britain‟s inability to fulfil its substantial overseas commitments.71 
Hankey wrote on 4 March 1933 that the arms industry was „the weakest point in 
Imperial Defence‟.72 On 31 March another report described how the shipbuilding 
and armaments industries had drastically declined in terms of available plant and 
skilled labour, and blamed disarmament, the existence of large surplus stocks, the 
government‟s restrictive arms trade policy and a lack of foreign orders.73 As a 
result, Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade, told his colleagues 
on the CID that „our armament firms are now weaker than they have been for 
three generations‟, while James Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, admitted 
that the situation was „very serious‟.74 These contemporary images of decline and 
weakness have pervaded subsequent historical accounts of the inter-war arms 




 The authors of the civil history of the Second World War were granted 
access to relevant official documents and adopted an unsurprisingly gloomy view 
of the arms industry in their summaries of the inter-war period. In 1952 Michael 
Postan, a Cambridge professor of economic history who had worked for the 
Ministry of Economic Warfare, wrote in his volume on British War Production 
that financial stringency and disarmament in the „lean years‟ prior to rearmament 
had not only seriously lowered the armed forces‟ equipment but also caused a 
considerable reduction in the industrial capacity at the services‟ disposal.76 
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Nonetheless, Postan recognised Vickers‟ dominance amongst the specialist 
producers and suggested that the firm enjoyed a near-monopolistic relationship 
with the Admiralty for design and production.
77
 William Hornby‟s 1958 volume 
on Factories and Plant referred to the arms industry‟s „serious decline‟, the 
„persistent deterioration‟ of shipbuilding resources and the „general deterioration‟ 
of armament productive capacity.
78
 Hornby argued that the specialist arms 
manufacturers, unable to find either a satisfactory basis for their peacetime 
existence or to modernise their plant, suffered from limited domestic and foreign 
orders and reached „the verge of extinction.‟79 Such views swiftly became 
historiographical orthodoxy although subsequent accounts tended to criticise the 




J. D. Scott, who had worked for the Ministry of Aircraft Production during 
the Second World War and subsequently wrote part of the civil history, published 
the official history of Vickers in 1962. Granted access to the firm‟s records, Scott 
demonstrated that internal business troubles and the general trade depression 
played an important part in its post-1918 misfortunes although he reiterated the 
debilitating effects of defence cuts. Despite these problems, he suggested that 
Vickers possessed a distinct advantage over its rivals in terms of labour 
availability, industrial capacity and overall market dominance.
81
 Richard 
Davenport-Hines, as part of his wide-ranging analysis of the arms industry‟s 
fortunes between 1918 and 1936, subsequently argued that this virtual monopoly 
ultimately damaged Vickers‟ efficiency.82 In a largely gloomy account, 
Davenport-Hines‟ assessment of the armament industry‟s position reflected the 
1930s service departmental views and repeated, albeit in some detail, the usual 
litany of retrenchment, disarmament and ruinously stringent export controls. As a 
result, he concluded that these policies killed off many of the specialist firms and 
consequently limited Britain‟s flexibility in international affairs.83 Nonetheless, 
his study remains particularly valuable for its examination of the industry‟s 
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managerial transformation and its illuminating portraits of the boardroom 




Although business historians have rarely gone beyond the standard 
narrative of decline or investigated the motives behind the government‟s allegedly 
devastating policies towards the arms industry, they have provided a great deal of 
useful information on the characters, structures and daily operations of individual 
firms. Business history has also shed greater light on the industry‟s unusual 
relationship with the financial community. Following themes developed in R.S. 
Sayers‟ 1976 history of the Bank of England, John Hume and Michael Moss 
explored how the rising debts of large armament firms like Beardmore helped 
prompt the Bank‟s wider interventions into British industry in the inter-war 
period.
85
 Kenneth Warren investigated similar themes in his subsequent „life 
history‟ of Armstrong although he explicitly excluded „the military-political-
industrial complex‟ from his account, as a „distraction‟ from purely business 
history.
86
 Nonetheless, his later work on Cammell Laird interestingly suggested 
that post-1918 governments were more interested in maintaining their relationship 
with Armstrong and Vickers than with the other comparatively smaller arms 
firms.
87
 In 1987 Steven Tolliday‟s comprehensive institutional analysis of the 
British steel industry between the wars described both cooperation and conflicting 
interests amongst the business, banking and political communities.
88
 In particular, 
he argued that Montagu Norman, the Governor of the Bank of England, was 
cautious and unrealistic in his dealings with the arms industry, and Vickers was 
therefore able to seize the initiative through a stronger and more pragmatic grasp 
of the situation.
89
 Nonetheless, Tolliday focused on the implications of this 
partnership for the wider steel industry and therefore offered limited analysis of 
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the political and strategic implications of this unique financial-industrial 
relationship for the specific circumstances of armaments production.  
In contrast to the economic and industrial focus of individual business 
histories, Correlli Barnett has located the arms firms‟ struggles within a wider 
panorama of national decline. His 1972 book on The Collapse of British Power 
painted a familiarly depressing picture of the inter-war period: disastrous 
adherence to disarmament, widespread pacifism, and a penny-pinching Treasury 
with a vested interest in defence cuts.
90
 However, although he referred to the arms 
industry‟s „crippling inadequacy‟ and „partial decrepitude‟, he also recognised that 
the specialist firms represented only a small part of the wider production of war 
equipment, which required the state to harness the country‟s general industrial 
resources. In this regard, he argued that Britain‟s lack of advanced engineering 
resources, including skilled labour and machine tools, was mainly responsible for 
impeding rearmament.
91
 In seeking to explain this wretched situation, Barnett did 
not blame the government as much as the entire nation and its liberal traditions. 
Indeed, he suggested that this fundamental malaise in the British national 
character made the country‟s decline and its appeasement of Nazi Germany 
virtually inevitable.
92
 In particular, he asserted that entrenched liberalism, with its 
emphasis on individualism and a suspicion of the state, had left Britain with a 
backward industrial structure and a deep-rooted antipathy to organisation. Barnett 
contended that the Great War‟s enormous demands had forced a „second 
industrial revolution‟, which had brought British industry into the modern era with 
a previously unthinkable relationship between the government and private 
enterprise.
93
 However, this change was purely temporary: after 11 November 
1918 the „brilliant coach‟ of collective reorganisation reverted to the „dried-up 
pumpkin‟ of laissez-faire individualism; the country‟s politicians and industrialists 
swiftly returned to their distinct spheres; and the relative erosion of British 
industrial strength continued apace.
94
 Contemporary interest in „de-
industrialisation‟ and the fate of Britain‟s general manufacturing industries during 
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the 1970s and 1980s provided Barnett‟s wide theory of decline with a receptive 
audience and its implications informed political, scholarly and public debate.
95
 
Several historians challenged the overall basis, as well as particular aspects, of 
Barnett‟s argument, and David Edgerton has particularly criticised its skewed 
assessment of the character of Britain‟s liberal elite and its erroneous 
conceptualisation and comparisons of relative industrial strength.
96
 
Like the McKinnon Wood committee in 1918, Barnett correctly 
recognised that the armaments industry formed only part of the country‟s overall 
capacity for the production of war material. Nonetheless, the question of how the 
government intended to harness and mobilise the „war potential‟ of general 
industry has received only intermittent scholarly attention. From the mid-1920s 
responsibility for the planning of industrial mobilisation fell upon the Principal 
Supply Officers Committee (PSOC) of the CID, which included representatives 
from the service departments and the Board of Trade. In the 1950s the relevant 
volumes of the civil history of the Second World War praised the administrative 
and theoretical strength of the PSOC‟s embryonic supply organisation and noted 
how it obtained the cooperation of a small number of industrialists. However, 
these works also drew attention to the committee‟s focus on paper planning and 
its lack of practical application in the absence of a firm and durable hypothesis 
concerning requirements.
97
 Nonetheless, in the official military history of 
rearmament policy, which appeared in 1976, N. H. Gibbs suggested that Britain 
had never been better prepared for a major war at the level of administrative 
planning than in September 1939 and he highlighted the rapidity of British 
mobilisation for total war.
98
 
 By concentrating on the period of rearmament and outbreak of the Second 
World War, historians have tended to neglect earlier developments in the 
government‟s supply planning and the impact these had on its relationship with 
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the arms industry. Davenport-Hines briefly suggested that industrial mobilisation 
theory reduced the number of private armament firms after 1918 although he 
offered little analysis of the PSOC‟s activities.99 In 1988 G. A. H. Gordon praised 
the paper strength and light touch of Britain‟s inter-war supply preparations, but 
nonetheless reiterated that the naval arms industry became critically weak after 
the armistice, owing to a combination of defence cuts, depression, disarmament, 
and popular hostility towards armaments manufacture.
100
 Rearmament 
unsurprisingly forced major changes to Britain‟s supply organisation and G. C. 
Peden has argued that the lack of suitable manufacturing facilities acted as a 
greater brake on defence expansion in the 1930s than the availability or otherwise 
of financial resources.
101
 He also pointed out that the Treasury began to recognise 
the PSOC‟s importance in 1935 and subsequently used the committee as a 
mechanism for prioritising funds for rearmament. Yet although Peden‟s 
interpretation showed for the first time how the Treasury identified the importance 
of industrial capacity from the mid-1930s, his analysis of the earlier period was 
more traditional, blaming the Treasury and retrenchment for leaving the specialist 
arms industry in a skeletal condition by 1933.
102
 Therefore, although historians 
have tended to praise Britain‟s supply organisation, they have also repeated the 
pre-existing narrative of industrial weakness regarding armaments production, and 
have drawn only limited connections between these crucial elements of defence 
planning prior to rearmament. 
Much of the post-1945 historiography has criticised the arms firms‟ 
performance during rearmament, a period of unusual demand. Others have 
unfairly compared the industry‟s activity in the 1920s with the levels of 
production achieved between 1913 and 1918. In other words, historians have 
argued that armaments and the arms industry should have been maintained at 
levels unconnected to normal peacetime conditions.
103
 Therefore, it is hardly 
surprising that a different picture emerges when the actions of officials and 
businessmen are assessed in the light of their contemporary circumstances, rather 
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than judging them by completely different and, to some extent, artificial 
standards. 
Over the past two decades David Edgerton has challenged the dominant 
historiographical image of British military and industrial weakness and offered a 
comprehensive „post-declinist‟ explanation of the state‟s relationship with 
industry, science and technology in the twentieth century.
104
 He has described 
Britain as a „liberal militarist‟ state that actively sought to harness the country‟s 
economic, industrial and commercial power for the development of 
technologically advanced weapons and thereby remove the need to mobilise mass 
conscript armies. As part of his wider argument, Edgerton has disputed long-held 
historiographical orthodoxies about inter-war armaments by fusing together a 
number of revisionist accounts. First, he has drawn upon articles by John Ferris 
and others which have argued that Britain retained considerable relative strength 
after 1918 and remained a great power.
105
 Second, he has cited Ferris‟ assertion 
that, in absolute terms, Britain had spent at least as much as any other power on 
defence during the 1920s.
106
 Third, he has referred to Dick Richardson‟s argument 
that many British politicians viewed international disarmament with scepticism or 
hostility.
107
  Fourth, he suggested that liberal internationalist public opinion was 
not suffused with idealistic pacifism but was militantly anti-fascist: for example, 
more than 58 percent of respondents to the Peace Ballot agreed on the use of 
international military measures against an aggressor state, compared to barely 
over 20 percent definitely against.
108
 Fifth, he pointed out that British firms held a 
large share of the global arms trade, although he has not assessed the motivations 
or impact of the government‟s regulatory policies towards arms exports. In this 
regard, Donald J. Stoker‟s recent case study has demonstrated how Britain 
unsuccessfully attempted to use its control of weapons transactions to achieve 
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wider political and strategic objectives in the Baltic between 1918 and 1936.
109
 
Ultimately, Edgerton has concluded that the British inter-war armaments industry 
was at least as large as any other in the world and continued to produce 
technologically advanced defence equipment. In the light of this, G. C. Peden has 




Overall, the majority of post-1945 historians have echoed the complaints 
of contemporary officials and have propagated descriptions of exaggerated 
decline in the inter-war British armaments industry. These remain potent images, 
inevitably connected to the argument that Britain fell behind the revisionist 
powers by delaying its entry into the 1930s rearmament race.
111
 Conversely, 
several recent historians have pointed out that Britain possessed considerable 
defence and industial capabilities. Building on these foundations, this thesis 
demonstrates how the arms industry, largely represented by Vickers Limited, 
developed and maintained a large degree of peacetime strength. Nonetheless, the 
government undoubtedly came to believe that the armaments industry had 
declined and this opinion affected its response to the challenge of the revisionist 
powers in the 1930s. Perceptions are extremely important in policymaking and 
this particular representation of backwardness was a crucial factor in the 
subsequent course of rearmament, appeasement and industrial mobilisation for the 
Second World War. The present study demonstrates that this dangerous gap 
between image and reality mainly arose from the turbulent nature of the state‟s 
post-1918 relationship with the private armament manufacturers and, to an extent, 
was encouraged by the industry itself. 
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Arms and the Businessmen: British State-Industry Relations, 1918-1936 
 
Despite the recent revisionist turn, Davenport-Hines‟ 1979 thesis remains the only 
dedicated full-length analysis of the arms industry‟s affairs between 1918 and 
1936. The present study, while identical in chronological span and overall subject 
matter, challenges this previous work in several important ways. First, Davenport-
Hines was primarily concerned with industrial history and treated the arms 
industry‟s political linkages as a secondary albeit decisive „external influence‟.112 
Moreover, he largely confined his examination of these connections to the service 
departments‟ association with the private manufacturers. Conversely, this thesis 
places state-industry relations at the centre of its analysis, and presents a more 
balanced and comprehensive assessment of the specific determinants, nature and 
results of this relationship. Crucially, it incorporates a wider investigation of 
interdepartmental policymaking throughout Whitehall and demonstrates how 
other ministries, notably the Foreign Office and Board of Trade, were deeply 
involved and responsible for specific elements of the industry‟s affairs. It also 
deals more thoroughly with the arms industry‟s important and unusual links with 
the City of London, which in some ways supplanted traditional state-industry 
relations. Second, Davenport-Hines contended that the arms business was 
„commercially dead‟ during this period, owing to the government‟s adherence to 
the League of Nations, its parsimony and its pursuit of disarmament.
113
 Yet he 
undoubtedly exaggerated the impact of these policies: in fact, British 
policymakers viewed the League‟s efforts to control armaments and arms 
production with considerable scepticism, while the domestic government and 
overseas customers continued to purchase privately-sourced weapons in a 
competitive market. Indeed, this thesis argues that British policy was more 
realistic than implied in Davenport-Hines‟ work and included a large degree of 
forward planning through the PSOC, even though this did not effectively 
incorporate the private arms industry. 
To recreate the multifaceted and frequently antagonistic inter-war 
relationship between post-war British governments and the arms industry, this 
thesis draws upon government documents held by the National Archives at Kew 
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alongside material located in business and banking archives throughout the United 
Kingdom. The Cabinet and Committee of Imperial Defence papers include the 
reports and correspondence of various subcommittees on issues pertaining to arms 
production: these reveal the lack of a unified arms industry policy at the Cabinet 
level; the tendency to address individual problems through interdepartmental 
subcommittees; and the strong influence of industrial mobilisation theory on 
official attitudes, most notably through the Principal Supply Officers Committee. 
At the international level, the Foreign Office Arms Traffic Department files 
provide valuable insights into the fundamental realism that underpinned British 
policy, particularly at Geneva. On the industrial side, the Vickers Archives at 
Cambridge University give a sense of the firm‟s character, drive and mounting 
frustration with the government. The Armstrong papers at Newcastle and the 
Beardmore records at Glasgow show how these companies struggled next to 
Vickers. The personal papers of Sir James Lithgow and Lord Weir, also at 
Glasgow, offer an interpretation of the PSOC‟s activities from these industrialists‟ 
point of view. The Bank of England Archive contains a great deal of useful 
material pertaining to the big arms firms, which sheds light on the balance of 
power between finance, industry and government. Few historians of the 
armaments industry have made use of the Baring Archive although its papers fill 
some of the gaps in the Bank of England records and offer a different perspective 
from within the City of London. In terms of published primary sources, the 
minutes of the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and Trading in 
Arms remain invaluable, while the League of Nations‟ publications provide a 
comprehensive, if often dry, account of the interminable proceedings at Geneva. 
The focus of this study is the relationship between the state and the arms 
industry, particularly the way in which successive governments failed to create a 
proactive strategy for dealing with the private manufacturers, and the industry‟s 
response to this perceived rejection. To maintain this focus, public opinion, 
whether real or imagined, is generally examined only when it affected the 
behaviour of the key actors in this relationship. Similarly, labour relations and 
unemployment are only discussed when they formed a part of state-industry 
dialogue. 
In examining the nature of the government‟s relationship with the arms 
industry between 1918 and 1936, this thesis divides the subject into three broad 
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headings. First, it addresses the dynamics of state-industry relations at the 
domestic level. Chapter 1 reviews the arms industry‟s origins and its relationship 
with the state before and during the Great War, and assesses the post-1918 impact 
of retrenchment and disarmament on this arrangement. This chapter also 
investigates the competition for national defence contracts between private firms 
and government factories. It concludes that post-war developments undoubtedly 
caused tensions in the state-industry relationship and fostered a sense of 
abandonment amongst the concerned firms, but they did not terminally weaken 
the arms industry. Chapter 2 examines the critical impact of industrial 
mobilisation theory and planning on the private manufacturers‟ place in national 
defence. Influenced by the experience of 1914-1918, the government‟s peacetime 
supply organisation, centred on the PSOC, aimed to locate adequate arms-
producing capacity for a vaguely-defined future conflict within the resources of 
general industry. As a result, policymakers placed relatively little importance on 
the specialist firms‟ ability to act as a nucleus for expansion until rearmament 
forced a rapid reconstitution of state-industry relations. Influenced by liberal non-
interventionist tradition, the government‟s under-funded and under-staffed 
investigations into the country‟s total industrial capacity were barely able to 
scratch the surface of national potential. Together with alarming intelligence 
about other countries‟ preparations, Britain‟s supply organisation ultimately 
generated an enduring and exaggerated sense of relative weakness and further 
alienated the specialist arms industry. Ironically, defence planning rather than 
disarmament proved the most fundamental source of inter-war tension between 
the manufacturers and the government. 
The second part of the thesis investigates the reality behind the image of 
the arms industry‟s inter-war decline and focuses on its largely independent 
reorganisation against the background of government indifference. Chapter 3 
examines the specialist firms‟ initially painful adjustment to peacetime conditions 
and explains that, while the total number of individual concerns certainly 
declined, the survivors were compelled to address their many internal structural 
weaknesses. In the mid-1920s Vickers independently reorganised its business 
operations, while the more heavily indebted companies required impetus from 
their bankers. Crucially, these experiences, including an initial failure to diversify 
into „civilian‟ product lines, forged a much greater industrial identity for the arms 
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manufacturers. Chapter 4 explores the relationship between Vickers, the leading 
armaments firm, and the Bank of England, which had a dual role as Armstrong‟s 
commercial banker and the central bank. This unusual financial-industrial 
relationship not only helped Vickers to dominate the British arms industry by the 
1930s but also created modernised plant for peacetime needs and a reasonably 
efficient nucleus for emergency expansion. In particular, Vickers took advantage 
of the Bank‟s cautious naïveté to push forward a much clearer and ruthless 
programme of reconstruction: this strategy ultimately resulted in a world-leading 
and fiercely independent private arms firm. Therefore, limitations in the state-
industry relationship should not be confused with fundamental weaknesses in the 
specialist industrial resources available to the government. 
 The final chapters examine official policy towards armament exports and 
investigate the international aspects of the state‟s relationship with the arms 
industry. Chapter 5 demonstrates that the government‟s implementation of various 
export controls had little success in achieving wider political and strategic goals. 
Moreover, these measures did not destroy Britain‟s share of the global arms 
market, which remained large despite fears about growing international 
competition. Although the government offered some diplomatic assistance, for the 
most part the firms were again forced to adjust independently to post-1918 trading 
conditions, which they achieved with reasonable success. Chapter 6 provides the 
first comprehensive account of Britain‟s inter-war participation in various 
multilateral efforts to secure international regulation of both the armaments trade 
and private arms manufacture. While the government certainly approved of 
limited regional agreements, particularly to prevent smuggling of surplus rifles 
throughout the British Empire, it strongly resisted the League of Nations‟ attempts 
to impose all-encompassing regulations on transactions between private firms and 
sovereign states. Although policymakers and officials rarely accepted 
contemporary public criticism that private arms manufacture and trading were 
immoral and dangerous, their policy at Geneva was primarily motivated by wider 
security considerations: in particular, they did not wish to compromise Britain‟s 
ability to buy from neutral states during wartime, or put off general industrial 
firms from undertaking weapons manufacture. In other words, British policy was 
heavily influenced by industrial mobilisation planning rather than the interests of 
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the specialist firms although, in the case of international business, they frequently 
appeared synonymous. 
 The ever-shifting and complex inter-war relationship between Whitehall 
and the private armament manufacturers was marked by varying combinations of 
antagonism, cooperation and misunderstanding, and was also subject to a range of 
external domestic and international pressures. The parties involved pursued 
differing ambitions, indulged in deliberate obfuscation, and at least one side felt 
frequent pangs of jealousy and betrayal. More dangerously, all of these elements 
simultaneously existed in the international relations of the period, and the rise of 
the revisionist powers led the private manufacturers to assume renewed 
importance in national security planning prior to the Second World War. 
However, to explain why state-industry relations had weakened between the 
armistice and rearmament, it is first necessary to survey the historical 
development of Britain‟s private armament industry, from its origins in the 
Crimean War to the immense changes wrought by the Great War.   
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When President Dwight Eisenhower famously used the term „military-industrial 
complex‟ in 1961, he suggested that it referred to a relatively new development in 
American history. However, the „conjunction of an immense military 
establishment and a large arms industry‟ was not without historical precedent.1 In 
Britain, the private armaments industry and the state could look back on a century 
of contacts and contracts. Indeed, Clive Trebilcock has suggested that the period 
from the 1860s until the late nineteenth century represented „the birth-pangs of the 
modern military-industrial complex‟.2 On the face of it, the manufacture of 
weapons by private enterprise served the interests of all concerned, providing 
innovative defence products for the government while generating profits for 
entrepreneurs and creating tens of thousands of jobs in some of the poorest areas 
of the country. Yet the relationship between arms producers and governments was 
not always close and state-industry relations came under extraordinary pressure 
during the inter-war period.  
The experience of the Great War raised questions about the role and 
efficiency of private armaments manufacture both in peacetime and war, while the 
Paris Peace Conference placed disarmament firmly on the international agenda, 
together with the idea that making arms for profit was morally objectionable and 
liable to abuse. Nonetheless, no British government seriously considered 
outlawing private manufacture and the service departments continued to purchase 
a significant percentage of their armaments from the „trade‟. Yet this was actually 
part of the main problem affecting state-industry relations after 1918: while the 
war had brought about considerable international and domestic changes, the 
government and the arms industry did little to adapt their relationship to meet 
these new challenges. As a result, individual private manufacturers faced an uphill 
battle which proved too much for several firms. The industry‟s parallel struggle to 
adjust to post-war conditions without official assistance has a significant bearing 
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on wider industrial and strategic issues, which are examined in subsequent 
chapters, but it is first necessary to explain how and why the arms manufacturers 
came to feel cast out by the state. 
The Origins of the Private Military-Naval Industries and the Impact of Total 
War 
 
The Crimean War (1854-6) provoked a revolution in armaments technology by 
inspiring William Armstrong, a Newcastle engineer, to develop a more powerful, 
accurate and manoeuvrable field gun. When this artillery was modified for use on 
warships it drove further technological advances, in an ongoing contest between 
the penetrative force of the projectile and ever-increasing thicknesses of armour 
plate.
3
 Following Armstrong‟s lead, other private firms, such as Beardmore 
(Glasgow) and Vickers (Sheffield), moved from the general engineering and steel 
sectors to manufacturing military-naval armaments for the government. The entry 
of large-scale private enterprise into armaments production not only fostered 
innovation but also marked a major shift in the way the state obtained its arms and 
ammunition. The Admiralty, recognising that the state-owned Royal Dockyards 
could not keep up with rapid technological change or maintain adequate facilities 
for emergency production, attached great importance to strengthening and 
protecting the private warship industry, which was able to supplement its income 
through overseas sales.
4
 Indeed, before 1914 Britain possessed the world‟s leading 
warship designers and its firms dominated the global naval arms trade.
5
 The 
military-industrial relationship for land armament production, which experienced 
comparatively less rapid technological change, was not as balanced and the War 
Office favoured the Royal Ordnance Factories (ROFs) at Woolwich, Waltham 
Abbey and Enfield, leaving only „crumbs‟ for the private manufacturers.6 For 
example, between 1910 and 1914 Vickers alone received annual Admiralty orders 
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In the two decades before the Great War, armaments manufacture became 
big business. During the 1890s no global competitor matched or bettered 
Armstrong, except for Krupp in Germany.
8
 By 1905 Vickers‟ rapid growth had 
left it with a capital value of £7.4 million which made it the sixth largest British 
company, while Armstrong ranked eleventh with £5.3 million.
9
 Armstrong, with 
25,000 workers, was the twelfth largest employer in the country, while Vickers 
was fourteenth with 22,500 employees.
10
 However, this was not a golden age of 
unbroken prosperity for the arms firms, since the market was volatile and subject 
to frequent slumps.
11
 Although the relationship between the state and the private 
arms manufacturers appeared mutually beneficial, the government held most of 
the cards. It decided what to spend – and with whom – based upon its own 
conception of defence requirements. As a result, there was less scope for 
corruption than critics later assumed.
12
   
Individual firms cooperated to protect themselves against the 
government‟s power and began to form large-scale combinations at the turn of the 
century.
13
 Vickers‟ amalgamation with the Naval Construction and Armament 
Company at Barrow-in-Furness in 1897 made it the first British company that 
could supply a warship complete with engines, guns and machinery.
14
 That same 
year, Armstrong merged with its old rival, Joseph Whitworth of Openshaw 
(Manchester) which provided the firm with facilities for armour plate 
production.
15
 John Brown forged a closer association with a fellow Sheffield firm, 
the gun-makers Thomas Firth, and in 1899 took over the Clydebank Engineering 
and Shipbuilding Company.
16
 Charles Cammell (Sheffield), who had 
manufactured armour plate since the 1860s, merged with Laird shipbuilders in 
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1903-4, and in October 1905 bought half of the ordinary share capital of Fairfield 
shipbuilders and engineers (Glasgow).
17
 To obtain capacity for ordnance 
production, Cammell Laird and Fairfield, in association with John Brown, took 
over the Coventry Ordnance Works in 1905.
18
  Beardmore, inspired by increasing 
armour plate sales and the example of others, undertook massive extensions to its 
Parkhead works in 1898-1900.
19
 The Glaswegian firm also took over Robert 
Napier‟s shipbuilding and marine engineering business at Govan, bought land at 
Dalmuir to lay out a shipyard, and acquired a stake in Thornycroft, which built 
destroyers at Chiswick and subsequently Woolston, Southampton.
20
 In this 
manner, the geography of British arms production became increasingly 
concentrated in the north and was predominantly naval. 
Although these big combinations were responsible for some of the most 
advanced naval technology in the world, they could not immediately produce 
large quantities of arms and ammunition for land warfare. The escalating costs 
and production shortfalls experienced during the Boer War (1899-1902) gave a 
foretaste of the problems this could cause over an extended period of fighting, yet 
the government subsequently failed to organise the arms industry to ensure large-
scale production in future emergencies or conflicts.
21
 This meant that the country 
was, in the words of David Lloyd George, the first Minister of Munitions, „totally 
unprepared for land hostilities on a Continental scale‟ in 1914.22 In fairness, all 
combatants suffered from the simple circumstance that static trench warfare 
encouraged an enormous rate of artillery fire which greatly exceeded the existing 
rate of shell production.
23
 In the early stages of the war, the ROFs could not 
expand to meet demand and the state turned to the private manufacturers. This 
faith in the arms industry was irrational because although the firms were highly 
skilled and specialised engineers of heavy armament, they had no great superiority 
or experience of manufacturing small items in quantity and shell production 
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continued to fall short.
24
 The resultant scandal contributed to the fall of Herbert 
Asquith‟s Liberal government in May 1915, and the subsequent coalition quickly 
established the Ministry of Munitions to address the fundamental problem that not 
enough factories were producing shells.
25
 The Ministry centralised the control of 
production and supply; coordinated the resources of firms with no previous 
experience of armament work; and encouraged the direct involvement of 
businessmen in organising the national war effort.
26
 This departure from liberal 
tradition also reflected a growing sense that the previously dominant ideology of 
„business as usual‟ was unsuited to the demands of total war, which required the 
state to assume greater command over the economy.
27
 
Besides improving efficiency, the imposition of government control over 
industry was also intended to manage wartime prices and prevent profiteering.
28
 
This involved some compromise in the overall direction of supply planning, as in 
March 1915 when the government agreed not to interfere with the actual direction 
or management of individual arms firms in exchange for their cooperation.
29
 Yet 
although state control was mainly indirect, businessmen, including arms 
manufacturers, became involved in the work of the Ministry to an unprecedented 
extent.
30
 Crucially, supply was no longer conceived purely in terms of specialist 
manufacture, but more on the ability to mobilise ordinary industry for the mass 
production of war material.
31
 Indeed, one of the Ministry‟s first tasks was a survey 
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For their part, the specialist arms firms farmed out their skilled men and 
designs to help educate „civilian‟ companies in munitions production. John Meade 
Falkner, the novelist, poet and chairman of Armstrong, told his shareholders in 
1916 that „in doing this we have, of course, created a crowd of potential 
competitors‟, but he trusted that „such things should not be left out of account 
when the final balance has to be struck.‟33 Falkner repeated these words in 
September 1918 and expressed his hope that the state would recognise the firm‟s 
„special service‟ once the war was over.34 Amongst other items, Armstrong‟s 
wartime output included 47 warships, 1,062 aeroplanes, 13,000 guns and 
carriages, and 14.5 million shells. It also fitted 62 warships with armaments and 
repaired and refitted a further 521 warships.
35
 Yet, on 22 November 1918 the 
McKinnon Wood committee, investigating the Woolwich Arsenal for the Ministry 
of Munitions, advised that „the arguments in favour of the retention of a 
Government arsenal in peace time are overwhelming‟ and proposed that private 
manufacture „will not improbably disappear as a speciality.‟36 Although the report 
did not advocate the closure of private arms-producing concerns, these comments 




Defence Spending After ‘the War to End All War’ 
 
The Great War caused enormous physical, social and economic damage and re-
drew the political map of Europe. Unsurprisingly, the British government wished 
to restore a semblance of normality after the armistice and quickly retreated from 
its wartime economic interventionism. Similarly, the private arms industry 
appeared to revert to its pre-1914 concentration on naval production and close 
Admiralty links. However, both the government and the specialist manufacturers 
were profoundly changed by their wartime experience. On a structural level the 
armaments firms were much larger than before, having dramatically increased 
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their plant, buildings and machinery at the government‟s behest.38 Yet the 
government no longer required the vast quantities of arms and ammunition 
demanded by total war and it also needed to provide work for the state factories.  
In dealing with the service departments, several of the firms‟ directors 
were retired servicemen who maintained cordial relationships with their ex-
employers. Nonetheless, neither the War Office nor Admiralty allowed their full-
time staff to take up employment with private armament manufacturers.
39
 
Moreover, the industry tended to recruit individuals who had expert technical 
knowledge of specific product lines, rather than officials who had worked in the 
contracts departments.
40
 While this policy was undoubtedly useful in designing 
weapons to meet the services‟ specific needs, these close service-industry ties 
offered little chance of influencing armaments expenditure. In any case, defence 
spending was not dictated by the services, but instead resulted from a thorough 
process of investigation and review which involved all the concerned government 
departments. Each year the Chiefs of Staff reviewed the position of imperial 
defence, based on a broad range of sources. The Committee of Imperial Defence 
then commented on their report before submitting it to the Cabinet for its 
consideration. This first stage was undertaken in complete secrecy, although it 
involved a large number of ministers and officials. Subsequently, the service 
departments submitted their financial estimates to the Treasury, which also kept 
itself completely informed on all aspects of defence policy through the Cabinet, 
CID and representation on various subcommittees. This stage was also kept 
secret.
41
 Therefore, even before the service estimates reached the final stage of 
parliamentary debate, this system provided a series of checks and balances against 
malpractices and corruption and essentially differed little from pre-war practice.
42
 
The Treasury, as the guardian of the government‟s finances, was 
committed to balancing the budget and careful control of public spending. 
However, it had lost command over the armed forces‟ expenditure during the 
Great War and had no way of ensuring that departments did not inflate prices by 
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competing for the same resources or offering over-generous contracts.
43
 After the 
war, it sought to re-assert its control and to scale down the armed forces, although 
it was not opposed to the purchase of modern weapons if they reduced overall 
spending. A reduction in defence expenditure also appeared to complement the 
Cabinet‟s decision of August 1919 that „the British Empire will not be engaged in 
any great war during the next ten years‟.44 
Several historians have suggested that the position of Britain‟s armed 
forces and, by extension, its strategic options up until the early 1930s were 
dominated and weakened by the parsimonious Treasury and „the ten-year rule‟, 
although opinion is divided as to whether this was an understandable development 
under the circumstances or an unforgivable dereliction of duty.
45
 However, John 
Ferris has demonstrated that the ten-year rule was ambiguous and open to 
interpretation and did not result in the ostrich mentality amongst British strategists 
that has traditionally been portrayed. He has also emphasised that the Treasury 
only possessed limited control over defence spending in the first half of the 1920s, 
and did not obtain full control until 1928. According to Ferris, „throughout the 
1920s Britain spent absolutely at least as much money on its armed forces as did 
any other state on earth.‟46 Indeed, inter-war spending on the armed forces, while 
naturally much lower than during wartime, was higher than it had been in the 
1890s and was roughly similar in terms of constant prices to the figures for the 
years just before 1914.
47
 
By itself the total level of defence spending does not indicate how much 
was actually spent on armaments, let alone how much ended up going to the 
private firms. In fact, most of the money was spent on items such as wages, 
clothing, victualling, medical services and accommodation. Moreover, the 
emergence of air power meant that some money was diverted away from the 
military-naval industries, although several of the traditional firms had developed 
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their own aircraft sections, or could manufacture the armament for aeroplanes.
48
 
Although the air force generally received much less funding than the other two 
services during the 1920s, it devoted a much higher percentage towards 
technological procurement: for example, in 1930 its total expenditure was £17.8 
million, of which £7.9 million (44 percent) was spent on new equipment.
49
 
Table 1 shows naval expenditure between 1923/4 and 1932/3, next to the 
amount spent on shipbuilding and repairs (column B) and how much of this went 
towards new construction (column C). New construction averaged around 12 
percent of total spending and was then further divided between the state 
dockyards and private yards: the latter manufactured 250,273 tons of new warship 
construction between 1925 and 1934 compared to 129,886 tons built in the Royal 
Dockyards.
50
 A number of private shipyards could build hulls for naval vessels, 
although few were able to construct the specialist armament or equipment 
required to complete a warship. Moreover, although British shipbuilding capacity 
had increased massively during the war, only a handful of yards (Cammell Laird, 
John Brown, Swan Hunter, Vickers and Harland and Wolff) possessed the 
facilities to build hulls for the largest battleships and aircraft carriers.
51
 
Nonetheless, when regular post-war naval building commenced in 1924, it 
became clear that the available work would not occupy all of the existing yards. 
Therefore, in 1925 the private naval firms agreed to distribute shipbuilding 
contracts at prices which would allow a reasonable return and enable them retain 
as many technical staff and as much plant as possible. Even so, Beardmore and 
Palmer (Jarrow) proved unable to continue in this field and closed their yards.
52
  
Table 2 shows the amount spent annually on new naval armaments (as 
distinct from naval shipbuilding) and the percentages allocated to government 
factories and the trade. This indicates that the small number of private naval 
ordnance manufacturers, with occasional exceptions, could count on around one 
million pounds of orders per year. As for land armaments, the Army annually 
received about £10-15 million less than the Navy between 1923/4 and 1932/3. It 
spent between £1.5-2.6 million per year on armaments, and usually spent about a 
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third of this with private manufacturers.
53
 In sum, the private manufacturers could 
usually expect to obtain from a third to a half of post-war expenditure for new 
naval and land armaments, a roughly similar percentage as it had received in the 
period 1905-1912.
54
   
Ultimately, defence spending proved unable to sustain the post-war private 
armaments industry in its initial form. As a result of wartime expansion and 
subsequent reduced demand, each firm possessed excessively large productive 
facilities which peacetime government orders could not fill. Vickers and 
Armstrong, the two biggest manufacturers, complained in 1927 that they were 
operating at less than 40 percent of capacity.
55
 The following year  Lord 
Invernairn, Beardmore‟s chairman, told shareholders that the company had taken 
on wartime plant extensions at prices far above market value, and possessed 
heavy armament capacity „far in excess of the possibilities of the market to absorb 
to-day.‟56 Moreover, the types of armaments ordered were not always the right 
kind to keep specialist plant, such as for armour plate, in full working order. By 
itself, government spending did little to protect individual firms from the slump 
conditions which affected the heavy industries after a short post-war boom. 
Vickers had to cut back its expert staff and pared down its research and 
development department while birds nested in the shipyard cranes at Barrow 
during the spring of 1922.
57
 Cammell Laird‟s Coventry Ordnance Works closed 
down in 1925, while at the company‟s other factories, according to Kenneth 
Warren, „[t]he hopefulness of the early post-war period then passed over into 
contraction, to stagnation and eventually to blank despair.‟58 The arms industry 
eventually and painfully adjusted to the changed market conditions and the 
number of firms fell away through amalgamation or liquidation.
59
 In the 
meantime, according to Vickers‟ historian, the company faced „an anxious, 
uneasy, constant struggle.‟60 This was true for all arms manufacturers and a prime 
cause of uncertainty came from developments in post-war international affairs, 
particularly the quest to achieve global disarmament. 
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Table 1: Expenditure on Warship Construction 1923/4-1932/3 (£millions) 
 
 A: Naval 
Expenditure (In 
Current Terms) 
B: Expenditure on New 
Shipbuilding Construction, 
Re-equipment and Repairs 



































































Factories Spent with Trade 
1920-21 6,049,000 1,833,000 (30%) 4,216,000 (70%) 
1921-22 4,009,000 1,723,000 (43%) 2,286,000 (57%) 
1922-23 2,406,000 1,281,000 (53%) 1,125,000 (47%) 
1923-24 2,680,000 1,321,000 (49%) 1,359,000 (51%) 
1924-25 2,668,000 1,432,000 (54%) 1,236,000 (46%) 
1925-26 2,649,000 1,483,000 (56%) 1,166,000 (44%) 
1926 2,235,000 1,124,000 (50%) 1,111,000 (50%) 
1927 3,070,000 1,366,000 (44%) 1,704,000 (56%) 
1928 2,911,000 1,689,000 (58%) 1,222,000 (42%) 
1929 2,606,000 1,568,000 (60%) 1,038,000 (40%) 
1930 2,336,000 1,502,000 (64%) 834,000 (36%) 
1931 2,160,000 1,283,000 (59%) 877,000 (41%) 
1932 2,039,000 1,176,000 (58%) 863,000 (42%) 
1933 2,520,000 1,333,000 (53%) 1,187,000 (47%) 
1934 2,773,000 1,481,000 (53%) 1,292,000 (47%) 
1935 
(forecast) 
4,126,000 2,140,000 (52%) 1,986,000 (48%) 
1936 
(estimate) 
7,511,000 2,700,000 (36%) 4,811,000 (64%) 
 












Source: Roskill, Naval Policy I, pp.580-2. 
 
The Disarmament Dilemma and the Naval Industries 
 
Disarmament – meaning the reduction and limitation of armaments by 
international agreement – was a major ambition of the newly-created League of 
Nations and became a popular theme in inter-war international relations. Many 
people blamed the pre-1914 arms race for the outbreak of the war and public 
opinion forced statesmen to pay lip service to the idea that arms control would 
prevent future conflicts. At the same time, many governments accepted that 
qualified disarmament might result in political and economic benefits. Therefore, 
a series of largely abortive multilateral efforts to limit or reduce „national 
armaments‟ took place during this period.61 Mirroring the opinions of 
contemporary critics, such as Philip Noel-Baker and Lord Robert Cecil, who 
served in both of Stanley Baldwin‟s Cabinets in the 1920s and was the President 
of the League of Nations Union, some historians have questioned the extent to 
which inter-war British governments were committed to, or even understood, the 
concept of disarmament.
62
 Certainly the results did not match the time and energy 
invested in the question. After seven years of painstaking preparation, the 
Disarmament Conference met in 1932 to negotiate the terms of a general 
convention, to bind all states and cover every type of land, sea and air weapon. 
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This ambition came to an end with the German delegation‟s withdrawal in 
October 1933.
63
 Yet, despite the absence of agreement, the disarmament process 
had a number of harmful effects on the British armaments industry, especially in 
the naval sphere. It also made official policy appear ambiguous or even 
duplicitous, as successive governments wrestled with the dilemma of trying to 
appear committed to disarmament while simultaneously retaining adequate arms-
producing capacity to safeguard the empire‟s vital sea communications.64 This not 
only impacted on Britain‟s international reputation, but also eroded the state‟s 
relationship with the armaments industry, by causing firms to feel increasingly 
undervalued at a time when many of them were struggling to stay afloat. 
In late 1921 Sir Eustace Tennyson d‟Eyncourt, the Director of Naval 
Construction and former Armstrong ship designer, and Lord Beatty, the First Sea 
Lord, warned that a complete cessation of capital ship-building would result in a 
serious deficiency in skilled labourers, while a lengthy construction „holiday‟ 
would „kill all thought and development in capital ship design‟. Instead they 
unsuccessfully recommended a policy of gradual construction, which would also 
obviate the need to pay a large subsidy to keep private industry in an adequate 
state of readiness. Beatty also suggested that gradual construction programmes 
would act as a natural „cap‟ on the number of arms firms, and would also prevent 
the recrudescence of expensive and potentially dangerous naval competition after 
the holiday period had expired.
65
  Moreover, the Admiralty had drawn up an 
ambitious post-war naval programme including the production of capital ships 
armed with enormous 16-inch guns.
66
 Armstrong, Cammell Laird, John Brown 
and Vickers were led to expect substantial naval work for their extensive iron, 
steel, engineering and shipbuilding works, and Armstrong even invested in new 
armour-producing plant, despite national overcapacity.
67
 This programme augured 
well for the post-war naval-industrial relationship because capital ships, as the 
largest warships afloat, required huge quantities of armour, the biggest guns and 
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turrets, and the most powerful engines. These items required highly specialised 
plant and skilled labour, which were mainly found in the private sector, while the 
process of designing and producing a new ship involved several years of close 
cooperation between the Admiralty and the manufacturer. 
However, on 6 February 1922 Britain, France, Italy, Japan and the United 
States signed the non-League Washington naval treaty, one of the few successful 
instances of disarmament in modern times. The treaty was linked to political 
agreements in the Pacific and Far East, and reflected the mutual Anglo-American 
desire to avoid a costly armaments race. It was also based upon a level of mutual 
agreement and sympathy of objectives which was absent from the other inter-war 
disarmament negotiations. By the terms laid down at Washington, Britain, the 
United States, Japan, France and Italy agreed to limit their capital ships in the 
ratio 5:5:3:1.75:1.75, and restrict the size of each vessel to 35,000 tons. Moreover, 
the terms of the treaty imposed a ten-year holiday on new construction.
68
 The 
existing Admiralty procurement programme was subsequently shelved, and the 
government cancelled four capital ship contracts.
69
 It also abrogated its pre-treaty 
armour plate contracts and, although it subsequently reimbursed Armstrong 
£121,000, it could not compensate for the lack of work. Over the next fifteen 
years, British yards only built three capital ships: one battle-cruiser (HMS Hood) 
and two „treaty‟ battleships (HMS Nelson and HMS Rodney).70 
The dangers Tennyson and Beattie had warned of were arguably realised, 
but, in some ways, the limitation of capital ships made sound strategic and 
economic sense. The enormous unit cost and building time of these colossal 
structures resulted in an understandable caution about risking them in combat, as 
the war at sea had demonstrated.
71
 In any case, the Board of Trade, after 
consulting Vickers, Armstrong and Cammell Laird, suggested that the temptation 
of a „period of active building‟ after a long moratorium would likely compel the 
arms industry to maintain sufficient plant and even undertake some experimental 
work, if provided with a „comparatively small subsidy‟ during the holiday period. 
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Nonetheless, the Board admitted that the cessation of construction would have a 
„considerable‟ impact on the arms firms.72 
The Washington treaty placed no limits on the naval powers‟ ability to 
build smaller vessels, beyond restricting the size of cruisers to 10,000 tons and the 
calibre of their guns to eight inches. Cruisers, the next stage down from capital 
ships (a light cruiser was approximately one-quarter the displacement of a capital 
ship, a heavy cruiser roughly one-third), were arguably more valuable in 
protecting the British Isles‟ insular strategic position and imperial 
communications. These vessels could be used either as support for the main battle 
fleet or, crucially, to impose or break blockades.
73
 As Brian McKercher has noted, 
this latter quality „meant trade protection in wartime and that to a nation which 
had nearly starved to death only ten years earlier was a very real issue.‟74 
Unsurprisingly, the leading naval powers found it difficult to reach agreement on 
limiting cruiser strength. At the Geneva Naval Conference in 1927 the United 
States, Britain and Japan failed to extend the principle of the Washington treaty to 
other classes of vessel, when Britain resisted American calls to compromise on its 
„absolute‟ needs for patrolling 80,000 miles of trade routes and communications.75 
The failure to conclude an agreement, combined with revelations over secretive 




By the end of the 1920s, the disarmament process had only caused the 
cancellation of a small number of, admittedly lucrative, capital ship contracts. The 
Admiralty continued to order comparatively smaller vessels, the bulk of which 
were constructed in the latter half of the decade (Table 3). The two battleships 
cost an estimated £14 million, while individual cruisers cost between £1-1.5 
million, destroyers just over £0.5 million and submarines approximately £0.25 
million each.
77
 Along with cruisers, the submarine and destroyer were key 
weapons in trade warfare. The submarine‟s ability to wreak havoc on merchant 
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shipping prompted Britain and the United States to call for its abolition, but the 
smaller naval powers viewed the submarine as an equalising weapon which 
enabled them to defend themselves against countries with larger surface fleets. To 
meet the submarine threat, navies invested in destroyers, which were used to 
escort convoys of merchant ships as well as provide protection for the main battle 
fleet.
78
 Though the unit costs were smaller than for capital ships, the demand for 
such „auxiliary‟ vessels was greater – and this kind of work was ideally suited for 
Vickers‟ shipyard at Barrow.79 Whereas the majority of destroyers were more 
economically constructed in private yards, the Royal Dockyards were better suited 
to cruiser construction, and the Admiralty divided this work more evenly.
80
 
Between 1925 and 1934 the Royal Dockyards built 98,200 tons of cruisers 
compared to 86,220 in private yards. The respective figures for destroyers were 
2,750 and 51,700 tons.
81
 Moreover, sales of submarine mines, depth charges and 
paravanes formed a small but „exceedingly profitable‟ part of Vickers‟ overseas 
sales in the 1920s.
82
 
The capital ship holiday forced the government to make certain 
arrangements with the private arms industry to help maintain specialist naval-
orientated plant in peacetime. Armour plate was used extensively to protect large 
warships and required dedicated steel works incorporating enormous rolling mills 
alongside massive bending and forging presses. At the end of the war, the five 
armour firms (Armstrong, Beardmore, John Brown, Cammell Laird and Vickers) 
could manufacture 60,000 tons annually, which was greatly in excess of 
peacetime needs.
83
 Indeed, following the Washington treaty, the maximum annual 
armour requirement stood at 3,000 tons, and in 1926 Douglas Vickers stated that 
government orders could not keep one armour workshop more than half-
employed, let alone sustain five plants.
84
 However, after the expiration of the 
construction holiday, the Admiralty anticipated it would require between 18-
23,000 tons annually. If the country‟s existing plant and personnel disappeared 
during this time, the government would face a hefty bill and a long wait before 
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this capacity could be rebuilt from scratch and it would also lose a decade in 
potential innovation.  
The armourers and the Admiralty realised some kind of assistance was 
required, but nothing was resolved until the mid-1920s, when Colville, a Scottish 
steel firm, threatened to undercut the five existing armour producers. The 
traditional firms, which claimed to be spending £424,075 a year on maintaining 
idle armour plant, were outraged, and to prevent further controversy the 
Admiralty reached an exclusive suppliers‟ arrangement with them.85 
Subsequently, prices for armour plate included an „element of contribution‟ which 
varied depending on how many orders were placed in a given year.
86
 This 
assistance was not concealed from the public, although at first the wording 
attempted to obscure the fact that the government was subsidising the armour 
producers. William Bridgeman, the First Lord of the Admiralty, told Parliament 
on 17 November 1926 that: 
 
The inducement offered to the manufacturers of 
armour plate to maintain their existing plants and 
technical staffs is that each manufacturer has been 
given a share of the orders for armour plate at prices 
which take into account the higher cost necessarily 




Vickers, Armstrong and Cammell Laird, which together produced less than 2,500 
tons of armour plate in 1927, combined their armour producing plant in 1928 to 
form the English Steel Corporation (ESC).
88
 Between 1927 and 1932, the armour 
industry received a total of £366,328 in declared financial assistance from the 
government.
89
 Some embarrassment ensued in 1929 when, in the absence of any 
armour orders, the government could no longer disguise the subsidy paid to the 
firms.
90
 However, neither this support nor cartelisation proved enough to halt the 
reduction in capacity. Indeed, the formation of the ESC meant that plant was 
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closed down in order to centralise production at the River Don works at 
Sheffield.
91
 In 1932 the Admiralty renewed the armour pool agreement in the 
hope that the remaining firms would share their technical knowledge.
92
 Certainly, 
British manufacturers remained world-leaders in qualitative development: for 
example, in 1938 Sir Reginald Henderson, the Controller of the Navy, suggested 
that no country exceeded the quality of British-made hard cemented armour plate. 
Therefore, he refused to buy foreign-made cemented armour, although the 
Admiralty subsequently purchased 10 percent by weight of Britain‟s non-
cemented armour needs for 1938-39 from Czechoslovakia. Although British 
quality remained high, the private firms were unable to meet unusually large 
demand with their existing plant. With the onset of rearmament, the Admiralty 
ordered 34,361 tons of armour in 1936, compared to 8,550 the previous year. Yet 
the amount delivered in 1936 was only 7,500 tons, and the figure only rose to 
12,500 tons in 1937. However, the Admiralty refused to blame the firms for this 
shortfall and suggested that it had conceptualised its future requirements on the 
basis of thick armour, whereas rearmament involved the production of thinner 
plates. In this regard, the same quantity of plant and labour could provide 4,000 
tons of thin plates annually compared to 9,000 thick plates. Therefore, it appeared 
that the most important unit for measurement was the number of plates delivered, 
rather than the total weight.
93
  
As with armour plate, the highly specialised manufacture of heavy naval 
gun-mountings required the Admiralty to take measures to preserve capacity. 
Each mounting was an enormous and technically advanced piece of machinery, 
and constituted one of the most expensive individual parts of a warship. Vickers 
correctly anticipated a decline in such work after the war, and had initially 
experimented with general engineering at its Barrow works. This not only proved 
financially disastrous but also reduced the quality of skilled labour. Therefore, 
when orders picked up in the mid-1920s, it proved difficult to get the men back to 
the exceptionally high standard of workmanship required on ordnance work.
94
 To 
retard further decline, the Admiralty allowed Vickers and Armstrong to 
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monopolise gun-mounting production, a policy also intended to prevent these 
firms demanding a subsidy if orders were subsequently reduced. However, this 
meant that Beardmore was shut out.
95
 The Coventry Ordnance Works was also 
told not to expect any gun-mounting work or a subsidy to preserve its capacity.
96
 
By the end of the 1920s, it no longer existed as an armaments concern while 
Beardmore faced bankruptcy. 
To assist Vickers and Armstrong in covering their heavy outlays on gun-
mounting contracts, in 1926 the Admiralty adopted the simple expedient of 
issuing blank contracts, thereby circumventing a 1905 parliamentary rule, which 
stated that advance payments were not to be made until contracts were signed.
97
 
Gun-mountings represented a large proportion of total expenditure on naval 
armaments in private yards: for example, in 1926 the Admiralty settled the price 
with Armstrong for eight-inch mountings for three cruisers at £460,000 per ship.
98
 
According to Sir Charles Craven, an ex-submarine officer and the general 
manager of Vickers-Armstrongs‟ works and shipyards, such business remained 
the firm‟s „most profitable industry‟ in 1932.99 Faced with stiff home competition 
and limited orders for warship construction, the ability to undertake naval 
ordnance manufacture was an advantage which enabled Vickers to reduce its 
establishment charges and make competitive tenders for occasional non-naval 
shipbuilding work. It was, however, a disadvantage in obtaining hull and 
machinery orders, which were usually spread amongst firms which did not 
possess an ordnance capacity.
100
 
 The Admiralty clearly wished to help its main suppliers and continued to 
place a large amount of trust in the private armaments industry or, at least, certain 
key firms. To some extent, this demonstrated the endurance, or even a 
strengthening, of the naval-industrial complex in the inter-war years. The „special 
relationship‟ whereby the government provided guarantees or assurances in order 
to preserve a small group of high-quality specialist producers was not a new 
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development, and had roots in the late nineteenth-century.
101
 Yet the Admiralty‟s 
willingness to provide support in the 1920s did not represent a long-term solution 
to the arms industry‟s underlying problems which were caused by its over-
capacity for peacetime production. 
The Labour Party was returned to power in 1929 and its manifesto pledged 
a further reduction of armaments and cuts in defence spending.
102
 The new 
government particularly sought to mend Anglo-American relations and prevent a 
naval race. In July, as a gesture of goodwill, James Ramsay MacDonald, the 
Prime Minister, announced the suspension of work on two cruisers, and the 
cancellation of two submarines and a submarine depôt ship, stating that „the Navy 
as it is left after this announcement is perfectly capable of doing its duty.‟103 Most 
of the cutbacks affected the Royal Dockyards, rather than private shipbuilders, but 
this was not the end of MacDonald‟s naval activities. Through highly personal 
diplomacy, the Prime Minister sought and achieved a rapprochement with Herbert 
Hoover, the US President.
104
 The result of their discussions, the London Naval 
Conference of 1930, has been described by Christopher Hall as „the high water-
mark of inter-war naval limitation‟.105 It produced an agreement between Britain, 
Japan and the United States which extended the capital ship construction holiday 
for a further five years and also imposed a limit on cruisers, with Britain reducing 
its stated absolute requirement from seventy to fifty.
106
 The continuation of the 
capital ship holiday was disappointing for the country‟s shipyards and workshops 
but the cruiser agreement was hardly fatal: Britain built twelve cruisers between 
1930 and 1933, which compared favourably with the fourteen cruisers built during 
the whole of the 1920s.
107
 
Sir Charles Craven was not unduly pessimistic. The announcement of the 
1930 naval programme enabled him to estimate how many orders Vickers-
Armstrongs would obtain and he observed this programme was below the 
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minimum required to replace wastage in the fleet in order to preserve the standard 
accepted at the London Naval Conference. Indeed, Craven wrote of the 
possibility, in the event of a change of government, of an increase in naval work. 
Nonetheless, Vickers-Armstrongs‟ northern works required an annual turnover of 
£7.5 million, of which less than half could be expected from government work. 
Factoring in £500,000 of foreign armament work, Craven anticipated a depressing 
quest for £3.6 million of scarce merchant ship orders.
108
 General Sir James Noel 
Birch, Vickers-Armstrongs‟ head of land sales, was more disturbed: „Ramsay will 
ruin the country. We shall not have a single man left who knows how to make a 
gun if this sort of thing goes on.‟109 
In the midst of financial crisis, the Labour government resigned in August 
1931 and was replaced by a National coalition. Naval expenditure reached the 
inter-war low figure of £50.1 million in 1932-3 before steadily rising as 
rearmament got underway.
110
 By March 1935, 60 ships were under construction 
or on order, with 48 of these going to private yards.
111
 A further naval conference 
met in London between December 1935 and March 1936, resulting in a treaty 
which further improved Anglo-American relations. However, with Japan 
abrogating the Washington treaty in December 1934, and the Anglo-German 
Naval Agreement of June 1935 legitimising Germany‟s naval rearmament, this 
did not prevent a naval building race between the increasingly suspicious 
powers.
112
 In April 1936 Vickers-Armstrongs‟ shipyards and ordnance works 
were bustling and the firm was also manufacturing a large proportion of the 
armament for the warships under construction in the Royal Dockyards.
113
 
While naval disarmament produced significant, albeit limited and short-
lived, results, an international agreement covering land weapons proved more 
elusive. French insecurity about Germany‟s potential for future aggression and 
British unwillingness to provide a guarantee to France helped to create 
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 Moreover, while the successful naval negotiations dwelt on a few 
types of warship, land armaments were always treated as part of the wider quest 
for general disarmament. This vast endeavour failed in part because of the 
complex technical issues of establishing equivalents between different types of 
arms, in part because of hostility and suspicion among the participating powers.
115
 
Yet although the Disarmament Conference failed to reach an agreement, it 
nonetheless had a negative impact on the arms industry‟s already limited land 
business owing to what Lieutenant-General Sir Webb Gillman, the Master 
General of the Ordnance (MGO), called „the atmosphere of disarmament which is 
supposed to exist‟.116 In March 1931, Lieutenant-General Sir J.R.E. Charles, 
Gillman‟s successor, wrote to Birch:  
 
1932 is going to be a critical year. There is a big 
drive on the part of men like Lord Cecil, who are 
going to leave no stone unturned to bring about at 
least a reduction of armaments and expenditure 
thereon at Geneva next year. I cannot, of course, 
give away such official secrets as I know, but 
considerable energies are being directed towards 
achieving this very laudable end. In these 
circumstances you will realise how impossible it is 
for the Army Council to put forward any scheme 
involving large expenditure on armaments on the 
very eve of the Geneva Conference, whose sole and 




The conference also affected overseas business and one of Vickers‟ travelling 
representatives wrote that, while proceedings continued, military authorities 
seemed reluctant to place any orders.
118
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 The pursuit of disarmament did not decisively cripple the British arms 
industry but it did strain individual firms and state-industry relations. For a start, it 
reduced the amount of work available to British firms. It also increased the need 
for the government to subsidise certain key firms while simultaneously increasing 
the government‟s reluctance to be seen to support them. After all, Britain was a 
leading member of the League of Nations, whose covenant suggested that the 
private manufacture of arms was „open to grave objections‟ and „evil effects‟.119  
Even though the League‟s disarmament efforts were largely unsuccessful, they 
strengthened opposition to arms expenditure and the arms industry, placing the 
latter on the defensive. These issues also created a further problem for the 
government in balancing its relations with private enterprise and the state-owned 
factories and dockyards. 
A Civil Service Conspiracy? State Manufacture and Unemployment 
 
Some of the most revealing evidence as to the post-war tensions affecting 
military-industrial relations in the late 1920s and early 1930s appears in the 
official and private correspondence between General Sir James Noel Birch, a 
Vickers director, and senior figures at the War Office, including Field-Marshal 
George Milne, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff; Sir Herbert Creedy, the 
Permanent Undersecretary of State at the War Office; General Sir Webb Gillman, 
the Master General of the Ordnance; and Lieutenant-General Sydney Peck, the 
Director of Mechanisation.
120
 Birch himself had been MGO from 1923 until his 
retirement in 1927, after which he took up a directorship at Vickers and became 
head of land sales under the Vickers-Armstrongs arrangement. He wrote in 
January 1928 that Vickers‟ contracts from the War Office since 1918 were 
„trifling‟.121 Matters scarcely improved afterwards: orders placed with Vickers-
Armstrongs totalled £411,094 in 1928, £228,410 in 1929, and a mere £115,705 in 
1930.
122
 To some extent, these problems were self-inflicted. Shortly after arriving 
at Vickers, Birch noted that „We are not on the good terms we ought to be with 
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the War Office and as we are the sellers, it is up to us to put it right.‟123 Peck 
revealed in June 1928 that the War Office had lost faith in the firm‟s Sheffield 
works‟ pricing, while the Director of Artillery expressed bitterness against the 
company in February 1929 because it had evaded a question about delays which 
had cost the War Office money.
124
 Birch was eager to correct these problems, but 
also felt that the War Office should improve its own methods. 
Although Birch suspected his old service colleagues now considered him 
„a prejudiced bloated manufacturer, out to squeeze my Country in every way I 
can‟, he was undoubtedly patriotic, fervently pro-mechanisation and genuinely 
perplexed by what he viewed as the War Office‟s retrograde attitude towards tank 
production.
125
 For their part, Birch‟s friends at the War Office were often helpful 
although not always hopeful.
126
 Surprisingly, Birch did not consider that the 
League‟s disarmament efforts were particularly dangerous, stating in 1932: 
 
I cannot think the Dis-Armament Conference [sic] 
will come to much. The Empire‟s serious danger is 
not, I believe, from these conferences, but from the 
growing strength of the Civil Servants and the way 





Birch believed the War Office‟s „numberless civil servants‟ had a vested interest 
in keeping the Woolwich Arsenal well-employed, a commitment that worked 
against Vickers-Armstrongs‟ interests.  He viewed Sir Herbert Creedy, the top 
civil servant at the War Office, as the leader of this conspiracy and proposed that 
the bureaucrats should undertake a stint in the Army, arguing that „[a] few 
casualties would make a great difference.‟128  Birch feared that Gillman, his friend 
and successor as MGO, was no match for Creedy, whom he alleged cared only for 
the „Arsenal preserve‟ and nothing for military efficiency.129 
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Meeting Birch at the Carlton Club in July 1928, Sir Laming Worthington-
Evans, the Secretary of State for War, apparently expressed his support for equal 
treatment between Vickers-Armstrongs and the Royal Ordnance Factories. 
However, this issue remained unresolved and prominent in the firm's dealings 
with the War Office over the next few years.
130
 The crux of the matter was 
Vickers-Armstrongs‟ expensive drawing office, which produced experimental 
designs for items including tanks, guns and carriages. The firm argued it did not 
receive adequate recompense for these facilities, either for the cost of the „test‟ 
models or in terms of subsequent bulk orders.
131
 Moreover, its designers attracted 
the attention of American manufacturers and required financial inducements to 
convince them to stay in England.
132
 Therefore, the company repeatedly 
demanded a fixed percentage of work if its models were officially adopted, or that 
it should receive payments if the Arsenal built its designs.
133
 The former 
arrangement was considered far preferable, since it would keep as much plant and 
as many workers employed as possible.
134
 The explicitly-stated alternative was 
that Vickers-Armstrongs would be forced to withdraw from unprofitable land 
armaments manufacture to concentrate on naval and civil work.
135
 However, 
given that the mechanisation of the Army was at experimental stage, the War 
Office felt unable to place bulk orders for any one type of vehicle.
136
   
Consistent work, rather than piecemeal orders, was crucial if Vickers-
Armstrongs was to maintain continuity of employment and avoid losing skilled 
men who would otherwise be tempted to seek less precarious jobs.
137
 Birch felt 
either credit or a loan for this purpose was essential, but the War Office did not 
allow any credit system.
138
 As for a loan towards military expenditure, Sir Otto 
Niemeyer, an ex-Treasury official and Bank of England director who 
subsequently joined Vickers-Armstrongs‟ board, agreed with Creedy that it was 
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out of the question, both as a matter of financial principle and also because of the 
Treasury‟s immense existing loan commitments.139 Moreover, the War Office 
argued it had given the firm fair treatment. Creedy pointed out that in the first 
bulk tank order, made in 1923, Vickers had received 30 tanks against 28 for the 
Arsenal and, in total, Vickers and Armstrong had received 43 percent of tank and 
98 percent of „dragon‟ artillery tractor orders.140 Birch strongly disagreed. As 
Vickers-Armstrongs was not guaranteed similar orders in the future, he suggested 
that Creedy should take a longer view and, in friendly spirit, mocked his 
bureaucratic position:  
 
if you had been as much frightened as I was during 
the first two years of the war [...] instead of sitting 
comfortably in Whitehall with an occasional bomb 
over you, which did your health nothing but good 
by shaking up your liver, you would agree with me 
that when Vickers-Armstrong bring out something 
absolutely new they should be kept alive by getting 
a certain proportion of the orders for it [...] Mark 
you, once let the armament firms go down, they will 
never recover, and if you believe that there is never 
going to be another war, then you are a very wicked 




Creedy responded that Birch was a „rascal‟ as he knew the financial and political 
conditions from his own time as MGO.
142
 Nonetheless, Birch continued to 
criticise Creedy and his band of civil servants.
143
 
 Until these controversies were resolved, Birch argued that there would 
„never be a good feeling between the trade and the War Office‟, and Vickers-
Armstrongs could scarcely be a „willing servant [...] and a national asset under 
present conditions.‟144 Tensions were unsurprising in the difficult conditions of 
the late 1920s and early 1930s, and Birch‟s persistence may have done more harm 
than good as each side tried to make the other realise it was not a „charitable 
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institution‟.145  On 1 August 1930 Peck, who had supported Vickers-Armstrongs 
at the War Office, wrote to Birch to express regret at „the apparently increasing 
antipathy of your department against my own. I cannot see that it can be of any 
advantage to anybody.‟146 Although much of Birch‟s correspondence was jocular 
and light-hearted, he scrawled on a letter to Vickers‟ chairman that Creedy was a 
„pedantic ass‟.147  Nonetheless, he tried not to give the impression of a vendetta, 
and explained his frustration was down to his patriotism and worries that current 
British arrangements for emergency production were even worse than the „futile‟ 
arrangements of 1914.
148
 Moreover, from a pecuniary standpoint Birch claimed 
Vickers‟ directors were not antagonistic to the War Office but disliked making no 
profits and felt concern for the shareholders.
149
  
Birch‟s opinions regarding the role of the civil service should probably be 
taken with a pinch of salt: some years later, one of his colleagues described how 
the General „liked to be in the swim of affairs in Whitehall‟, but scarcely „carried 
all the weight in the Company or in Whitehall that he thought he carried.‟150 
Nonetheless, Birch‟s letters reveal that military-industrial relations spanned a 
range of sentiments, from warmth and cooperation, to belligerence and irritation. 
Putting aside the design controversy and the civil servants, Birch felt that Vickers-
Armstrongs‟ relationship with the War Office was close and satisfactory, although 
he suggested that the Admiralty and Air Ministry were more sympathetic to the 
firm.
151
 The Admiralty certainly maintained its traditionally cordial relations with 
the surviving naval constructors. For example, at the launch of the fleet repair 
vessel HMS Resource in November 1928, Craven spoke of the „wonderful 
encouragement‟ that Vickers-Armstrongs had received from the Admiralty „to 
help us keep our plant in the industry [...] in which we are specialists‟.152 Colonel 
Headlam, the Admiralty‟s Financial Secretary, attended the launch, thanked the 
company for its wartime contribution, and emphasised that the country had to 
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look to firms like Vickers-Armstrongs so long as the possibility of war 
remained.
153
 Earlier in the year Headlam had drawn the House of Commons‟ 
attention to the necessity of keeping both government and private naval building 
establishments in use.
154
 Yet the state‟s manufacturing establishments were 
rapidly becoming political issues beyond their arms-producing function. 
With the emergence of a large private naval industry in the latter half of 
the nineteenth century, the primary role of the Royal Dockyards had largely 
changed from new construction to the equally important task of repairing, refitting 
and converting existing vessels.
155
 By 1918, Britain possessed seven Royal 
Dockyards of which only Portsmouth, Devonport and Chatham undertook new 
construction during the inter-war years.
156
 The state‟s shipyard at Rosyth was 
mainly equipped for capital ship construction and was not required in the post-
Washington era, while the less modern works at Chatham were more suitable for 
cruiser and destroyer construction. In September 1925 the Admiralty announced 
its decision to reduce Rosyth and Pembroke, another building yard, to a „care and 
maintenance‟ basis.157 This provoked a lengthy parliamentary debate on whether 
the government had given due regard to the municipalities concerned and 
workmen affected.
158
 Indeed, employment levels at the Royal Dockyards slumped 
from 38,485 in November 1924 to 30,071 in October 1928 (although both figures 
remained higher than the 25,580 individuals employed in 1907).
159
 When the 
Labour government demanded the reduction of at least £1.25 million from the 
naval programme in 1929, it therefore requested that the burden would not only 
fall on the dockyards.
160
 
Labour‟s stated disarmament policy not only raised questions about 
national security but also confronted it with an acute doctrinal and political 
dilemma, since reductions in naval construction had to be shouldered by either the 
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public or the private yards, and meant further unemployment and possible labour 
unrest in the already depressed shipbuilding industry. In November 1929 a joint 
committee of the Parliamentary Labour Party, the General Council of the Trades 
Union Congress and the Executive Committee of the National Labour Party 
submitted a memorandum on the „Economic Consequences of Disarmament‟ to 
the government. Though supportive of disarmament as a tenet of foreign policy, 
the committee argued that the domestic cost should not be borne exclusively by 
workers. It considered the claims of Royal Dockyard employees as more 
significant in this regard, because private shipyards could theoretically offset a 
decline in naval work by undertaking general industrial and foreign armament 
work. Nonetheless, the committee recognised that transferring existing naval work 
would merely shift unemployment from one area to another, and suggested 
alternative methods of employment for the yards. In the last resort it argued that 
retroactive compensation be paid to depressed districts, including Barrow, 
Newcastle, Sheffield, Rosyth and Pembroke.
161
 
The Treasury consulted with various departments, including the 
Admiralty, and suggested that the committee appeared to have a wildly optimistic 
vision of how much disarmament was actually going to take place. In fact, it 
described disarmament as „a difficult ideal which is not yet attained‟ and pointed 
out defence expenditure for 1930 was not much below the previous year. The 
interdepartmental report suggested that „the effect, spread over such a vast 
employment area, of the variations in new construction expenditure, is too small 
to justify such Government action as is proposed.‟ It compared the effect of the 
decision to cancel a relatively small amount of naval construction to  
 
the effect liable to be produced in individual 
industries by many possible decisions of policy 
lying within the sphere of Government or by the 
progress of invention, the change of fashion, or 
general changes in the character of trade.
162
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The report objected to all of the committee‟s ideas for stimulating employment; 
and rejected as „fundamentally unsound‟ its plea for compensation since it would 
discriminate between dockyard workers and other government employees, as well 
as between state and private workers.
163
 As Tom Shaw, the Secretary of State for 
War and a former trade unionist, subsequently argued: „Why should compensation 
be paid to armament workers and not to miners, transport workers and other 
indirectly affected classes of workpeople?‟164 
On the land armament side, Creedy parodied the government‟s standpoint 
over lunch with Birch in December 1929: 
 
The workmen in the Arsenal are specially Labour 
servants, and they must be taken every care of and 
we must not discharge one of them. Further, there 
are to be no more wars, and we do not see use of 
supplementing our supplies by the upkeep of a firm 




Creedy also mentioned that Henry Snell, Labour‟s MP for Woolwich East, was 
pushing hard to make good on his election pledge to increase work at the Arsenal 
at the expense of private firms.
166
 Nonetheless, in April 1930 a Cabinet committee 
confirmed that the private firms operated under less equitable terms than the 
Royal Ordnance Factories. For example, the latter recouped the actual cost of 
work, while the private arms manufacturers quoted a firm price, and were subject 
to penalties in the event of delays and other problems. Moreover, the ROFs 
received a special annual subsidy, worth £133,000 in 1930, to maintain 
emergency plant: therefore, transferring further arms work to the state factories 
raised the question of subsidising the country‟s private capacity.167 However, 
these conclusions did not result in any form of proactive assistance. Somewhat 
dramatically, Gillman told Birch in February 1931 that: „Nothing less than a 
change of Government will help your firm!‟168 However, although the ROFs 
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received more favourable treatment, their orders received were still relatively 
small until 1935.
169
 Meanwhile, Vickers-Armstrongs‟ land armaments branch 
persevered and survived, and the Army possessed a „very considerable‟ reliance 
on private manufacture for a range of armaments.
170
 With the decline of other 
firms, Vickers-Armstrongs built up a dominant position as the War Office‟s 
principal private supplier of guns, carriages, mountings, tanks, tractors, machine 
guns and gun ammunition.
171
 
The twin issues of disarmament and unemployment meant that decisions 
pertaining to the reduction or increase of armaments were highly controversial. In 
the extremely competitive market for arms manufacture after 1918, the 
government was always engaged in a balancing act between the state‟s own 
manufacturing facilities and private industry, yet at the same time it avoided 
directly confronting the latter‟s well-publicised troubles. The 1930s critics offered 
an extreme solution: the complete nationalisation of the arms industry in order to 
remove the vested financial interest in preparations for war.
172
 However, in 1936 
the Royal Commission rejected this suggestion, partly because it feared that a 
state monopoly would necessitate a much larger quantity of labour to be 
permanently allotted to arms production. As a result, the commissioners suggested 
that nationalisation itself could create a dangerous vested interest: 
 
Experience in all countries suggests that the 
resistance to the reduction of expenditure on 
armaments increases in proportion as a government 
increases its direct employment of labour in the 
manufacture of arms. The extent to which 
governments are using the manufacture of arms as a 
means of employing labour or curing 
unemployment, and their fear of the consequences if 
they demobilise this labour, is, we believe, a new 
and very serious obstacle to the reduction of 
armaments, and it seems to us an advantage that this 
country should not be more deeply committed than 
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Nonetheless, the Commission recommended that the government‟s factories be 
fully equipped for the production of all types of naval, military and air 
armaments.
174
 In 1937 an interdepartmental committee rejected this proposal, 
owing to the vast costs and other difficulties involved.
175
 Moreover, rearmament 




General Birch, in one of his many letters to the War Office, neatly encapsulated 
the essence of traditional state-industry relations. He wrote in May 1929: „we all 
have the same end in view, and that is the greatest production in war time and the 
very best possible killing machines, and we should never produce these as well 
apart.‟176 In many ways, the relationship between government and manufacturer 
after 1918 resembled a harsher version of pre-war arrangements. In particular, the 
Admiralty still viewed the arms firms as an important part of national defence and 
maintained cordial relations with key suppliers. However, new external pressures 
also affected the state-industry relations and although the overall impact of 
disarmament has been exaggerated, it undoubtedly had an important effect upon 
naval-industrial relations. It reduced work in an industry which was already 
suffering from overcapacity and fostered uncertainty about the future. Many yards 
went out of business, while specialist plant was left in limbo, assisted and 
subsidised to a limited extent by the service departments, but never fully 
supported financially or with orders. The pursuit of disarmament thus aggravated 
the already severe impact of Britain‟s reversion to peacetime defence spending. 
The 1920s experienced no international tensions comparable to the decade before 
the war, yet the arms firms were attempting to fill works which were much greater 
in size and more costly to operate. Disarmament and ongoing depression also had 
an impact on the state-owned factories and dockyards. Unemployment in 
„government areas‟ became a political issue, dividing the state‟s loyalty and 
causing further animosity with the private arms industry. 
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 Aside from the physical decline of the arms firms in the aftermath of the 
war – the decay of their plant and loss of skilled workers – the manufacturers also 
felt psychologically beleaguered. James Frater Taylor, Armstrong‟s deputy 
chairman, felt that the lack of orders not only damaged the balance sheets but also 
contributed to a lack of „driving force‟ in the company‟s works.177 Even if the 
service departments remained helpful on the whole, successive governments 
chose not to confront the industry‟s underlying problems. It is not fair to say that 
the state completely abandoned the manufacturers in the inter-war period, but 
neither did it offer a constructive means for them to adjust to post-1918 
conditions. Thus, state-industry relations stagnated and the government did little 
beyond watching and noting the struggles of the armament firms. Meanwhile, a 
sense of dejection settled over the industry. 
 
                                                 
177
 Baring Archive, London (hereafter BA), 200279, Taylor Memorandum, December 1926. 
 72 
 
2. An Inadequate Insurance: Industrial Mobilisation Planning 
between the Armistice and Rearmament 
 
From every source we are told that the new German infantry formations 
are in many cases inferior to our own, but that their artillery is good and 
lavishly supplied. If we equal the enemy in this respect our cause is won. 
British soldiers died in vain on the Aubers Ridge on Sunday because 
more shells were needed. The Government, who have so seriously failed 
to organise adequately our national resources, must bear their share of the 
grave responsibility. 
- ‘Shells and the Great Battle’ (editorial), The Times, 14 May 1915. 
 
 
The deterioration of the relationship between the state and the arms industry after 
1918 cannot be explained simply in terms of disarmament and depression. It also 
resulted from a major shift in the way the state conceptualised defence planning 
after the first great industrial war. Although the arms manufacturers achieved 
enormous feats of wartime production, politicians and civil servants doubted or 
ignored the future utility of specialist firms. The unprecedented scale of fighting 
on the Western Front had strained the country‟s administrative and manufacturing 
resources to the limit and demonstrated that its existing specialist facilities were 
not well-suited for rapid mass production. In particular, the „shells scandal‟ of 
May 1915 publicly exposed the government‟s supply arrangements, which chiefly 
relied on the private arms manufacturers, as inadequate for meeting the demands 
of total war.
1
 In response, the Ministry of Munitions was quickly established to 
mobilise the productive resources of thousands of general industrial firms with no 
previous experience of armament work. Britain‟s capacity for arms production 
was subsequently visualised on a very broad basis, a point made clearly in the 
McKinnon Wood committee‟s November 1918 report: 
 
The magnitude of present-day war operations is 
such that the reserve of manufacture in peace time 
for war development cannot be looked on as being 
concentrated in the Government arsenal and two or 
three particular firms. The real reserve for war is the 
whole of the manufacturing power of the country 
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Unsurprisingly, this theory of „industrial mobilisation‟ had a profound effect on 
the government‟s relationship with the specialist manufacturers. It also demanded 
a fundamental change in the state‟s relations with the general industrial 
community and required a carefully planned organisation that could not simply be 
improvised in an emergency. The official historian of factories and plant during 
the Second World War described it as „the ultimate industrial problem‟, and 
turning theory into practice certainly proved difficult.
3
 Potential sources of supply 
had to be investigated by casting a wide net over the country‟s industrial 
resources, followed by the allocation of this „located‟ manufacturing capacity to 
the relevant service department. The capacity of British industry for the 
manufacture of armaments and other products required assessment and 
industrialists had to be made aware of the specific challenges of war production. 
As one official put it, the ideal plan would „employ every suitable existing and 
installed machine from the very outset of the war.‟4  
In his 1988 study of British sea power, procurement and rearmament, G. 
A. H. Gordon highlighted the remarkable lack of scholarly attention directed 
towards the inter-war preoccupation with production resources in the context of 
defence policy.
5
 In addressing this gap, his work provided insights into the 
contemporary debates on supply issues, the perennial issue of inter-service 
tensions and the organisational structure of procurement. Gordon also described 
the evolution of a subtle and systematic British supply organisation against a 
background of „decline‟ in the naval industries.6 In fact, as this chapter 
demonstrates, the fundamentally unrealistic basis of Britain‟s supply organisation, 
particularly its ideological limitations, actually helped to generate these 
exaggerated and oft-repeated contemporary images of relative British industrial 
weakness. 
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The dramatic shift in peacetime state-industry relations required for the 
preparation of a successful scheme for wartime industrial mobilisation sat 
uncomfortably with Britain‟s non-interventionist liberal traditions. Nearly two 
decades after the armistice, Desmond Morton, an intelligence officer, launched a 
scathing attack on the government‟s apparent failure to learn the basic lesson of 
the Great War: that „you must plan economic mobilisation before you put it into 
action.‟7 He particularly condemned the government‟s policy of leaving 
„manufacture to the manufacturers‟ and contrasted it with the centralised direction 
evident not only under the dictatorships but also in other democracies. However, 
Neville Chamberlain, the Prime Minister, informed the Cabinet that it was 
inconceivable that a democratic state like Britain could intervene in labour, raw 
materials and finance to the same extent as Nazi Germany. This reflected the 
widespread attitude that Britain could only emulate German industrial 




A closer look at the widening gap between industrial mobilisation theory 
and practice in inter-war Britain demonstrates that while successive governments 
did not ignore the question of arms production in a future war, their attempts to 
solve the problem were over-ambitious and misguided. Although they created a 
range of organisations to advise on domestic policy and observe overseas 
developments, these lacked the necessary means and freedom of action to 
effectively prepare a scheme for industrial mobilisation. Their investigations 
produced a number of useful results but the main consequence was the impression 
that British preparations lagged behind those of other countries. Moreover, by 
pinning its hopes on the competence of Britain‟s general industrial resources, the 
state neglected the expertise of the private arms industry as part of its wider 
defence planning. 
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Domestic Supply Organisation: The Principal Supply Officers Committee 
 
The idea for what eventually became the official history of the Ministry of 
Munitions was first mooted in March 1916, with the intention that it would be 
useful in preparing supply arrangements for a future war.
9
 However, this project 
absorbed an increasing amount of time and money, and in March 1921 questions 
arose in the House of Commons over its usefulness as a planning aid (although it 
subsequently became an important reference work, particularly for the Board of 
Trade, War Office and Ministry of Labour).
10
 Indeed, the government only 
gradually attempted to create a more comprehensive peacetime organisation for 
coordinating supply in an emergency.
11
 In 1920 the CID appointed a munitions 
subcommittee to investigate the issue, but it struggled with the definition of its 
task and made slow progress.
12
 In early 1923 the Mond-Weir committee rejected 
any amalgamation of the three individual service departments, although it 
encouraged them to coordinate their supply arrangements.
13
 As a result of these 
findings, the munitions subcommittee requested a fresh start.
14
 Following another 
CID subcommittee report, the establishment of the Principal Supply Officers 
Committee in 1924 was a more promising step. The new committee was given a 
definite and deceptively simple problem to address: to establish the predicted 
wartime requirements of raw materials and warlike stores, and to locate sources of 
supply to meet these requirements. Crucially, the PSOC‟s terms of reference 
instructed it to discover manufacturing sources beyond the specialist arms 
industry, and to maintain a list of contractors who could divert their peacetime 
machinery to war work.
15
 These principles, and the committee‟s organisation, 
subsequently formed the basis of British industrial mobilisation planning. 
Consisting of the service departments‟ supply officers and a Board of 
Trade representative, the PSOC drew up preliminary plans covering peacetime 
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preparations and wartime mobilisation, although its recommendations only dealt 
with the initial transition from peace to war and only predicted what would be 
required after the first few months of fighting. Nonetheless, General Birch, in his 
pre-Vickers role as the PSOC‟s chairman and Master General of the Ordnance, 
reported in late 1926 that the committee was an „eminently suitable‟ standing 
body to direct further investigations in respect of all matters concerned with 
wartime supply „in the widest sense‟.16 At a CID meeting in March 1927, he 
pointed out that the supply question was more complex than in 1914-18, owing to 
the emergence of air power and a vast increase in mechanisation. The PSOC was 
therefore reconstituted the following month with the addition of Home Office and 
Board of Customs representatives. Most significantly, and because the 
committee‟s terms of reference covered a wide range of national resources and 
requirements, a Cabinet minister, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the President of the 
Board of Trade, was called upon to chair it.
17
 In this manner the Principal Supply 
Officers Committee became the primary architect of British industrial 
mobilisation strategy, although it was purely an advisory body to the CID and 
lacked permanent representation from influential and potentially crucial 
departments, especially the Treasury and Foreign Office. 
The appointment of the President of the Board of Trade as the PSOC‟s 
chairman provided an early indication that the committee would adopt a cautious 
approach toward armaments, given that the Board of Trade‟s traditional goal in 
defence planning was to maintain a healthy export market, rather than endorse 
elaborate schemes for war production.
18
 Indeed, besides armaments, a major war 
effort also required the manufacture of a certain number of ordinary products for 
both the services and the civilian market, and some of these goods were intended 
for export to help pay for imports of essential raw materials.
19
 However, this 
simply reinforced the need for more effective administration of war production 
and allocation of resources, in order to prevent overlapping and conflicts of 
interest. 
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The PSOC met annually to consider and report on the findings of its 
subordinate bodies. These consisted of the Board of Trade Supply Organisation, 
which was primarily concerned with raw materials, and the Supply Board, which 
prepared and maintained estimates of war requirements and attempted to trace 
untapped sources of supply. The Supply Board established seven supply 
committees to investigate different categories of stores, such as armaments 
(Supply Committee I), shipbuilding (III) and aircraft and fighting vehicles (VI), 
but also including items ranging from general stores (IV) to foodstuffs and 
veterinary supplies (VII).
20
 The Supply Board also absorbed the Contracts 
Coordinating Committee, which comprised the service departments‟ directors of 
contracts and had been set up in 1920 to avoid interdepartmental competition for 
stores.
21
 Additionally, the PSOC monitored relevant developments across the 
British Empire.
22
 By 1927 an Indian version of the committee had made 
„substantial progress‟, while New Zealand had also set up a small supply 
organisation and South Africa and Ireland were considering the matter.
23
 
However, the PSOC admitted in 1929 that it would be some years before it could 
accurately estimate the aggregate requirements for India, the Dominions and the 
Colonies.
24
 One well-informed industrialist commented as late as 1936 that the 
government did not appear to „have any well worked policy in regard to the 
degree and manner in which the Dominions can best help.‟25 
After considering the reconstituted PSOC‟s initial report in late 1927, 
Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister, described Britain‟s existing supply 
organisation as „backward‟.26 To improve matters, the committee undertook 
„preliminary exploration‟ and „useful spade work‟ over the course of 1928, which 
focused on the broad outlines and procedure for its subsequent work. The 
committee also proposed that it should base its future investigations on the 
hypothetical contingency of a 
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possible war, which, while likely to make 
substantial demands distributed over all three 
Services, would not require either maximum or 100 
per cent expansion for all three Fighting Services 




However, unable to visualise even this comparatively limited scenario in the 
prevailing peaceful state of international relations, the Chiefs of Staff provided a 
different „artificial hypothesis‟ of estimates, and supplied a list of predicted 
requirements covering the first year of a war in an extra-European theatre, with 
the provision that this could be changed according to circumstances.
28
 Both the 
Admiralty and Air Ministry subsequently revised their statements, and the PSOC 
had to request no further changes in the basis of its enquiry unless absolutely vital, 
because such alterations „complicated an already complicated problem.‟29 
 Wartime experience profoundly changed the way in which policymakers 
visualised the supply question, and the establishment of the Principal Supply 
Officers Committee meant the government possessed a forum to discuss 
procurement issues which it had lacked before 1914. The committee‟s existence 
indicated that the government felt compelled to take some form of action, even 
though the ultimate goal was often not fully understood. For example, one naval 
member responded to an enquiry as to how the PSOC should monitor the 
existence of supplies with the retort: „It seems to me to be a whole-time job; we 
should have to sit here and remain in session.‟30 Certainly, this remark reflected 
the immensity of the committee‟ task, which went far beyond its available 
resources. Moreover, intelligence from overseas soon extended its watchfulness 
beyond domestic boundaries. 
Foreign Supply Organisations and Industrial Intelligence 
 
The official history of the administration of Second World War production 
praised the strength and expertise of the inter-war Principal Supply Officers 
Committee and contended that it was „ready to apply itself to problems which 
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provided the widest scope for bold and resolute action.‟31 Yet, at the time, 
mounting evidence suggested that other countries were rapidly outpacing Britain 
in their plans for industrial mobilisation. For example, the PSOC‟s 1927 report 
quoted an unnamed military authority who suggested that 
 
Japan has long been trying to unify her industry, and 
in the near future the industrial mobilisation will 
become so thorough that in case of war, even 
benches in a park, any old pieces of iron and rubber 
soles will be converted to munitions, celluloid 
works to explosives factories, iron works to 




The report also contained details of American, French, Belgian and Spanish 
supply preparations and the PSOC‟s service representatives subsequently 
requested the fullest possible information from their overseas attachés on these 
matters.
33
 As intelligence regarding overseas developments mounted, this ad hoc 
procedure was replaced by a more thorough organisation which caused growing 
apprehension amongst officials and, eventually, influenced Britain‟s own supply 
arrangements. 
The prospect of a successful international disarmament treaty made the 
industrial war potential of a country all the more important as an indicator of 
national strength. For example, Germany retained formidable latent power, 
despite the disarmament provisions of the Versailles treaty. Therefore, the Inter-
Allied Military Control Commission, appointed in 1919 to observe German 
fulfilment of the treaty‟s military restrictions, also kept an eye on economic 
developments. The Control Commission wound up its work in 1928 and Field-
Marshal Sir George Milne, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, recommended 
that the CID appoint a dedicated subcommittee to deal with intelligence on 
Germany and beyond, because „knowledge of a country‟s plans for industrial 
mobilisation will [...] become as important as the knowledge of her plans for 
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military mobilisation.‟34 The Air Staff agreed and suggested that such information 
would help it to locate potential economic and industrial targets.
35
 
Milne also suggested establishing links with trade organisations, such as 
the Federation of British Industries, and also with leading armament companies to 
assist in the study of industrial mobilisation abroad. Before the Great War, arms 
firms had been a useful source of foreign naval and military intelligence and this 
continued after 1918.
36
 Moreover, in December 1927 General Birch, now at 
Vickers, wrote to both Milne and General Sir Webb Gillman, his successor as 
Master General of the Ordnance, drawing attention to overseas industrial 
preparations. In his letter to Gillman he revealed an alarming perspective from his 
new desk:  
 
From this end a thing stares me hourly in the face 
which never crossed my mind at the W[ar].O[ffice]. 
and that is the battle of industrial mobilisation 
which is going on practically all over the world. 
Every nation that can is out to strengthen its 
mobilisation position at other nations‟ expense.37  
 
In fact, Birch had drawn the CID‟s attention to foreign industrial mobilisation 
plans three years previously when he was still MGO.
38
 Nonetheless, no formal 
liaison was established with the arms industry, although representatives of the 
armament firms continued to communicate with the relevant government 
departments, often on topics related to industrial mobilisation. 
Cunliffe-Lister agreed that the investigation of overseas industrial 
intelligence would complement the PSOC‟s study of domestic resources and he 
informed the CID in November 1928 that a mass of potentially useful information 
on the subject already existed, which simply required collation and presentation.
39
 
At a meeting the following month, the departments concerned advised that 
relevant intelligence be exchanged between the Board of Trade and the service 
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departments, with a new CID subcommittee to deal with any matters arising from 
this arrangement. Cunliffe-Lister agreed, subject to the condition that British 
commercial representatives abroad would not carry out espionage, and on the 
understanding that the civil departments, already burdened with defence work, 
could not produce elaborate reports for the service departments on the general 
economic condition of foreign countries.
40
 The CID initially doubted the 
desirability of appointing yet another subcommittee, but approved of the 
suggested arrangement on 2 May 1929. The liaison was subsequently 
institutionalised by the establishment of the Foreign Countries Industrial 
Intelligence (FCI) committee, although the CID did not ask the Secret Intelligence 




 After the FCI committee‟s prolonged birth, it did not actually meet until 
20 March 1930, when its members expressed apprehension about their remit and 
wondered who held overall responsibility.
42
  Moreover, the civil servants who 
collated the material for the committee on top of their normal work soon 
complained that their workload had reached a „practical limit‟.43 A more effective 
liaison was required to break through the labyrinthine subdivisions of inter-war 
Britain‟s parochial intelligence community.44 Sir Edward Crowe, the Controller of 
the Department of Overseas Trade and chairman of the FCI committee, suggested 
using the USSR as a test case to work out different methods of obtaining 
information. In making this proposal, Crowe presumably had Desmond Morton in 
mind. Morton, an artillery officer during the war, joined the Secret Intelligence 
Service in 1919 where he collected reports on potentially valuable foreign 
industrial and scientific developments, including weapons technology. At some 
point during 1926 and 1927, the Secret Intelligence Service formed Section VI to 
enable Morton, virtually single-handedly, to examine the industrial and military 
strength of possible enemies, such as the Soviet Union. His reports caught the 
attention of Sir Maurice Hankey, who felt that Morton, with his wide range of 
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business contacts, was the ideal person to assist the FCI committee.
45
 Therefore, 
the Industrial Intelligence Centre (IIC) was established in March 1931 with 
Morton as its director. The centre was designed to act  
 
as a clearing house for the Defence Departments by 
receiving and disseminating, de die in diem, 
enquiries on economic and industrial matters 




In November 1931 G. S. Whitham, a member of the Armament Supply 
Committee and Assistant Director of Ordnance Factories, was appointed technical 
consultant to the Industrial Intelligence Centre, which, crucially, brought it into 
the PSOC‟s orbit.47 Subsequently, however, the PSOC merely appended the FCI 
committee and IIC‟s findings to its own annual reports while re-stating the 
importance of overseas developments and recommending further surveillance. 
The gathered intelligence reinforced the idea of a global quest for 
industrial mobilisation and indicated that, besides the major powers, Spain, 
Belgium, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Yugoslavia, Hungary and Poland had all 
begun to address the question. Although the methods adopted differed by country, 
the principle remained the same: to frame plans and take measures to extract the 
greatest possible war value from local industry, cooperating with industrialists 
where relevant.
48
 In pursuit of these tasks, those countries that possessed 
centralised control over their industries were reportedly able to undertake 
comprehensive preparations with the advantage of maximum secrecy.
49
 The 
Soviet Union, isolated and insecure, provided the clearest example of central 
planning and, as the IIC‟s initial test case, formed the subject of an important 
1931 memorandum, based on secret and open sources.
50
 This paper, subsequently 
circulated to the CID and PSOC, described how the Soviet authorities had begun 
to appreciate the importance of industrial mobilisation in 1925 and had since 
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established a comprehensive executive organisation. This was designed to enable 
the rapid conversion of, for example, tractor factories to the manufacture of 
fighting vehicles. Moreover, the Five Year Plan, introduced in 1928, was judged 
not only by its achievements in domestic industrialisation but also as to the 
wartime value of these developments.
51
 
While Soviet policy was largely a defensive reaction to a hostile world, 
Fascist Italy‟s preparations appeared more aggressive, although Mussolini‟s 
expansionist ambitions and rhetoric about producing aircraft to blot out the sun 
and an army comprising eight million bayonets were balanced in the 1920s by his 
outwardly normal behaviour as a European statesman and limited in practice by 
the Italian economy.
52
 However, by March 1933 the FCI committee reported that 
fascist industrial policy was planning to create a centralised domestic armaments 
industry capable of satisfying the estimated requirements for total war. 
Meanwhile, the French government and the Comité des forges (the steel 
manufacturers‟ association) had reportedly formulated a plan which, given the 
necessary skilled labour and raw materials, could maintain an initial force of 75 
divisions in the field.
53
 
 In October 1933 the FCI committee summarised its intelligence on the 
state of overseas industrial mobilisation. It pointed out how many countries, 
totalitarian and democratic, were actively strengthening their industry purely for 
the purpose of national defence. Moreover, industrial mobilisation was treated as 
a first-rank national problem rather than a purely military question, and it was 
invariably directed centrally by a cabinet committee or other executive council of 
state.
54
 By contrast, British preparations relied on the PSOC, a purely advisory 
body, which reported to the similarly non-executive, albeit influential, Committee 
of Imperial Defence.  
Ominously, the deteriorating state of international relations meant that 
some countries began to put their plans into operation. Intelligence suggested that 
Germany possessed a large and active staff drafting plans for industrial 
                                                 
51
 TNA, CAB 4/21/1057-B, FCI Memorandum, 15 July 1931; Ibid., Crowe Note, 16 July 1931. 
52
 MacGregor Knox, Common Destiny: Dictatorship, Foreign Policy, and War in Fascist Italy 
and Nazi Germany (Cambridge, 2000), pp.117-130. 
53
 TNA, CAB 4/22/1106-B, FCI Report, 13 March 1933. 
54
 Ibid., 1120-B, FCI Memorandum, 18 October 1933. 
 84 
 
mobilisation even before Hitler became Chancellor in January 1933.
55
 In March 
1934 the FCI committee reported that the Nazi government had activated many of 
these pre-existing schemes, resulting in a considerable expansion of the German 
armaments industry.
56
 Meanwhile, Japan partially mobilised its industry during 
1933 and 1934 to replenish reserves depleted by the Manchurian crisis and 
subsequent fighting against China. As a result, the Soviet Union placed its 
industry on alert, while Italy used its invasion of Ethiopia in 1935 as an 
opportunity to test its plans.
57
 Keeping up with these developments placed the 
IIC‟s personnel under enormous pressure.58 The centre obtained more staff in 
1935 but the demands on its time continued to multiply, and it was subsequently 
removed from the Secret Intelligence Service and transferred, partly for financial 
reasons, to the Department of Overseas Trade.
59




Britain theoretically possessed a mutually reinforcing system of 
committees to prepare domestic industrial mobilisation while monitoring 
developments overseas. Indeed, the Industrial Intelligence Centre was an 
innovative organisation with no comparable body existing in either the United 
States or France.
61
 However, in practice it had little influence until 1934, when the 
government began to recognise the threats posed by Nazi Germany and revisionist 
Japan.
62
 At the end of 1936, intelligence warned that delays in planning had left 
France in a serious position, whereas Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union had 
all implemented their preparations more efficiently.
63
 To some extent, this 
reflected the IIC‟s exaggerated belief in the over-arching power of totalitarian 
regimes.
64
 Nonetheless, it also demonstrated how peacetime preparations for 
industrial mobilisation had ceased to be an option and that the only question was 
the level of energy with which this goal was pursued. Moreover, while 
intelligence on overseas developments was not intended to provide a precise 
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blueprint for emulation, it sounded an increasingly urgent warning that Britain‟s 
system should be able to stand comparison. 
Arms Production and the Economic Consequences of Industrial Mobilisation 
 
Although the Principal Supply Officers Committee had none of the over-arching 
executive power of the Soviet Gosplan organisation, its investigations did result in 
some positive conclusions about the potential wartime capacity of British 
industry. In 1930 the Shipbuilding Supply Committee concluded that the number 
of building slips was just sufficient to meet the combined needs of the projected 
wartime naval and mercantile programmes, although there were signs that the 
shipbuilding industry would contract owing to the depression and overcapacity.
65
 
Indeed, the National Shipbuilders Security Company, a cooperative sponsored by 
the Bank of England, was registered the same year and, to reduce overheads, it 
closed down many yards deemed essential for emergency expansion, including 
Beardmore‟s Dalmuir shipyard.66 Nonetheless, the Supply Board suggested that 
the modernisation of the remaining establishments would help offset these losses 
and that many of the mothballed yards could be reopened in an emergency, 
although the availability of skilled labour remained an „increasingly serious‟ 
issue.
67
 Specialist items such as guns, mountings and armour plate for warships 
could only be manufactured by private armaments firms, and the provision of 
turret gun-mountings, monopolised by Vickers-Armstrongs, emerged as the key 
factor limiting the emergency production of war vessels, reflecting a similar pre-
1914 bottleneck. Despite these worries, the committee nonetheless considered that 
its suggestions for naval and mercantile marine industrial mobilisation could stand 
comparison with any other country.
68
 
Based on the findings of the other supply committees, the PSOC reported 
in March 1933 that the country‟s existing facilities were sufficient to meet 
predicted requirements for most stores. It also suggested that Britain possessed an 
advantage over the majority of continental states in obtaining raw materials, so 
long as it maintained its sea power and kept its communications open. However, 
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the committee worried that its overall preparations for industrial mobilisation 
lagged behind the other major powers.
69
 Crucially and perhaps surprisingly, given 
the desire to avoid another „shells scandal‟, the production of land armament 
equipment, and especially ammunition, emerged as the weakest link in the supply 
chain.  
Whereas naval procurement involved the gradual and relatively constant 
build-up of enormous and individually expensive warships over long periods, land 
armaments and ammunition were required in very small amounts during 
peacetime but in great quantities following the outbreak of war (although, of 
course, the navy also required much larger quantities of ammunition during 
wartime).
70
 In 1932 the Supply Board reported that the normal annual output of 
empty shell was 250,000, which was under two percent of its anticipated 
requirement for 19.5 million shell bodies during the first year of war. Furthermore 
only two specialist arms companies (Firths and Hadfield) produced shells for the 
government after 1925, compared to five in 1914: Vickers had stopped 
manufacturing shells largely owing to the perceived ease with which commercial 
undertakings could convert to this field of work in an emergency.
71
 The 
armaments firms and Royal Ordnance Factories could increase their production to 
some extent in an emergency, but this left a considerable deficit to be made up by 
non-specialist firms. Manufacturing shortfalls were also anticipated for other 
items besides shells on a corresponding or even greater scale not least because 
most non-armament factories had scrapped the specialist machinery that had been 
installed during the Great War.
72
 The Supply Board also located deficiencies in 
productive capacity for larger land armament items: for example, it reported in 
late 1930 that Vickers-Armstrongs and the ROFs could only produce 600 of the 
service‟s estimated requirement of 1,700 gun carriages for the first year of 
fighting. Therefore it proposed a division of labour, allowing the arms firms to 
keep the more complex operations, and farming the remainder out to general non-
specialist undertakings.
73
 Theoretically, this was a sound philosophy, reflecting 
experience gained during the Great War. In practice, policymakers had to address 
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fundamental difficulties in their relations with both the specialist and non-
armament industrial sectors.  
Expanding the country‟s industrial base for emergency armaments 
production involved a tricky dilemma. It was desirable for the service departments 
to distribute developmental and construction contracts over as wide a field as 
possible, because concentrating orders with a few firms worked against quick 
expansion. On the other hand, the PSOC recognised there was insufficient work to 
go around, particularly in the case of the private arms industry. Following the 
Supply Board‟s first report in July 1928, it warned the CID „of the danger of a 
serious diminution in the armament-producing capacity of the country and of the 
skilled operatives and designers on which it mainly depends.‟74 Arms firms were 
usually simultaneously engaged on work for two or even all three services, which 
worked against specialisation and narrowed the field of supply, although it was 
not financially practicable to allow any individual service a peacetime monopoly 
over any single firm. The Supply Board‟s response to these problems betrayed its 
uncertainty. On the one hand it again suggested enlisting the cooperation of 
suitable non-specialist general firms to help attain the required output. However, 
given the dwindling number of arms manufacturers, the Directors of Contracts 
(who, as members of the Board, were fully aware of the problem), were advised to 
deal with different needs on a case by case basis.
75
 
Although these reports implied that the private armaments firms would 
have an important role to play in industrial mobilisation, no significant attempt 
was made to bring them more directly under the PSOC‟s umbrella. Instead, the 
committee concentrated on the ability of general industry to convert to arms 
production. One of the biggest problems it faced in this direction was determining 
the scale of its enquiry and the attendant level of publicity. In 1930 the Supply 
Board pointed out foreign companies were openly cooperating with their 
governments and drew attention to the eventual need to similarly divulge the 
PSOC‟s purpose to the British industrial community at large.76 The following year 
it suggested that „taking the nation into partnership for war preparation is part of 
the price we pay for small Defence Forces.‟ However, such a wide-ranging policy 
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involved major political and economic implications and the Supply Board worried 
that it would lead to misrepresentation and distortion in view of the ongoing 
negotiations for international peace and disarmament. Its work therefore remained 
secret, though it recommended that the government gradually prepare public 
opinion to 
 
the idea that well thought-out schemes of 
preparation for war production are an essential 
corollary to reduced Defence Forces, so that the 
mind of the country will become familiarised to the 
principle and will learn to place confidence in it. 
 
This was also intended to make any acceleration of activity „less noticeable‟ and 
the PSOC concurred in these views.
77
 Yet policymakers remained wary of 
implementing any serious measures in these directions. 
British trepidation contrasted with intelligence reports from across the 
Atlantic, which indicated that the United States had managed to give an anti-
militaristic veneer to its industrial mobilisation planning. The British Military 
Attaché at Washington reported in 1927 that „the resources of the country in 
power, material and facilities are being thoroughly analysed and tabulated.‟78 The 
Kellogg-Briand Pact, signed on 27 August 1928, renounced war as an instrument 
of national policy, but, at the same time, the United States was allegedly making 
plans for its industry to arm six million men in an emergency.
79
 The National 
Defence Act of 1920 provided the basis for these policies. It had established the 
Assistant Secretary of War as the industrial head of the War Department and, 
according to Benedict Crowell, an architect of the Act, provided an organisation 
enabling American industry to proceed effectively „from the first minute of our 
belligerency.‟ Significantly, Crowell also believed that industrial preparedness 
was the „antithesis of militarism‟, reflecting the small American regular army, 
backed up by the reserve corps and National Guard.
80
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If industrial mobilisation could be portrayed as anti-militarist, it raised the 
possibility of a more thorough implementation of the concept in Britain. Yet 
Whitham suggested that the „exuberance of the war spirit‟ had endured in the 
United States, perhaps as a result of its delayed entry into the war, and this had 
allowed Washington to take much more public steps than he considered would be 
possible in Britain. He felt British popular opinion would probably not even 
accept a series of press articles on the question, whereas the American public, 
after ten years of propaganda, seemed not only to support industrial mobilisation 
voluntarily but also appeared to believe it was necessary to maintain world peace. 
Moreover, to get the best brains working on the problem, the United States‟ 
system incorporated trade organisations and learned societies. Washington also 
ordered trial „war emergencies‟ at works such as the sprawling Bethlehem Steel 
Corporation in Pennsylvania.
81
 In 1931 Congress appointed a special War Policies 
Commission to examine the whole question of preparation for war and hear the 
evidence of leading industrialists.
82
 All of this left a general impression amongst 
British supply officers that a thorough and integrated organisation existed across 
the Atlantic, based on conditions which they believed were unobtainable in 
Britain. 
Yet, in some ways, the early 1930s were perhaps not an unfavourable time 
to consider a reconfiguration of British state-industry relations in the context of 
defence planning, given various other long-standing practices and principles were 
also being challenged. As a result of the war, politicians and businessmen had 
become more open-minded about the idea of limited state intervention in 
peacetime, although this had not achieved many tangible results.
83
 In the midst of 
financial crisis in late 1931 the government abandoned its commitment to free 
trade and adopted imperial protectionism.
84
 In 1932 the National Government 
decided that limited intervention in the steel industry was required to help 
recovery and reorganisation.
85
 Scott Newton has suggested that these measures 
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represented a modification of Britain‟s liberal traditions, rather than their outright 
abandonment, and were based on the government‟s desire to retain the support of 
industrialists and preserve the financial system at a time of extraordinary 
pressure.
86
 Yet while these policies could be explained as necessary palliatives to 
counter the depression, the announcement of a widespread scheme for wartime 
armaments production would likely have been viewed as needless and potentially 
dangerous. The ongoing disarmament negotiations were a handicap to more overt 
action, but policymakers and industrialists also feared the potentially disruptive 
economic and political consequences of industrial mobilisation and were inclined 
to proceed on a strictly limited basis, with as little deviation from normal practice 
as possible. 
To avoid controversy or criticism from the public in general and industry 
in particular, the PSOC continued to operate in conditions of near secrecy. 
Enquiries to the general trade were not undertaken by the supply committees in 
the name of the CID, but rather were camouflaged within normal correspondence 
between the services‟ contracts departments and individual companies. This 
prevented the committee from making broad-based enquiries of non-specialist 
firms and its initial approaches to industrialists were tentative and limited to 
specific questions, although these were often useful in terms of conceptualising 
the wider problem. For example, the Supply Board noted in 1929 that Sir Harry 
McGowan of Imperial Chemical Industries had been helpful, and ICI also 




Although the PSOC was not qualified to take direct action, it did think on 
a larger scale. For example, the Board of Trade‟s quinquennial census of 
production facilitated the preparation of a register of businesses with potential 
value in a war emergency.
88
 The Supply Board also considered the establishment 
of local area organisations, which were intended to tap unknown manufacturing 
resources. They were also designed to avoid potential problems arising from the 
imposition of official control on commercial firms and were analogous to the 
regional Boards of Management that had operated during the Great War. 
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However, the enormous scope of this proposal meant that the matter was 
suspended, pending further data collection and a clearer statement of the problem. 
Therefore, the Supply Board continued its more limited policy of taking 
individual representatives from specific industrial concerns, producing items such 
as gauges and machine tools, into its confidence.
89
 
This mixture of ambition and caution meant that the PSOC‟s task became 
a balancing act between maintaining „business as usual‟ while simultaneously 
building up an organisation that would involve virtually the entire economic 
structure of the country and be able to produce, for example, 800,000 shell cases  
per week after the eighth month of a conflict. Perhaps realising this contradiction, 
Whitham wrote in February 1934 that a solution could not be reached through 
isolated attacks on one or two items of war stores but should „be dealt with 
nationally, that is to say by utilising the nation‟s resources for preparing plans in 
peace for war production.‟ Presumably based on his observations of American 
preparations, his ideal plan for industrial mobilisation demanded an all-
encompassing approach: 
 
The utilisation of brains, experience and resources 
of industry, forms a critical and fundamental 
principle in this scheme, coupled with the gathering 
together of the maximum number of individuals 





One problem in this regard was that by the 1930s, many of the men with first-
hand experience of the challenges of industrial mobilisation during the Great War 
had retired or passed away. It was therefore important to harness those who 
remained for their „special knowledge on specific stores.‟91 Sir Henry Fowler and 
Sir Glynn West, both of whom possessed wide-ranging experience of the Ministry 
of Munitions and who had a particular understanding of the problems of shell 
production, were consulted in 1934, and the Supply Board proposed to seek 
further advice from other retired civil servants and government officials.
92
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Approving of the PSOC‟s approach, West, who was also Armstrong‟s chairman in 
the early 1920s, drew attention to a decline in private arms manufacturing 
capacity but also noted that Britain possessed many sources of potential supply, 
including a greatly increased capacity for engineering, which simply required 
harnessing under a central organisation.
93
 
Most significant amongst the PSOC‟s external contacts was a small 
advisory panel of three prominent industrialists who had been specially selected 
by the committee to help investigate emergency arms production.
94
 Lord Weir 
was a Glasgow engineer with extensive experience of wartime munitions 
production and administration, including a period as Director-General of Aircraft 
Production. Although he abhorred publicity, he chaired various advisory 
committees in the post-war era, including the committee that rejected the 
amalgamation of the services in 1923. Weir was already aware of the PSOC‟s 
existence, having given evidence before it in July 1925.
95
 Sir Arthur Balfour, who 
shared the name of the contemporary politician, was a Sheffield steelmaker who 
had sat on wartime advisory committees concerning munitions and industrial 
affairs. Sir James Lithgow, a Glasgow shipbuilder, had served on the Western 
Front and had gained the Military Cross before taking up the newly-created 
position of Director of Merchant Shipbuilding in 1917, through which he formed 
a lasting professional relationship with Weir. Amongst his many other 
commitments, Lithgow was also the chairman of the National Shipbuilders 
Security Company. 
Introducing this eminent trio to the PSOC on 19 December 1933, 
Lieutenant-General Sir Ronald Charles, the Master General of the Ordnance, 
warned that Britain could not win a war without the cooperation of industrialists. 
Weir admitted that the country‟s industrial structure appeared in many respects 
weaker than in 1914 and, echoing the PSOC‟s earlier recommendations, called for 
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armaments supply to be visualised as part of a bigger picture, encompassing the 
entire engineering sector.
96
 Certainly, the PSOC agreed with this approach but had 
done little thus far except make paper plans. In February 1934, Balfour, Lithgow 
and Weir suggested that the committee‟s work to date was „an inadequate 
insurance‟ which could not compare to  
 
the foreign situation represented by strong 
permanent peacetime armament industry allied with 
elaborate planning for war expansion and associated 
with centralised control of industry, and the whole 




Subsequently, the Weir committee became the PSOC‟s most important and 
influential channel of contact with industry. However, the three industrialists 
viewed their close involvement with „personal distaste‟ and justified their 
participation on the importance of national security and defence alone.
98
 The 
PSOC‟s wide ambition and comparatively limited contacts with industry 
undoubtedly gave it plenty to think about, although putting its ideas into practice 
proved much more difficult. 
Calling the Matériel Reserves to the Colours: Plans and Problems 
 
By the early 1930s the Principal Supply Officers Committee possessed a 
reasonably solid organisational structure and its strategy to locate potential 
capacity for armaments production through a broad assessment of Britain‟s 
industrial resources seemed a wise policy, which met with approval from the 
limited number of industrialists that the committee contacted. Indeed, in March 
1933 the PSOC expressed satisfaction that it had achieved „maximum progress‟ 
with the means at its disposal.99 However, in light of increasingly alarming 
intelligence about overseas developments, the committee believed the time was 
ripe for more active steps. Yet its ability to undertake more practical measures 
was limited by a range of structural restraints, including the perceived dangers of 
state intervention, as well as its financial and human resources. These limitations 
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forestalled a more dynamic approach, which meant that the committee‟s planning 
lacked teeth, while its reports fostered a debilitating sense of relative industrial 
and organisational weakness. 
The central thrust of the PSOC‟s strategy to widen Britain‟s capacity for 
producing armaments involved providing general firms with „process 
specifications‟, which included comprehensive instructions for the manufacture of 
specific war stores. For example, the process specification for a 4.5-inch howitzer 
carriage listed 4,250 details of operations, 126 types of machine, nineteen types of 
skilled tradesmen, and 2,500 drawings of tools, jigs, gauges and fixtures. Discreet 
enquiries to ordinary commercial firms revealed that such information would have 
saved months of hard work and expenditure had it been available in 1914. After 
visiting several firms between 1930-1, the Director of Ordnance Factories 
commented how industrialists showed „the greatest willingness‟ to assist in 
developing process specifications.
100
 He reported in 1932 that those who were 
approached seemed to take an interest in the question of industrial mobilisation, 
with the heads of various firms rendering voluntary assistance.
101
 
 Yet the number of industrialists approached was strictly limited. The 
technical experts of the Directorate of Ordnance Factories, in conjunction with the 
Director of Army Contracts, visited 60 non-specialist firms between 1929 and 
1932, which paled in comparison with the 14,000 individual companies which had 
helped to produce munitions during the Great War. This was partly due to the 
PSOC‟s staff limitations and reflected its inferiority compared to other countries: 
the Supply Board‟s small technical staff compared unfavourably with the United 
States‟ better-funded organisation, which was reportedly inspecting over 40,000 
factories.
102
 Another part of the problem was that any increase of technical 
personnel represented an increase in the War Office‟s staff and therefore ate into 
its stringent departmental budget, even though the work assisted all three 
services.
103
 Moreover, the officials engaged on the PSOC‟s work did so in 
addition to their normal departmental duties.
104
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The fluidity of general industry caused further difficulties: the War Office 
noted in 1935 that several of the firms it had investigated three years previously 
had since changed their products and virtually all of them had changed their 
machine tools or methods. While this invalidated the earlier investigations, the 
War Office concluded that these changes would probably increase productive 
capacity.
105
 Similarly, military technology was not a fixed variable and few 
designs remained unchanged for more than a couple of years. This made it 
difficult to plan effective schemes for mass production. In fact, the PSOC 
admitted that the changing character and continuous development of weapons 
technology meant that the Armament Supply Committee could never truly 
complete its work.
106
 By June 1934, a „formidable‟ number of process 
specifications were yet to be commenced, while those that had been completed 
were liable to obsolescence and required periodic revision.
107
  
In late 1936 the Supply Board reported that, although the stability of 
armaments design was probably an unobtainable goal, there were definite 
planning advantages if changes in component and equipment design were limited 
to the essential, rather than the desirable. It also recommended that the service 
departments make use of normal commercial specifications and types of 
machinery where possible. After experimenting with the simplification of shell 
production, the Supply Board advised that the design of other articles required in 
large quantities during war be reconsidered with a view to mass production, with a 
consultation process to foster closer working relationships between the services 
and contractors.
108
 In this regard, the ROFs and various firms, including Vickers, 
obtained details of special machine tools developed in Germany and elsewhere for 
the mass production of shells.
109
 However, this attitude challenged one of the key 
tenets of the traditional relationship between the government and the arms 
industry, insofar as the state had previously approved of the competition of private 
enterprise as a catalyst for innovation. Now, the government looked more towards 
simplification and standardisation of armaments design as an important means of 
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reducing the time lag between outbreak of a major war and the conversion of 
general industry to significant levels of munitions output. 
The Principal Supply Officers Committee had possessed a certain luxury 
of time during the early stages of its work, with no realistic threat to prepare 
against. However, following the emergence of Nazi Germany as a potential 
enemy after 1933, the CID imposed a hypothetical time limit of five years for the 
PSOC to complete its work and instructed that the estimates of land forces should 
include the Dominions and India, even though their requirements had still not 
been received.
110
 The PSOC stated that this target would require radical measures 
to accelerate progress in respect to locating sources of armaments production, 
which remained its „chief source of anxiety‟.111 Otherwise, it suggested that the 
Armaments Supply Committee‟s task would take twenty years, and that much of 
its work would become redundant during this period. In response, Whitham was 
appointed full-time chairman of the Armaments Supply Committee, while the 
War Office technical staff investigating the capacity of firms was increased from 
17 to 29 individuals.
112
 
Nonetheless, the PSOC continued with what essentially amounted to a 
piecemeal attack on the problem. At a Supply Board meeting in March 1934, F. C. 
Bovenschen, the War Office Director of Contracts, observed that no contractual 
machinery existed to translate paper planning into action in time of emergency, 
though he doubted the lengths it would be practicable to carry such arrangements 
in peacetime. Similarly, the meeting felt it was premature to bring civilian experts 
more generally into the various supply committees, despite the increased urgency 
and widespread acceptance of the principle of industrial cooperation. The 
Contracts Coordinating Committee expressed concern that the presence of 
businessmen in high-level planning discussions would provoke embarrassment 
and upset their trade competitors.  Moreover, it did not fully approve of 
cooperating with trade associations, given their tendency to protect the least 
efficient member‟s interests.113 Subsequently the Supply Board appoached certain 
potentially useful organisations (for example, the British Chemical Plant 
Manufacturers Association and the Cable Manufacturers‟ Association) and 
                                                 
110
 TNA, CAB 2/6, CID Minutes, 9 November 1933. 
111
 TNA, CAB 4/22/1120-B, PSOC Report, 6 December 1933. 
112
 TNA, CAB 4/23/1158-B, PSOC Report, 7 January 1935. 
113
 GUAS, DC 96/21/9, PSOC(SB) Meeting, 21 March 1934. 
 97 
 




The PSOC was simultaneously forced to pay more attention to the private 
arms industry as part of national defence planning. Following a question raised by 
David Lloyd George in view of the forthcoming Disarmament Conference, the 
committee admitted in February 1932 that it would probably take Britian a 
minimum of two years to transfer from peacetime production to the output 
required for a major expansion of the armed forces equivalent to the Great War.
115
 
Over a decade since the Armistice, this was an admission that the implementation 
of industrial mobilisation would still be subject to considerable delay and that 
Britain‟s supply organisation had failed to integrate general and specialist 
industry. It also reflected the belief of General Lawrence, who had told Vickers‟ 
shareholders in 1930 that no government could afford to neglect the important 
„potential reserve‟ represented by the firm‟s unique plant, labour and design 
facilities. He also recalled how Vickers‟ men „were loaned to non-armament firms 
and national factories to supervise production‟ during the Great War.116 Indeed, in 
1933 the PSOC reported that it expected the specialist private armaments industry 
to shoulder much of the burden of production during the initial transition from 
peacetime to war production because it represented the „only hope of extra 
capacity which can be maintained in peace [...] on a business footing‟. The 
specialist firms, far from being considered archaic irrelevancies, were now 
deemed of „vital importance‟ in tiding over the critical phase while Britain 
developed its full naval and land strength.
117
 However, the committee also 
brought the „serious‟ decline of the armaments industry to the CID‟s notice.118 
The PSOC drew attention to the arms industry‟s difficulties in February 
1932 but it took until March 1933 before Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, 
requested a fuller statement of the situation. The resultant paper, also produced by 
the PSOC, significantly concluded that „a stable shipbuilding and armaments 
industry, which maintains an adequate output of naval craft and warlike stores as 
part of its normal peace-time programme is an essential element in our scheme of 
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Imperial Defence.‟ The committee noted how Britain had possessed several 
private arms firms in 1914, but even these had proved insufficient to meet 
wartime demands and the country had „suffered [...] for want of munitions.‟ By 
1933 many companies had gone out of business. Only Vickers-Armstrongs 
remained for the manufacture of the heavier types of armaments and its capacity 
had declined in tandem with orders (for the fate of the others, see Appendix I, 
although the small arms firms were not strictly comparable to the industrial 
giants).
119
 MacDonald informed the CID on 6 April that the situation was „very 
serious‟ but seemed unclear as to what more could be done from the civil-
industrial perspective to improve national capacity for arms production.
120
 
As the private armaments industry apparently could not be relied upon and 
in the absence of any state-sponsored rescue scheme, Whitham wrote that it 
seemed necessary to accumulate adequate reserve stocks to meet requirements for 
the early stages of a war.
121
 Yet maintaining vast quantities of warlike stores in 
peacetime was financially impossible and politically undesirable, and the state 
continued to place its faith in the potential capacity of general industry. In this 
regard, MacDonald asked the PSOC in February 1934 to investigate arrangements 
to speed up post-mobilisation output by non-specialist firms, with a view to 
reducing the reserve stocks held by the War Office. In January 1935 the Supply 
Board predicted that the interval before production in quantity could be expected 
after the outbreak of war varied from six to twelve months depending on the item, 
although these estimates were based on as yet unattained optimal conditions, 
which required the placing of peacetime educational orders.
122
 
Overseas intelligence suggested that educational orders placed by the state 
had allowed a large number of foreign firms to gain experience of manufacturing 
arms stores and had automatically „balanced‟ their plant for armament production, 
thereby reducing the time they needed to turnover to war production, while also 
building up a reserve of finished components.
123
 By contrast, the firms that 
informally cooperated with the PSOC were told there was no guarantee of extra 
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work as a result.
124
 Moreover, the committee recommended that any additional 
orders for warlike stores and ancillary equipment be placed, in the first instance, 
to prevent specialist firms from disposing of existing plant. Only then could any 
further orders be placed with non-armament firms to create new facilities and 
provide education in arms production.
125
 In February 1935 the CID approved the 
placing of additional orders, though little was done to implement these measures 
and the Supply Board reported in October 1935 that the optimal conditions for 
turnover from peace to war production remained far from realisation.
126
  
Educational orders were also intended to create extra jobs and alleviate the 
problem of locating sufficient skilled labour, which the PSOC felt was „likely to 
be one of the most potent factors to militate against increased production, not only 
of ships but of armament and engineering stores.‟127 For example, the 
manufacture of shells needed 17,000 skilled workers to meet estimated 
requirements, alongside 115,000 semi-skilled workers and 18,000 unskilled and 
juvenile workers.
128
 The committee‟s investigations showed that the available 
skilled labour was insufficient for the hypothesised armaments and shipbuilding 
programmes: for example, the number of men employed in the shipbuilding and 
related industries in June 1935 was only 49 percent of the total number required 




The worsening international situation had considerably increased the scope 
of the PSOC‟s already difficult task. After considering a report by the Chiefs of 
Staff, the CID declared in November 1934 that national defence planning should 
proceed not only on the basis that arrangements be completed by 1939 in respect 
of a „possible conflict with Germany‟ but also that plans should take account of 
requirements for the defence of Britain‟s vital Far Eastern interests.130 Therefore, 
the PSOC requested that the services provide revised statements showing their 
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requirements for the first twelve months of a war in the Far East, and also for a 
war with Germany in 1939.
131
 
The Shipbuilding Supply Committee remarked that the new naval 
hypothesis exacerbated the skilled labour situation, and suggested that it would be 
difficult to meet the services‟ requirements for bullet-proof plating with existing 
productive capacity.
132
  Nonetheless, in September 1936 the committee reported 
that the majority of its requirements could be met. Where possible, the Admiralty 
placed „educational orders‟ with firms for potentially problematic articles 
including destroyer and submarine torpedo tubes, high pressure air storage 
cylinders for submarines and ships, destroyer gun-mountings, cruiser mountings 
and gun sights.
133
 Again, the situation was more acute for land weapons and 
ammunition and the changed estimates created fresh difficulties: for example, the 
Supply Board had to re-calculate how much of the capacity already located for 
2,200 light tanks could be used for the new requirement of 2,325 bigger and 
heavier „I‟ tanks.134 The Board reported in 1936 that it would take eighteen 
months to reach the required output of smaller calibre guns, if the necessary plant 
was erected at the outbreak of an emergency, while the ammunition position 
remained seriously unsatisfactory, particularly in empty gun ammunition and 
components (see Appendix II). More capacity was also required for small arms 
production, as existing rifle stocks were expected to last only until the second year 
of fighting. When the Supply Board finally obtained full possession of the new 
service hypotheses in late 1936, it was forced to admit that the revised estimates 
„rendered valueless‟ much of its previous work.135 
The worsening international situation drew wider political attention to the 
issue of Britain‟s defence preparations. In early February 1936, Sir Austen 
Chamberlain, the former Chancellor of the Exchequer and Foreign Secretary, 
publicly criticised the government‟s existing machinery for planning national 
defence, and particularly questioned its ability to harness its industrial resources. 
Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade and chairman of the PSOC, 
complained to Stanley Baldwin, the Prime Minister, on 17 February that 
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Chamberlain‟s criticisms were misplaced but had made a „most profound impact 
on the public mind‟. Moreover, Runciman claimed that the government had made 
„such progress in the last six months as had not been made during the last six 
years‟, largely owing to Weir‟s involvement both as an industrial advisor and, 
more importantly, as a member of the ministerial Defence Policy and 
Requirements subcommittee of the CID.
136
 While this was hardly a glowing 




Sir James Lithgow was less sanguine than Runciman about the state of 
industrial planning. Moreover, he had become increasingly involved with 
Beardmore‟s affairs and he worried this would compromise his position on the 
industrial advisory committee, which he felt, in any case, was „rather a farce‟.138 
The PSOC‟s thirteenth annual report, produced in November 1936, strengthened 
Lithgow‟s belief and he suggested that the public lacked confidence in the 
government‟s handling of the industrial problems connected to defence matters. 
He wrote to Weir: 
 
It is perfectly obvious that little or nothing is being 
done in the way of making arrangements for future 
supplies until every I is dotted and T is stroked in 
the specifications for the individual requirements. 
[...] I am filled with alarm at the dreadful state of 
affairs which the Report discloses, and am 
completely opposed to the whole method of the 
organisation and the lack of breadth which seems to 





Later that month, Lithgow met with Weir and expressed his belief that their 
committee was not „consulted sufficiently‟, while Weir explained that, although 
the conversion to war production was currently under review, the committee‟s 
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slow-moving and hypothetical work on supply deficiencies had to give way to the 
more immediate problem of rearmament.
140
 
The Impact of Rearmament 
 
Tensions in the Far East led the Cabinet to abandon the ten-year rule in March 
1932. This, together with the growing German threat and Italian aggression, 
prompted a gradual shift in the government‟s strategic outlook, from a belief in 
the possibility of further disarmament towards admitting the need for some degree 
of rearmament. Between 1934 and 1935 various Cabinet and CID committees 
reviewed the standard of Britain‟s armed forces and uncovered an alarming 
number of weaknesses. The most important body in this process was the Defence 
Policy and Requirements Committee which, unlike the PSOC, included Treasury 
and Foreign Office representation. The prescribed solution was all-round defence 
expansion, in the form of a series of deficiency programmes.
141
 After years of 
relative torpor, the activity and debates surrounding rearmament threw the 
inadequacies of Britain‟s existing supply organisation into sharp focus and helped 
reconstruct the government‟s relationship with the private armaments industry. 
On 14 October 1935, Cunliffe-Lister, who was now Air Minister, declared 
that Britain would be „criminally negligent‟ if it did not immediately improve its 
own war organisation, especially in light of reported French weaknesses. The CID 
lamented that it had been working on plans for many years, but had never had the 
money to implement concrete measures. On the other hand, the deficiency 
programmes were expected to make funds available for additional plant and 
tools.
142
 Significantly, the blame for previous inaction was blamed on financial, 
rather than political or ideological obstacles. Indeed, General Sir Hugh Elles, the 
Master General of the Ordnance (1934-38), hopefully wrote to Weir that „at long 
last, we shall get some money to get the process going‟.143 This could not disguise 
the fact that a considerable gulf still existed between the government and 
industrial sector even though the deficiency work fostered a closer relationship 
between wider industry and the service departments for the first time since 
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 On 23 October 1935 the Grand Council of the Federation of British 
Industries resolved to assist in meeting the government‟s requirements at a 
reasonable cost, but it also suggested this object would be achieved most 
economically and efficiently if the government took British industry into its 
confidence and charged it with the task of setting up any required organisations.
145
 
After years of relative government indifference, rearmament signalled a 
resumption of the private arms industry‟s traditional role in national defence. 
Even though the effects were not immediately felt in the private factories and 
yards – for example, Vickers-Armstrongs‟ Barrow yard was only half-occupied at 
the end of 1935 – rearmament brought a renewed sense of optimism to their 
boardrooms.
146
 In March 1936 came the welcome news that the government 
wished to encourage and increase private armaments manufacture during the 
period of rearmament.
147
 For its part, Vickers publicly indicated its willingness to 
accept, under certain conditions, a temporary degree of government control in 
another major war.
148
 While perhaps not entirely sincere, given that its comments 
were made as part of the company‟s evidence to the Royal Commission in 
January 1936, when it had to fend off calls for the industry‟s permanent 
nationalisation, the relations between private arms manufacturers and the 
government for defence purposes were traditionally closer than those between the 
state and the non-specialist types of industry, even if the this had been in a hiatus 
during the PSOC‟s work. 
Yet the lack of any meaningful post-1918 dialogue between the 
government and arms industry concerning the latter‟s adjustment to peacetime 
conditions left an indelible impression on state-industry relations during 
rearmament. For example, in their negotiations with the Admiralty about the 
expansion of armour plate production, the concerned firms (Beardmore, English 
Steel Corporation and Firth Brown) were mindful of the trouble caused by their 
previous wartime extensions and adopted a cautious attitude. This resulted in 
some conflict and it took several months before agreement was reached in 
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 In another sign that lessons had been learned from 1914-18, 
Vickers-Armstrongs, while expanding its specialist capacity, did not build 
facilities for the manufacture of shells, given the suitability of general industry for 
this work. Therefore, the firm concentrated on heavier work, such as its share of 
the programme for five capital ships which materialised after the Washington and 
London naval restrictions lapsed at the end of 1936.
150
  
While it is unsurprising that the government turned to the proven 
specialism of the private arms firms during rearmament, it is arguably the case 
that an opportunity was missed to incorporate them more comprehensively and at 
an earlier date into a practical scheme for industrial mobilisation, integrating 
rather than separating the specialist and more general sectors. At the same time, 
intelligence appeared to validate the government‟s deep-rooted resistance to a 
more intrusive industrial policy. In October 1936 the FCI committee suggested 
that 
 
should a country decide for no matter what reason, 
to mobilise her industry for armament production, 
she is liable to incur acute economic difficulties and 
a pressing unemployment problem upon a return to 
normal manufacture and trade.  
 
Specifically, the „unprecedented‟ level of industrial mobilisation in Nazi Germany 
had reportedly reached a saturation point and had starved normal industry of the 
expenditure necessary for efficiency. Reports from elsewhere highlighted other 
potential dangers: Czechoslovakia, Finland, France and Japan had all made legal 
enactments conferring greater powers on their governments to encroach upon 
private enterprise in peace and to control national wealth, property and the activity 
of their citizens. The democratic countries had attempted to reconcile this degree 
of state control with the right of private ownership, fearing that, otherwise, the 
establishment of a controlled defence economy would assist extremist political 
thought and impede the return to democracy at the cessation of hostilities. Some 
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governments had avoided this controversy by postponing the more drastic 
regulations until faced with an actual threat to peace.
151
 
Arguably Britain could have developed a more effective industrial 
mobilisation strategy without emulating Nazi Germany or implementing sweeping 
legislation. For example, the Weir advisory committee suggested the possibility of 
developing a „shadow‟ armaments industry. One of the most practical suggestions 
made to the PSOC, this was offered in February 1934 as a potential solution to the 
specialist firms‟ inability to meet predicted wartime demand, while also scaling 
down the over-ambitious scope of the committee‟s work to date. It involved 
selecting between 250 and 400 engineering firms which, owing to their peacetime 
scale of output, maintained a strong administrative and executive structure, 
employed suitable technical personnel, and possessed tool-room strength, 
metallurgical knowledge and experimental facilities. The Weir committee 
suggested that these concerns, together with Vickers and the Woolwich Arsenal, 
provided an ideal nucleus for emergency expansion, and therefore recommended 
placing any educational orders with them and not with a larger number of „weak 
and inefficient units‟.152 The CID approved Weir‟s recommendations in May 1934 
and 91 large engineering firms had been investigated by the end of the following 
year, with a view to creating a shadow arms industry.
153
 In a dovetailing of 
industrial mobilisation strategy and rearmament policy, the shadow system, 
originally intended for war production, was put into much wider operation in early 
1936 as the demands of the deficiency programmes filled up the private arms 
industry‟s existing capacity.154 
Weir told the government in January 1936 that the orders placed under the 
deficiency programmes would „vastly facilitate‟ British industry‟s ability to turn 
from peace to war production.
155
 Rearmament provided an enormous fillip to 
industry and employment, and thereby created a certain amount of „war potential‟, 
yet how far this contributed towards the service departments‟ estimated 
emergency requirements, especially in regard to armaments, still caused concern. 
Enquiries to the War Office revealed that even if its deficiency programme met its 
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targets by 1939, this would still leave shortages in estimated wartime capacity, 
ranging from 45 to 61 percent for various types of shell casing, 60 percent in 
fuses, 47 percent for two-pounder cartridge cases and 52 percent for 25-pounders. 
In September 1936, the Supply Board optimistically suggested that where the 
service‟s hypothetical requirements were greater than the actual orders placed 
under the deficiency programme, the larger figure be taken as the basis.
156
 While 
this did not become official policy, it did encourage the War Office to spend more 
on educational orders.
157
 It also served to highlight the enormous implications of 
industrial mobilisation: taken in isolation, rearmament was a major undertaking 
with important political and economic consequences, yet it still did not create 
enough capacity to meet predicted emergency requirements. 
Rearmament wrought significant changes to the existing supply 
organisation. The Supply Board‟s bureaucratic machinery was used to allocate 
firms to the relevant service department for the purposes of the deficiency 
programmes and it also determined questions of priority.
158
 Therefore, its 
immediate focus shifted away from industrial mobilisation planning and towards 
the government‟s short-term needs. As a result, the Board moved from its 
previously advisory capacity to a more executive role during 1935. To meet the 
extra workload Sir Arthur Robinson became its full-time chairman. In 1936 a 
Treasury representative attended Supply Board meetings for the first time „to 
learn more of the real needs and methods of the defence departments‟, although 
the Treasury avoided sitting on the PSOC until summer 1937.
159
 Despite frequent 
suggestions as to the likely function of the Supply Board in a future war, whether 
it would form the nucleus of a Ministry of Supply or continue to act as a judicial 
and advisory body, the Board ultimately disintegrated in 1938, as the civil 
departments, with no experience of the PSOC‟s apparatus, indulged in panic 
buying, and the services went beyond their allocated capacity. Moreover, the 
majority of the Supply Board‟s staff simply disappeared back to their respective 
departments to deal with the growing crisis.
160
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In terms of overall direction, Sir Thomas Inskip, a lawyer, was appointed 
Minister for Coordination of Defence in February 1936. This newly-created 
position was designed to consider defence problems as a whole and facilitate the 
execution of rearmament through effective use of industry and manpower. To this 
end, Inskip replaced Runciman as chairman of the PSOC.
161
 Subsequent 
difficulties in fulfilling the deficiency programmes and criticism of Inskip in late 
October 1936 led to a resurrection of the controversy over the desirability of a 
Ministry of Supply. While rejecting this as an unnecessary diversion, internal 
debates on this question further strengthened the Cabinet‟s opposition to industrial 
compulsion during rearmament, which it considered politically and 
uneconomically unacceptable at this stage.
162
  
While rearmament was related to the concept of industrial mobilisation, 
they were also different in several respects: rearmament was an attempt to build 
armaments up to a perceived safe level in a relatively short space of time, while 
industrial mobilisation represented a much longer-term effort to create an 
organisation for wartime supply, encompassing the greater part of British 
industrial capacity. An effective industrial mobilisation scheme would have 
theoretically assisted with rearmament yet in Britain they were distinct policies, 
perhaps because industrial mobilisation involved definite preparations for a future 
war, while rearmament was more easily presented as a deterrent. Rearmament 
fitted in with the status quo, as the government tended to appease or negotiate 
with business and labour to meet its requirements, rather than crudely imposing its 
will.
163
 It was a temporary policy to meet a specific threat, whereas industrial 
mobilisation involved a larger and unpalatable shift in state-industry relations. For 
businessmen, preparations for industrial mobilisation meant government 
interference with no guarantee of extra work while rearmament brought tangible 
advantages in the form of orders. For politicians, their attention in 1936 was 
focused much more on the immediate future rather than long-term planning. 
Nonetheless, the informal links with industry and the development of a shadow 
armaments industry which had resulted from the PSOC‟s work undoubtedly 
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proved useful, even if British officials were unable to fully mobilise industry to 
meet the German threat in the mid-1930s. 
Conclusion 
 
The Great War irrevocably changed attitudes towards war production and 
subsequent national defence planning incorporated a significant industrial 
dimension. Faced with mounting evidence that other countries, especially 
Germany, Japan, the Soviet Union and the United States, were actively pursuing 
measures to facilitate industrial mobilisation, British policymakers accepted the 
need to prepare similar schemes and launched an ambitious survey of peacetime 
industrial capacity together with a limited number of industrialists. Yet the 
fundamentally liberal basis of state-industry relations meant that officials were 
ideologically reluctant to probe too far into industrial affairs, while businessmen 
remained suspicious of the state‟s intentions. Together with prevailing currents of 
pro-disarmament public opinion, little was done to break down the structural and 
psychological barriers to closer cooperation and nothing replaced or built upon the 
defunct Ministry of Munitions as a means for communicating and collaborating 
with industry.  
Working in near-secrecy, the Principal Supply Officers Committee‟s over-
worked staff and under-funded organisation only managed to investigate a small 
number of non-specialist firms and inevitably reached similarly limited 
conclusions. Yet the reported deficiencies in arms producing capacity were 
perhaps not as alarming as the PSOC suggested. First, they were based on 
scenarios which envisaged the use of certain types of weapon. In this regard, the 
Weir committee advised „elasticity in supply arrangements‟ in the event of 
alternative scenarios, such as if artillery was not as predominant as expected.
164
 
Developments in tanks and aircraft suggested that a future war would involve 
greater mobility, and in these areas the PSOC expressed cautious optimism.
165
 
Second, even when deficiencies were reported they were not usually based on an 
assessment of the full capacity of British industry but on a limited sample of 
firms. The Supply Board seemed generally hopeful that, given time and extra 
staff, it could uncover further resources. But it needed the authority to act 
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decisively and this resolve was not present. If anything was found wanting in the 
1930s, it was Britain‟s attitude towards arms manufacture and wartime supply, 
rather than its potential industrial strength. Certainly, had the British economy 
been entirely subordinated to defence planning, the country risked becoming the 
kind of totalitarian state that it was trying to defend itself against. However, the 
problem lay more in the PSOC‟s continued conceptualisation of industrial 
mobilisation on a grand, almost totalitarian scale, despite having neither the 
resources nor the will to make this policy into reality. When it addressed the issue 
on a more practical level through the shadow armaments scheme and the 
development of „process specifications‟, it had greater success. 
One of the more surprising aspects of the PSOC‟s annual reports was the 
virtual absence of the private armaments industry as part of its wider industrial 
mobilisation planning, beyond periodic surveys of specialist capacity. Given that 
the committee was the main organisation investigating arms production, it is 
therefore unsurprising that the private manufacturers felt increasingly abandoned 
by the state after 1918. The PSOC certainly fretted about the declining number of 
specialist firms, but the quantity of units did not matter so much as the actual 
strength of the individual companies and, crucially, the manner in which they 
were integrated into a broader scheme for expansion. The firms envisaged their 
future wartime role as providing guidance for non-specialist manufacturers, but 
there was little evidence of the PSOC working towards this end. Instead, by 
advocating standardisation and haunted by the 1915 shells crisis, the committee 
attempted to diminish the need for specialist assistance. It did acknowledge the 
arms industry‟s important research and design function but the committee 
ultimately spent too much time on the Sisyphean task of assessing the potential 
arms-producing capacity of general industry. Therefore it neglected the 
possibilities offered by the armament firms‟ unique knowledge and resources. 
The government certainly could not rely on the private arms firms for all 
of its stores in a major war, but it was increasingly clear that an enfeebled arms 
industry would cause serious problems in the initial adjustment from peace to war 
production and, moreover, several important items could not be produced by non-
specialist concerns. The PSOC‟s failure to locate sufficient capacity in non-
specialist industry meant that, from 1933, the arms firms were again viewed as 
vital cogs in the turnover from peace to war production, but even this did not 
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result in immediately perceptible benefits. Rearmament changed the situation and, 
when faced with the short-term need to correct deficiencies and meet the German 
threat, the government began to resurrect its traditional relationship with the 
private arms manufacturers to meet these requirements. Fortunately for British 
security, reports of the industry‟s decline were greatly exaggerated. 
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3. From Diversification to Rationalisation: The Arms Industry’s 
Identity Crisis, 1918-27  
 
 
After a short post-war boom, the British heavy industrial sector suffered from 
overcapacity, unemployment, an inability to match global competitors and a 
consequent contraction in its export markets. At the end of 1926, Sir Edwin 
Cornwall, a London coal dealer and ex-Liberal MP for Bethnal Green, told the 
beleaguered holders of Armstrong‟s stocks, notes and shares that  
 
of all business the armament business has had to 
face the greatest vicissitudes since the war, largely 
through forces of circumstances. First of all there is 
the extraordinarily unfortunate position in which the 
iron and steel industry in this country finds itself, 
and it is a matter of grave national concern to see 
this vitally basic industry in such a plight. Add, 
therefore, to the difficulties of the iron and steel 
situation the difficulties of those who manufacture 
armaments out of iron and steel, and it will be 
readily appreciated that the problem is not an easy 




Successive governments refused to accept any share of this responsibility after 
1918. The state had encouraged and helped the arms firms to expand during the 
Great War, but absolved itself of any liability for the industry‟s subsequent 
problems. As demonstrated by the PSOC‟s industrial mobilisation planning, state 
intervention in industrial affairs was always a sensitive issue, while the strictly 
orthodox Treasury refused to subsidise the steel industry, believing handouts 
would simply postpone reorganisation measures or lead to similar demands from 
other sectors.
2
 Unfavourable industrial conditions, together with the deterioration 
of the government‟s relationship with the arms manufacturers, left the latter 
feeling isolated and abandoned, while retrenchment and naval disarmament 
contributed to their poor results. 
Faced with such an overwhelming combination of external problems, it is 
possible to overlook the arms firms‟ own internal failures and misjudgements. In 
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particular many of them attempted to diversify into non-armament „civilian‟ lines 
of production after the war, with mostly disastrous consequences. By the mid-
1920s all of the big companies were facing serious financial problems and 
subsequent investigations revealed defective business cores that had long been 
masked by Edwardian prosperity. As a result of this and in the absence of 
meaningful government assistance, the financial community and especially the 
Bank of England forged closer links with indebted firms. Indeed, the growing 
presence of accountants and financial experts holding important roles in industry 
was not unusual in the inter-war period, as large firms sought better methods of 
financial oversight.
3
 Their involvement in the armament business encouraged the 
wider restructuring of the industry and the first shoots of recovery began to 
emerge in the mid-1920s. 
In adjusting to the post-war world, the specialist arms manufacturers 
underwent an identity crisis, uncertain if they were an anachronism in a world of 
internationalism, retrenchment and mass production. Meanwhile, their bankers 
faced the choice of cutting their losses or to trying to revive their ailing customers. 
The Bank of England also had to reconcile its responsibilities as the central bank 
with its position as Armstrong‟s commercial banker. In the face of continued 
government indifference, the manner in which these dilemmas played themselves 
out led to a fundamental transformation of the structure and outlook of the British 
armaments industry. This not only enabled it to survive during a period of 
extraordinarily difficult trading conditions, but also allowed it to look more 
hopefully towards the future. 
Peacetime Hopes and the Failure of Diversification 
 
At first, the private armaments industry optimistically faced the post-war world, 
satisfied with its contribution to the national war effort. The individual firms 
correctly anticipated that peacetime arms orders were unlikely to fully occupy 
their massively extended plant and this led them to explore new and unfamiliar 
directions. John Meade Falkner, Armstrong‟s chairman, informed the 
shareholders in September 1918 that the company would expand into „civil‟ lines 
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of production when the war ended.
4
 The following month Vickers announced its 
intention to develop its „peace resources‟ for the production of ships, railway 
materials, automobiles, turbines, various electrical goods, gas engines, wood 
products and sewing machines, although it admitted that it would remain an 
armaments firm to an extent.
5
 Beardmore anticipated work in locomotives, 
launched a risky automobile venture and made a rash decision to continue in the 
aircraft business, despite its lack of success designing aeroplanes during the war.
6
 
Cammell Laird, a comparatively smaller company with a pedigree in commercial 
steel work, did not worry as much as the bigger firms about post-war 
reconstruction and intended to dispose of its gun-making interests, which were 
concentrated in the Coventry Ordnance Works.
7
 Overall, armaments were not the 
focus of the firms‟ post-war plans. 
Commercial shipbuilding offered early hopes for steady work, and naval 
shipyards were readily adaptable for mercantile purposes.
8
 However, despite the 
loss of fifteen million tons of merchant shipping during the war, worldwide 
construction capacity had also increased and a short boom left the global fleet 8.4 
percent larger in June 1919 than in June 1913.
9
 Moreover, while British capacity 
had increased by 40 percent, its market share contracted by a third.
10
 
Compounding matters, the increase in freight capacity was not matched by a 
parallel increase in freight.
11
 To obtain work, British shipbuilders accepted 
deferred payments and undertook contracts with no chance of profit.
12
 By mid-
June 1921 Armstrong had nearly £3 million worth of merchant shipbuilding 
cancellations and suspensions.
13
 With its mainly foreign customers struggling to 
make payments, the company tied up increasing amounts of its money in 
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unsaleable ships and unrealisable mortgages.
14
 These experiences further 
promoted diversification into less traditional areas.   
The Birmingham Small Arms Company (BSA) was comparatively 
fortunate with its post-war projects, largely owing to its existing pedigree of 
commercial production, particularly motorcycles, bicycles and machine tools. 
Although BSA continued to manufacture sporting rifles, it had virtually ceased to 
produce armaments for warlike purposes by the mid-1920s.
15
 BSA‟s rifle-making 
equipment and processes were well-suited for the manufacture of bicycle frames 
but the problem for firms like Vickers and Armstrong was that their heavy 
specialist plant was not as easily adaptable for general commercial applications.
16
 
For example, when Armstrong built its first locomotives to the extremely close 
tolerances it used in armament production, they seized up in testing.
17
 Moreover, 
when the firm attempted to make non-armament items alongside gun-mountings, 
this contaminated its precision ordnance equipment with dust and grit, much to 
the Admiralty‟s displeasure.18 
For the heavy armament companies, expanding into unfamiliar areas not 
only proved unremunerative but also incurred serious liabilities. Wartime earnings 
helped to pay for ambitious projects, although the funds available for 
diversification were apparently limited by excess profits tax.
19
 In fact, the firms 
had used a number of inventive accounting practices, including secret reserve 
accounting, to deflate their profit returns during the war years.
20
 Indeed, renewed 
concerns over profiteering during rearmament in the 1930s led some critics to 
suggest that it had been easy for industry to evade excess profits duty.
21
 
Nonetheless, Douglas Vickers, the chairman of Vickers, publicly stated in 1925 
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that the government‟s close watch over costing during the war had severely 
restricted the company‟s ability to make profits, and  
 
when the company had made profits, excess profits 
[tax] and one thing and another took away 
practically everything but what was left in the shape 
of bricks and mortar. That was really the reason 




Vickers‟ financial shortcomings also resulted from its chaotic internal accounting 
system, and were exacerbated in March 1919 when it purchased the Metropolitan 
Carriage, Wagon and Finance Company for approximately £3 million in excess of 
its true worth, largely due to a misplaced faith in forecasts provided by Frank 
Dudley Docker, a dynamic Birmingham industrialist and the Metropolitan‟s 
chairman.
23
 Although the Metropolitan Company had manufactured 80 percent of 
Britain‟s tanks between 1916 and 1918, Vickers intended to use this acquisition to 
develop its interest in commercial rolling stock and electro-technology and, 
consequently, Dudley Docker joined its board. Although he personally did well 
out of the deal, Docker submitted a critical memorandum to his fellow directors in 
November 1919 which drew attention to the negative public impression „that 
Vickers are inclined to “take up anything”‟ and suggested that a more systematic 
approach to new initiatives would help to restore the company‟s reputation.24  
Vickers‟ works certainly produced a disparate range of objects in 1919, 
ranging from wooden toys to gas meters, with the bolder acquisition of the 
Metropolitan Company standing alongside these less spectacular manufactures.
25
 
Mark Webster Jenkinson, an accountant who later became the company‟s 
financial director, reviewed this situation between 1921 and 1922 and criticised 
the scale of Vickers‟ post-war ambitions. He held that „combinations or trusts can 
only be successful if confined to one trade or class of trade, that is to say one type 
of production or its subsidiaries.‟26 The figures backed him up: in 1897 Vickers 
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made £216,000 profits off assets worth £4 million (5.4 percent), while in 1922 the 
firm‟s diverse and expanded assets, worth £35 million, only yielded £680,000 
profits (under two percent).
27
 
At Armstrong, Sir Glynn West replaced Falkner as chairman in 1920. 
West, an imperious man with little financial experience, told his first annual 
general meeting that the company‟s conversion to peacetime production was 
proving difficult, owing to raw material and wage costs.
28
 Five years later, 
Armstrong failed to earn the interest on its debentures by nearly £300,000 and its 
yearly report blamed not only the „continuance of adverse conditions‟, but also the 
failure of diversification which was „not giving the results which were 
expected.‟29 Its foray into motor car construction had fared reasonably well but 
Walter Layton, the editor of the Economist, argued this minor success was merely 
„a bagatelle compared to the magnitude of Armstrong‟s [other] undertakings‟, 
most of which had resulted in substantial losses.
30
 
Armstrong‟s problems had increased dramatically in 1922, owing to its 
involvement in the construction of a hydroelectric power plant and newsprint 
factory at Corner Brook, Newfoundland. Historians have universally condemned 
this overambitious scheme, describing it as the „nadir of West‟s judgement‟ and 
„the project which contributed most to [Armstrong‟s] financial collapse.‟31 Even if 
the investment appeared a logical step for Armstrong‟s directors, Kenneth Warren 
has suggested that „in retrospect it may well be seen that they misread the sign of 
the times.‟32 J. D. Scott has succinctly summarised the principal cause of failure: 
„Between the Armstrong Board and this desolate sub-arctic hamlet there soon 
developed a mutual lack of comprehension.‟33 Nearly 54 percent of Armstrong‟s 
subsidiary holdings were in Newfoundland by 1925 and, less than three years 
later, after a variety of organisational and environmental problems, it represented 
42.4 percent of its losses on investments. When Armstrong, which made only £3.4 
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million total profits from its entire range of activities for the seven years prior to 
1926, finally disposed of Corner Brook in 1927, it had lost £2.8 million from an 
outlay of £5 million.
34
 
Diversification also negatively affected the firms‟ more traditional 
overseas subsidiaries. For example, Armstrong had developed an Italian offshoot 
in the 1890s, the Pozzuoli works near Naples, which had also branched into 
commercial work when faced with reduced armament demand after 1918. 
However, it was poorly placed to compete with more modern and better 
positioned Italian factories. As a result, its turnover was poor and it ultimately 
ended up spending more than it was earning.
35




Faced with mounting debts and possible ruin, the arms firms began to 
survey the wreckage of their diversification policies in an attempt to salvage any 
remaining profitable enterprises. In June 1925 Vickers‟ board invited a committee 
to review the company‟s position. Significantly, the committee was mainly 
composed of financial experts. It included Docker, who had retired as a director in 
1920 but maintained influence through his nominees to the board; Reginald 
McKenna, the chairman of the Midland Bank since 1919 and former Chancellor 
of the Exchequer; and Sir William Plender, a prominent accountant. Jenkinson 
undertook the committee‟s detailed research.37 Their report of 4 December 1925 
described how Vickers had lost a „considerable portion‟ of its capital through the 
general trade depression and depreciation in foreign exchanges, while its earning 
power had been affected by a rise in overseas competition, the domestic 
production of armaments in foreign countries, the shipbuilding slump, and general 
financial stringency and unrest throughout Europe. Moreover, Vickers‟ 
management had proved unable to direct its vast range of new interests.  
While Vickers could do little about domestic financial constraints or 
external trading conditions, it was willing and able to address its own internal 
faults. Jenkinson prescribed sweeping administrative changes, particularly the 
establishment of three management boards to coordinate the firm‟s activities: an 
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industrial board, a financial board and, to concentrate on Vickers‟ traditional 
business, an armament and shipbuilding board.
38
 A thorough re-organisation 
along these lines followed, accompanied by a writing down of capital by the 
tremendous sum of £12.5 million.
39
 In April 1927 General Sir Herbert Lawrence, 
who had replaced Douglas Vickers as chairman the previous year, informed the 
shareholders that „considerable economies‟ had been made. Docker, McKenna 
and Plender commented the following month that Vickers had achieved a 
„satisfactory position‟.40 Indeed, Vickers now commanded nearly £1.8 million of 
liquid resources and appeared to be in control of its internal affairs, from the 
management down to the factory floor.
41
 On 15 March 1928, the directors 
announced the firm would pay a dividend on its ordinary shares for the first time 
since 1922.
42
 Vickers‟ relatively early recognition of its problems, its willingness 
to seek outside expertise, and its ruthlessness in implementing reorganisation 
placed it in a strong position compared to its rivals.  
At the time, most of Vickers‟ directors blamed the failure of the firm‟s 
post-war diversification strategy on the lack of institutional mechanisms to inject 
finance into industry.
43
 Yet Armstrong ironically endured a much greater crisis 
because it was more easily able to fund its peacetime expansion through its 
commercial account with Newcastle branch of the Bank of England, which it had 
opened in 1857. The firm successfully appealed for an increased overdraft in 
March 1918: Sir Alan G. Anderson, the Controller of the Navy and a newly-
elected director of the Bank of England, had questioned this request on the 
assumption that the company had made sufficient wartime profits, but was 
reassured by an anonymous friend in a large firm, which he described as similar to 
Armstrong, that an amount of up to £2.5 million would be quite reasonable.
44
 Sir 
Brien Cokayne, the Governor of the Bank, was anxious not to upset the company 
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by adopting an excessively rigid stance towards its apparently sensible plans, and 
agreed to extend the required assistance.
45
  
Little thought was given to the eventual repayment of the sum borrowed in 
the prevailing mood of enthusiastic expansionism.
46
 Sir Henry Clay, an economist 
and advisor to the Bank in the 1930s, subsequently suggested that the Bank‟s 
financing of Armstrong‟s post-war activities was simply a „matter of course‟.47 
Nonetheless, at the time, the Bank noted that it possessed „no definite arrangement 
determining the limit of advances‟ provided to Armstrong, which had reached 
£1.4 million by May 1921, on top of a wages account overdraft of £200,000.
48
 
Such assistance was exceptionally large, especially given the unfamiliarity of 
Armstrong‟s new enterprises. It also became virtually impossible to withdraw this 
support even when these projects contributed to the firm‟s mounting losses.49 As a 
result, the Bank and other important figures in the City of London became 
increasingly involved in Armstrong‟s affairs and eventually found themselves 
more deeply drawn into the arms industry than they perhaps intended. 
In February 1924 Armstrong requested a further increase in its overdraft to 
meet expenses incurred in Newfoundland. The Bank agreed but stated that future 
advances would require further justification.
50
 Crucially, it also instructed 
Armstrong to consult with Baring Brothers‟ merchant bank on the progress of its 
contracts with Newfoundland. This brought Edward Peacock, a partner in Barings 
and a former Bank of England director, into Armstrong‟s affairs.51 In the spring of 
1925, Peacock and Montagu Norman, who had replaced Cokayne as the Governor 
of the Bank of England in 1920, observed that West was over-worked and „had 
more to deal with than he could properly manage.‟52 Indeed, at Armstrong‟s 
general meeting the following month, West could only suggest that „our only hope 
of regaining the proud position we once held is to work harder and produce 
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more.‟53 That the company required a much more comprehensive and urgent 
strategy was underlined in mid-June when its liabilities to the Bank reached £2.6 
million, a larger figure than anticipated.
54
 By 28 August 1925 Armstrong‟s 
demands had reached £3.5 million, as far as the firm could be sure of its financial 
position. Faced with this escalating debt, the Bank decided to continue providing 




 Armstrong‟s deteriorating position caused its worried bankers to 
undermine the firm‟s existing management. By contrast, Vickers had no major 
commitments to banks and, after its reorganisation, possessed large liquid 
resources.
56
 Vickers had retained its independence throughout, while Armstrong 
required the necessary dynamism to be imposed by external figures such as 
Peacock, whose observations and range of contacts, including his close 
relationship with Norman, made him an important figure in the company‟s 
subsequent history. The contrasting fortunes of Vickers and Armstrong, Britain‟s 
two largest arms firms, proved extremely important in the subsequent direction 
and strength of the armaments industry. However, before any major 
reorganisation could take place, the bankers needed to uncover the true state of 
Armstrong‟s position in order to establish precisely what had gone wrong and 
what could be rescued. 
The Armstrong Prognosis 
 
Armstrong‟s considerable financial and organisational problems involved a 
lengthier and more painful reconstruction than Vickers and, from summer 1925, 
most of the burden devolved upon James Frater Taylor, a Scottish chartered 
accountant with an uncanny ability to get „to the bottom of things‟.57 Peacock 
recommended Taylor to Norman based on his reputation as a doctor of sick 
companies, while Norman dealt with the imposition of Taylor upon West‟s 
chairmanship as Peacock felt the Governor could broach the matter without giving 
                                                 
53
 BoE, SMT 8/2, Armstrong General Meeting, 21 May 1925. 
54
 BoE, G 14/64, Committee of Treasury Minutes, 17 June 1925. For the security held by the 
Bank, see: SMT 8/3, Branch Banks Office Memorandum, 17 June 1925. 
55
 BoE, G 14/64, Committee of Treasury Minutes, 28 August 1925; BoE, SMT 8/3, Murray to 
Norman, 2 September 1925. 
56
 BA, 200279, Peacock to Hankey, 8 April 1927. 
57





 Taylor ostensibly acted as Threadneedle Street‟s nominee on 
Armstrong‟s board although he did not always agree with the Bank‟s policy. For 
example, he criticised its decision to impose an increased interest charge on 
Armstrong‟s excess total liability from 1 March 1926, arguing that this was 
counterproductive when the firm was trying to effect economies, a fact which the 
Bank was well aware of.
59
 Nonetheless, his presence and his growing importance 
reflected the Armstrong board‟s decreasing control over the company. 
Taylor‟s investigations helped diagnose Armstrong‟s underlying 
administrative problems, which mainly stemmed from the inadequacies of its 
accounting system when confronted with the firm‟s diverse range of post-war 
activities.
60
 Armstrong had no monthly balance sheet, leading to discrepancies in 
working costs, notably in the „very hungry‟ contracting department, which had 
invested larger amounts in projects than it had indicated to Barings.
61
 
Shortcomings in the finance committee‟s personnel, headed by Sir George 
Murray, a former Treasury Permanent Secretary, matched the inefficient 
accounting machinery. Now an „old man‟ and apparently ignorant of the 




To unscramble Armstrong‟s tangled finances, the accountancy firm Price 
Waterhouse carried out an audit based on the 1925 balance sheet. The subsequent 
report made alarming reading and revealed that even Armstrong‟s traditional 
armament work was making losses. For example, it had spent £66,455 to 
complete a £44,740 contract to build mines for Turkey. Furthermore, when the 
mines were shipped, Turkey refused to accept them and, although Armstrong 
anticipated disposing of them elsewhere, the amount realisable was of 
„considerable doubt‟. Further losses were expected on various other Admiralty 
and War Office contracts and even the £1.2 million contract to build the hull for 
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HMS Nelson, one of the two capital ships under construction, ultimately incurred 
a £40,000 loss. Substantial losses were also anticipated on non-armament 
contracts, including commercial shipbuilding.
63
 At the end of 1925, Armstrong‟s 
debts to the Bank totalled £4.8 million.
64
 The firm‟s accounting system, balance 
sheets and wages account subsequently received a much-needed overhaul to try 
and plug the gaps, and explanations were requested from the contracting 
department for discrepancies between the estimated and actual costs of jobs.
65
 
Taylor presented his initial report on Armstrong‟s position, which he had 
produced in conjunction with Sir Gilbert Garnsey of Price Waterhouse, on 30 
March 1926.
66
 It painted a bleak picture and demonstrated the extent of the firm‟s 
reliance on the Bank of England: work-in-progress worth £5 million was more 
than offset by £6.8 million of liabilities and there appeared little prospect of 
Armstrong meeting its fixed charges for 1926 and 1927. Moreover, other banks 
were involved in Armstrong‟s subsidiaries, raising further questions about the 
firm‟s future stability. The Pearson Knowles steel company, acquired in 1920 in 
mistaken anticipation of a shipbuilding boom was a „distinct menace‟.67 It was in 
a „perilous state‟ and Armstrong had provided it with over half of a £1.5 million 
bank guarantee. Another unsuccessful post-war acquisition, the Partington Steel 
and Iron Company, was described as an „incubus‟ and owed a restive Westminster 
Bank £1.3 million, of which Armstrong had guaranteed £300,000.
68
 However, 
Peacock considered it unlikely that the Westminster would jeopardise the situation 
and he promised to talk to its general manager who, by the end of 1926, had 
promised to act in a „spirit of friendly cooperation‟ towards Armstrong.69 The 
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Bank of England, meanwhile, was able to convince the Commercial Bank of 
Scotland not to force the repayment of its £189,000 debt from Armstrong‟s 
construction subsidiary.
70
 Taylor believed that no other banks were likely to cause 
major trouble over guarantees and unsecured loans, but, according to Peacock, „he 
guards himself by saying that he never feels quite sure that he has got to the 
bottom of things and is constantly having unpleasant surprises.‟71 This was 
potentially embarrassing for the Bank of England. In its role as the central bank it 
told other banks not to prop up failing firms, instead suggesting that such 
enterprises should either reorganise themselves or go bankrupt.
72
 Yet the Bank 
ignored its own advice in an effort to protect its investment and increasingly 
intervened to help Armstrong, its commercial banking customer, fight off 
receivership. 
Taylor‟s revelations caused considerable surprise at the Bank of England 
and forced it to take an increasingly dictatorial line towards its ailing customer. 
On 3 April 1926 Anderson, now deputy governor at the Bank, wrote that 
Armstrong was „in about as bad a mess as it is possible to conceive‟ and that it 
should „face the music‟ and undergo „complete reconstruction‟.73 From the outset, 
Taylor had recommended an infusion of new blood into the jaded Armstrong 
board.
74
  He now wrote to Peacock that „for some time the “sins” of the 
Management, or mis-management, must bear fruit. The seed has been sown and 
the crop is inevitable.‟75 Peacock duly told the Bank that a change of Armstrong‟s 
executive was imperative.
76
 Subsequently, the firm‟s directors, with the exception 
of Taylor, were usually left out of high-level discussions concerning the 
company‟s future direction.  
From mid-April to mid-May, with a two-week delay owing to the General 
Strike, the Bank of England and Barings, with input from Taylor and Garnsey, 
made several critical decisions about Armstrong‟s future.77 In terms of personnel, 
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they decided Taylor would continue to act behind the scenes as the company‟s 
chairman of finance while West should step down as chairman. West concurred in 
this decision although he suggested that Taylor‟s prognosis was „over gloomy‟. 
Norman asked Lord Southborough, an Armstrong director and formerly the 
Permanent Secretary of the Board of Trade, to replace West, as he was considered 
better equipped to handle the shareholders. Southborough had also sat on the 
Board of the Admiralty at the outbreak of war in 1914 and apparently remained 
„hand in glove‟ with his former employers, which had a possible utility for 
Armstrong‟s armaments business.78 In terms of further assistance, the Bank 
crucially decided to continue supporting Armstrong until 1 April 1927, to give it a 
chance at reconstruction. The alternative was receivership, which would almost 
certainly have resulted in the loss of all government naval contracts, which 
remained Armstrong‟s primary source of income. 
 The General Strike and ongoing coal dispute reduced Armstrong‟s 
profitability for 1926 and early 1927 and, while it was hard to measure the exact 
damage, fuel and power alone cost an extra £70,000.
79
 It also meant that 
insufficient steel was available to begin shipbuilding contracts.
80
 In October 1926 
Alfred Cochrane at the Openshaw works wrote that the „general effect of the 
Dispute is now disastrous to us, as our orders are falling off on all sides, and our 
work everywhere is held up.‟81 The ongoing problems worried Taylor, who had 
„excepted major contingencies in the nature of strikes‟ when making predictions 
about Armstrong‟s future prospects.82 
The Bank of England and its advisers had engineered West‟s departure 
and had stated their commitment to keeping Armstrong afloat for another year. To 
ensure the company used this period of grace to implement reconstruction, the 
Bank demanded the immediate appointment of an advisory committee of eminent 
men from the commercial and financial world, to oversee the resignation of the 
disillusioned and elderly directors and the transition to a reorganised Board, while 
the specialists, such as Taylor, continued to investigate the possibilities of 
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 Sir George May, the secretary of the Prudential Assurance 
Company, chaired the advisory committee, which met between November 1926 
and December 1928.
84
 Norman also approached Lord Weir, who, despite some 
initial misgivings, rendered „excellent assistance‟ to Taylor, although this 
occurred „behind the scenes‟ owing to Weir‟s dislike of publicity.85 
Armstrong‟s experience with its bankers was not unique amongst the big 
arms companies. Beardmore‟s post-war investments and expansions, guaranteed 
by Lloyds Bank, had also proved extremely unprofitable during the prolonged 
post-war depression. The Scottish firm‟s liquidity deteriorated rapidly, and it was 
forced to obtain a £500,000 overdraft from Lloyds. This covered matters until 
1926 but anticipated profits failed to materialise and its liabilities totalled 
£300,000 more than its assets. The National Bank of Scotland and the Royal Bank 
of Scotland were also involved, and the three banks decided to make no further 
money available until the company took steps to reconstruct its management and 
finances. Therefore, Beardmore‟s board appointed Sir William McLintock, an 
accountant, as the chairman of a committee to examine the position. In October 
1926 McLintock reported that the firm‟s overvalued assets were only worth about 
£900,000 in reality, and were completely offset by £4 million of outstanding 
current liabilities.
86
 Besides the Scottish banks and Lloyds, its creditors also 
included the War Office and Treasury.
87
 This was the „worst crisis‟ in 
Beardmore‟s history and, after unsuccessfully applying for government aid at the 
end of 1926, the banks appointed an investigative committee, headed by Frederick 
Szarvasy, the chairman of the British Foreign and Colonial Corporation. The 
committee also comprised Sir Gilbert Garnsey, William Paine, the joint general 
manager of Lloyds Bank, and P. E. Marmian, an engineer and director of the 
Burmah Corporation. Through this process, the banks seized the initiative from 
Beardmore‟s directors.88 
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The failure of diversification and poor trading conditions of the early 
1920s helped expose the internal shortcomings of individual arms companies. The 
firms were subsequently forced to reject their outdated administrative structures, 
clear out their old boards of directors, and adopt modern and efficient managerial 
methods under the guidance of forward-thinking individuals with backgrounds in 
accounting and finance. Diversification had contributed towards enormous losses 
and debts, which led to various banks playing a more active role in their 
customers‟ affairs. As a result, virtual control of Armstrong and Beardmore, two 
of Britain‟s largest arms manufacturers, had passed into the hands of their bankers 
by the end of 1926. In Armstrong‟s case, this was especially significant because it 
held a commercial account with the central bank, which had a great deal more 
influence than normal clearing banks but was also subject to much greater 
domestic and international scrutiny. To prevent its customer collapsing, the Bank 
of England was initially content to simply dictate the pace and general direction of 
Armstrong‟s reorganisation but, faced with fierce competition in the arms market, 
the Bank soon found itself taking more of an active interest in the firm‟s business. 
 









Elswick & Close works 
(ordnance, other heavy engineering) 
5,513 8,705 10,157 
Scotswood 
(locomotives, shells, fuses) 
1,359 2,857 3,107 
Shipyards 3,299 5,497 5,470 
Openshaw 
(armour plate, ordnance, other heavy 
engineering) 
2,658 2,624 2,738 
Total 12,829 19,683 21,472 
 
Source: BoE, SMT 8/1, Numbers of Personnel Employed by Armstrong Whitworth, n.d. (Figures 
of the Civil Engineering Contracting and Hydro-Electric Departments and the London Office are 




A Return to Arms 
 
By the mid-1920s it was clear that armament factories were not readily adaptable 
to successful commercial applications and the Financial Times concluded that the 
failure to convert to peacetime production „far from being surprising, was 
inevitable.‟89 A subsequent article in The Banker suggested one difficulty was that 
while „Admiralty work [...] requires the greatest precision of workmanship, 
commercial work demands intense swiftness of output to meet competition, and 
such chopping and changing reacts unfavourably on workmen‟.90 In mitigation, 
the government‟s stated policy of demobilisation and disarmament had indicated 
that the move away from armaments was a sensible route, while the post-war 
economic slump had also made life more difficult. In December 1926 Sir Edwin 
Cornwall admitted Armstrong‟s board had clearly lacked foresight and judgement 
when confronting the post-war situation, but still suggested that the directors had 
„embarked on a bold, far-reaching policy which, if the world recuperation of trade 
had been rapid, might have resulted differently.‟91 However, rather than pondering 
what might have been, each firm had to face up to the consequences of their 
failing businesses and devise recovery strategies. 
Armstrong‟s managerial changes during the spring and summer of 1926 
signalled the end for its diversification projects, and the firm subsequently 
refocused on armaments and engineering. The widespread belief that armaments 
were not going to be a profitable source of post-war income had initiated the rush 
for diversification. Ironically, armaments now seemed to offer a way out of 
Armstrong‟s troubles. A certain amount of arms work was available and, in the 
mid-1920s, Armstrong‟s traditional works showed an improving level of 
employment (Table 4).  By way of comparison, Armstrong employed a total of 
25,561 workers in November 1913, 47,583 in July 1915 and 78,000 in November 
1918.
92
 In March 1925, its traditional business was employing only 4,000 fewer 
workers than in the winter before the war. Nonetheless, the firm‟s internal 
problems meant that much of this work was unprofitable and its position remained 
far from secure. 
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Taylor requested that the firm avoid any new or unfamiliar business and he 
called for an intensive management of the core works at Newcastle, using existing 
plant as far as possible He reflected that the arms industry‟s „special nature‟ meant 
that practical advice could only be obtained from rival companies.
93
 In particular, 
Vickers provided a comparatively successful example of a firm which had shifted 
its focus away from a diverse range of subsidiary interests and back towards arms 
production.
94
 General Lawrence made this volte-face clear, in his guarded speech 
to Vickers‟ 1927 annual meeting: „it is no good disguising the fact that we are an 
armament firm, dependent very largely on armament orders‟.95 Similarly, 
Southborough had informed Armstrong‟s shareholders in December 1926 that the 
board aimed to dispose of the company‟s subsidiary interests, which had proved 
such a „strain and drain‟, and would henceforth concentrate on the promising 
signs for its armament business.
96
 Taylor, in a letter to Peacock, put it more 
bluntly: „Without armament work, more particularly gun-mountings, Armstrongs 
cannot exist.‟97  
Although Taylor believed in the possibility of Armstrong‟s recovery, the 
company‟s increasingly public difficulties threatened its armament business. 
Southborough outlined the firm‟s troubles at its well-attended and widely-reported 
annual meeting on 8 June 1926. Although he briefly mentioned the Bank‟s 
continued support, several shareholders criticised the departing directors as „rats 
getting away from a sinking ship.‟98 Armstrong‟s share price, as high as 12 
shillings earlier in the year, fell by a further sixpence to 5s 6d.
99
 The Admiralty, 
Armstrong‟s biggest customer for armaments, subsequently made concerned 
enquiries about the firm‟s ability to fulfil its contracts. In particular, it wanted 
definite guarantees that its orders would be carried out. However, Norman felt that 
it was unreasonable for the Bank of England, which had provided more limited 
guarantees in the past, to commit itself any further.
100
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To address these issues Southborough met with William Bridgeman, the 
First Lord of the Admiralty; Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, the Third Sea Lord; and 
Sir Vincent Baddeley, the First Principal Assistant Secretary to the Admiralty, 
while Garnsey subsequently met with Chatfield and Baddeley. The naval 
members of the Admiralty, represented by Chatfield, appeared genuinely 
concerned about the possibility of Armstrong‟s armament works shutting down, 
and Garnsey attempted to reassure them that, even under the worst possible 
conditions, these would be the last parts of the business to close. On the other 
hand, the civil service side, represented by Baddeley, wanted full protection in 
order to avoid awkward questions in the House of Commons if contracts were 
awarded to a company that subsequently went into receivership. Garnsey pointed 
out that if future work was contingent on guarantees, it would mark the end of 
Armstrong. Although this statement apparently made a „deep impression‟, 
Garnsey felt that Baddeley‟s attitude would not change unless some extra 
influence was brought to bear.
101
 Baddeley raised the question again in August, 
and the Bank of England noted that the kind of guarantee he sought, if 
underwritten by Lloyds of London, would swamp Armstrong‟s profits: on the 
other hand, Beardmore and the Thames Ammunition Works (a Vickers 
subsidiary) had provided the Admiralty with guarantees, either personal or 
underwritten by Lloyds.
102
 Peacock, apparently as a result of his „good offices‟ 
with Baddeley, eventually staved off the Admiralty‟s need for immediate 
guarantees on a contract worth £800,000, but the whole affair riled Armstrong and 
added to the sense that the private arms industry was handicapped by apathetic 
civil servants.
103
 More controversially, Armstrong subsequently pursued the idea 
that its bankers could use their political influence more overtly in the firm‟s 
favour. 
 In August 1926 Taylor asked Peacock directly about the possibility of 
concerted action to obtain prospective government work. Armstrong particularly 
hoped to obtain an Admiralty contract for a floating dock, and Taylor wondered if 
it was „possible through our various friends, including the Bank, to get the 
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Government to assist our situation deliberately.‟104 Peacock was receptive to this 
idea and subsequently told a meeting at the Bank that he wanted to see the 
government adopt a different approach towards Armstrong because it and Vickers 
were the only firms able to complete the biggest armament contracts. He 
suggested that the Bank of England and Barings should attempt to bring about this 
change of attitude, especially given Armstrong‟s efforts to reorganise itself.105 
Southborough pointed out that Winston Churchill, the Chancellor of the 
Exchequer, possessed a deep knowledge of Admiralty procedure and suggested 
that this would be an advantage, given how closely the Admiralty‟s civil servants 
were connected to the Treasury.
106
 Norman was aware of these developments and 
generally agreed with the idea of approaching the government.
107
 Taylor believed 
that the firm‟s previous experience in dock building, combined with the authority 
of Norman and Peacock, would negate the fact that Armstrong‟s tender for the 
floating dock was £20,000 higher than other quotations and on 16 September this 
trio agreed to consider the „exercise of concerted action with a view to procuring 
Government contracts for Armstrongs.‟108 Although the Bank was motivated 
neither by altruism nor concerns over national defence, this was only the 
beginning of Threadneedle Street‟s unorthodox, unprecedented and, to some 
extent, unintended involvement in the wider fortunes of the arms industry, a 
development with potentially awkward and scandalous consequences for the 
central bank. Yet the greater Armstrong‟s difficulties became, the harder it was 
for the Bank to contemplate abandoning the company. 
The Bank‟s primary motivation remained its desire to salvage some of its 
losses. Taylor, by this point, admitted that he had witnessed many company 
troubles, but had „never seen anything approximating the condition of affairs in 
Armstrongs.‟109 Armaments were now the predominant hope and Taylor felt that 
approaching the government in this regard was in the Bank‟s own interest. He 
suggested Norman should put the matter before the Prime Minister without delay, 
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emphasising the national importance of the business.
110
 Norman and Peacock 
decided that the Prime Minister should not be approached at this stage, though 
Norman agreed to call on the Treasury.
111
 On 21 September he had a long talk 
with George Barstow, the Treasury Controller of Supply, and bluntly informed 
him that if Armstrong stood no chance of obtaining profitable work, he would 
recommend that the firm close its yards and workshops. As a result, Barstow 
promised to make discreet enquiries.
112
 Meanwhile, Southborough wrote to 
Bridgeman about his „vain delusion‟ that his connections to the Admiralty might 
have been of some use. Both Norman and Southborough tried to make the 
government appreciate the political and economic consequences if the firm 
collapsed: that the state would presumably have to establish replacement facilities 
in its place; that other industrial concerns would also be seriously affected; that 
both Newcastle and the shareholders would face hardship; and that Armstrong‟s 
enormous liabilities to other banks would create difficulties. Despite these pleas, 
„not a finger‟ was lifted in response.113 When it emerged that Armstrong had not 
obtained the floating dock contract, Taylor wrote that the government clearly did 
not appreciate the situation.
114
 Indeed, this experience only reinforced the sense 
that the state was uninterested in the fate of the specialist manufacturers. 
In the face of the government‟s apparent indifference, Armstrong‟s 
financial situation grew increasingly urgent. Taylor, now the firm‟s acting deputy 
chairman, produced a second report with Garnsey in November, which gloomily 
stated that „some matters have turned out to be worse than we expected.‟115 
Armstrong could not offer further securities and its subsidiary interests continued 
to leak money. To meet its predicted losses, the company required up to £500,000 
in further financial assistance. In December it declared a five-year moratorium on 
its debentures and notes, which suspended some of its debt and provided some 
breathing space.
116
 Yet, in spite of Armstrong‟s poor position, the Bank was 
forced to keep it going and Norman promised Southborough that it would 
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continue to look after its „old friends‟.117 Meanwhile, important contracts were in 
hand, not least for the Admiralty; and Newfoundland, despite its losses, was worth 
far too much to simply abandon.
118
 Armstrong therefore still required further 
assistance, even though its total commitments stood at £6.5 million.
119
 There were 
few positives although, following the passage of the moratorium, Armstrong‟s 




Armstrong and its bankers viewed 1927 as a crucial test of the firm‟s 
viability and it therefore needed a certain amount of work to tide it over. To obtain 
orders, the Bank of England was willing to put the case before various civil 
servants and other officials as an issue of national importance, although it held 
back from ministerial enquiries at this point. Admittedly, it was not trying to 
create unnecessary armament orders but was attempting to ensure that contracts 
went to the company in which the Bank had a vested interest. However, these 
efforts did little except reveal Whitehall‟s lack of concern towards Armstrong‟s 
plight and Taylor lamented that there appeared to be „a cross current‟ against 
Armstrong at the Admiralty.
121
 More fundamentally, although arms firms were 
undergoing individual reorganisation, it was increasingly clear that the existing 
structure of the industry was unsuited for post-war conditions.  
Rationalisation and the Arms Industry I: Theory, Enquiries and 
Technicalities 
 
Armstrong‟s survival hinged on its ability to remain an armaments manufacturer, 
but it faced a powerful competitor in Vickers, whose reorganisation had already 
begun to take effect. In searching for ways of reducing the intense competition of 
the arms market, the two firms encountered the concept of „rationalisation‟. 
Borrowed from the economic phraseology of post-war Germany 
(Rationalisierung), the term described a method of reorganisation designed to 
reduce unnecessary costs. The war left many industries with vast surplus capacity 
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and the subsequent market contraction caused a desperate scramble for orders. 
This resulted in depressed prices, increased costs and losses or low profits. It also 
prevented the replacement of obsolescent plant, which further decreased 
competitiveness. Rationalisation, by means of horizontal amalgamations and the 
formation of cartels to regulate production, aimed to eliminate unnecessary and 
wasteful competition and encourage wide-ranging economies.
122
 This appeared an 
appropriate solution for British industry, which had generally endured a painful 
readjustment to peacetime conditions, and it seemed almost ideal for the over-
expanded arms manufacturers in particular. For example, much of their extra 
wartime capacity had simply been „tacked on‟ to existing plant, which worked 
against the formation of large-scale modern productive units.
123
 Rationalisation 
also complemented the tendency amongst individual arms firms, particularly 
evident prior to 1914, towards forming „rings‟ and combinations in order to 
defend themselves against unpredictable demand.
124
 Moreover, the bankers and 
industrialists involved in the project mistakenly believed that the government, in 
its desire to find a solution for the country‟s wider industrial problems, would 
actively support their efforts to rationalise an important sector of the economy. 
In April 1926 Taylor suggested that Armstrong and Vickers should pool 
their ordnance work, as both firms faced several years of insufficient orders.
125
 He 
subsequently asked Jenkinson, during a lengthy conversation on 18 June, whether 
a complete fusion of Vickers and Armstrong was feasible. Jenkinson replied that 
it was out of the question although he agreed with the possibility of an armaments 
agreement. Taylor perhaps displayed too much eagerness, as Jenkinson wrote to 
Docker that „it will pay us [Vickers] better not to hurry negotiations, as it is very 
evident that he would like to get something settled very quickly.‟126  
In August Peacock wondered if and when Vickers and Armstrong should 
approach the government with the suggestion of an arms pooling agreement. 
Lawrence was apparently receptive to the idea and, in passing, Peacock also 
mentioned that there „had always been an agreement‟ between the two firms 
although this was not generally known and risked prejudicing both companies in 
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the government‟s eyes.127 It is unclear which particular arrangement he meant: 
certainly, the two companies had exchanged weapons designs since 1902 and had 
formulated a global market-sharing agreement in 1906.
128
 Peacock arranged 
further talks between Taylor and Jenkinson in late 1926 during which they 
crucially agreed that a merger of Vickers‟ and Armstrong‟s armament works 
could set the arms business on a more rational footing.
129
 However, the working 
out of the detailed arrangements and actually coming to a firm agreement took a 
further year of negotiations. 
Norman, Peacock and Taylor all felt that the preliminary discussions 
contained „too much Vickers‟ although they believed that this could be dealt 
with.
130
 Nonetheless, at the end of December 1926, Taylor recognised that 
Vickers had the resources to „stand a prolonged siege‟ while Armstrong, faced 
with receivership, did not. To avoid selling Armstrong‟s birthright „for a mess of 
pottage‟, he mooted the idea of establishing a new company to take over both 
firms‟ armaments business.131 Lawrence initially thought this plan was „quite 
unfeasible‟ but intimated his agreement in January after consulting his experts.132 
The task of reconciliation subsequently proved an immense burden and even the 
normally indefatigable Taylor complained of overwork by the end of January. 
With Jenkinson falling ill, Taylor worried that „the human machine may break 
down.‟133 
While the technical negotiations provoked a range of disagreements, both 
sides agreed that the government‟s attitude was critical. On 11 January Lawrence 
suggested approaching the government as soon as possible, as any merger 
agreement would require its concurrence and assistance.
134
 Revelstoke at Barings 
subsequently wrote to Southborough that „it might be necessary to ask the 
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Government to become a party to the scheme.‟135 Yet, even though the arms 
industry possessed a unique historical relationship with the state, the decision to 
make government support a precondition risked endangering the entire project. 
Although the Great War and post-1918 changes in the world economy had helped 
to redefine the relationship between industry and the state, most politicians, 
particularly Conservatives, generally adhered to the Treasury‟s orthodox line and 
remained reluctant to subsidise failing industries.
136
 
Southborough was apprehensive of the possible reaction and attendant 
publicity if the government was asked to provide assistance, and he worried that 
any attempt to proceed by Bill would „give opportunity for endless discussion on 
all sorts of delicate subjects, involving peace and war, armament, finance, labour, 
wages, and in fact everything most embarrassing to the Parliamentary mind.‟137 
Norman, Revelstoke, Peacock, Southborough, Lawrence, Taylor and Jenkinson 
subsequently formed a committee to decide the best way to approach the 
government.
138
 When rumours about the merger began to appear in the press at 
the start of March, the group agreed that Norman and Revelstoke should see the 
Prime Minister and Lord Balfour, the Lord President of the Council, as soon as 
possible, while Sir Arthur Trevor Dawson of Vickers, and Tennyson d‟Eyncourt, 
who had joined Armstrong‟s board after leaving the Admiralty in 1924, should 
approach Bridgeman and Worthington-Evans. The idea was to make the 
government aware that conversations between the two companies were in 
progress, but to avoid anything resembling a formal approach and, most 
importantly, not to mention the question of assistance.
139
 These overtures were 
made without difficulty and Peacock wrote on 10 March that „the first round has 
been completed, I think not unfavourably.‟140 
Meanwhile, a joint committee, composed of technical and financial 
representatives from each firm and chaired by Sir William Plender, was formed in 
January 1927 to inspect and calculate the respective values of the works proposed 
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 To try and improve Armstrong‟s standing, Taylor appealed to the 
company‟s managers to show „increased energy‟.142 Nonetheless, the inspections 
highlighted the gulf between the two parties. Vickers had already successfully 
applied some of the principles of rationalisation to its own works, most notably 
demonstrated by Craven‟s reorganisation at Barrow-in-Furness. This process, 
begun in 1924, had centralised and concentrated Barrow‟s operations. It had 
involved initial drastic staff reductions but, by reducing the cost of production and 
consequently obtaining more foreign orders, the ultimate result was a rise in the 
workforce from 5,000 in 1923 to 12,500 by 1929, although Craven estimated the 
works could reasonably employ 15,000 and noted the prospects for government 
work remained uncertain. Nonetheless, he proudly wrote: „the fact we have 
obtained orders in a very competitive market and have built some of the finest 
passenger ships since the War shows that considerable reorganisation must have 
taken place.‟143 Indeed, during the technical inspections in February 1927, James 
Stewart, the head of Armstrong‟s shipyard, noted Barrow‟s superiority in plant 
and organisation, and enviously described it as „one of the most valuable and best 
laid out 100 acres that you can find in the engineering world.‟144 Norman 




More seriously, Taylor shared Stewart‟s view that, in comparison, 
Armstrong‟s core works at Elswick were inefficient, that Openshaw was 
„pathetic‟ and that „Vickers‟ men‟ were of a higher calibre.146 On the other hand, 
Tennyson d‟Eyncourt wrote several months later that he had „often heard Vickers 
directors say that they had made a great mistake when they chose Barrow as their 
site‟, owing to its inadequate depth of water for the construction of big ships. He 
further stated that Armstrong, along with Harland and Wolff at Belfast were the 
most capable yards for constructing bigger hulls, and pointed out that Tyneside 
was considerably less isolated than Barrow which meant Armstrong could more 
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easily discharge and re-engage men during fluctuations of work.
147
 Of course, this 
did not change the fact that Barrow was particularly well adapted for the kinds of 
ships that the government actually ordered in the 1920s. In April 1927 Taylor 
believed that Vickers knew it only had to wait patiently to achieve its goals and 
feared that it was cutting its prices to bring the time of reckoning closer. He 
therefore hoped that the „notoriously slow‟ Plender would be „seized with the 
importance of speed insofar as Armstrong are concerned.‟148 There is an 
interesting parallel here with the 1911 observation of Stuart Rendel, a pre-war 
Armstrong director who feared the firm was „being slowly starved and boiled 
down, so that Vickers can better swallow and digest us.‟149 
The initial technical investigations were completed quickly and the joint 
committee‟s report was forwarded to Plender on 18 February 1927. This outlined 
Armstrong‟s and Vickers‟ main activities (see Appendix III), recognised that both 
companies were dependent on ordnance work and naval shipbuilding, and stated 
that their combined capacity in these areas far exceeded current demand. For 
purposes of reorganisation, the report suggested that „it is both possible to close 
certain Works and to effect certain concentrations with consequent substantial 
savings in view.‟ The benefit from such measures would not be instantaneous but 
would „probably extend over a number of years in a gradually increasing ratio.‟ 
Armstrong‟s works at Scotswood, Gateshead and the commercial Walker shipyard 
were not considered, owing to their predominantly non-armament character.
150
 
The two firms agreed that if terms could be arranged, fusion was desirable, and 
would, after three years of adjustment, save £500,000 annually under existing 
trade conditions.
151
 There appeared plenty of scope for a successful rationalisation 
project. 
Rationalisation and the Arms Industry II:  A National and Rational Scheme? 
 
Sir William Plender‟s preliminary report was not ready until the beginning of 
June, much to Taylor‟s frustration. The delay resulted from unforeseen difficulties 
in unravelling the two firms‟ accounts, during which time Travers had to reassure 
                                                 
147
 Quoted in Davenport-Hines, „Armaments Industry‟, p.18. 
148
 BoE, SMT 8/36, Taylor to Peacock, 8 April 1927. 
149
 Quoted in Warren, Armstrongs, p.100. 
150
 BoE, SMT 2/126, Joint Technical Committee to Plender, 18 February 1927. 
151
 Ibid., Committee Minutes, 17-18 February 1927. 
 138 
 
Peacock that Vickers remained as keen for the fusion as Armstrong.
152
 
Nonetheless, Taylor was uneasy that Armstrong was qualitatively slipping behind 
and fretted the end would not be „difficult to guess‟ if this caused the firm to lose 
the Admiralty‟s support.‟153 Indeed, at the end of June, Baddeley supplied 
Peacock with an unofficial and confidential Admiralty note criticising the 
management, delays and quality of Elswick‟s gun-mounting department.154 
Therefore, a great deal rested on Plender‟s report and the government‟s response. 
Southborough observed that Plender‟s calculations were „unflattering to 
Armstrong‟, but he admitted the firm had little choice but to go along with the 
scheme or risk a fatal campaign of competition against Vickers. He also noted that 
„if we stand out of the policy of fusion, which is favoured by the Financial 
Powers, we shall lose a great deal of the friendly interest we have with the big 
people in the City.‟155 All of this amounted to a peculiar convergence of the 
military, financial and industrial worlds and also meant that the Armstrong‟s fate 
now rested on decisions made in Whitehall, the City of London and the 
boardroom of its old rival, Vickers. The question remained to what extent the 
government wished to become involved in the future of the arms industry. 
Plender discussed his findings with Lawrence, Jenkinson, Taylor and 
Peacock, and finalised a memorandum which Norman formally distributed to the 
Prime Minister‟s office, the Treasury, the Board of Trade and Sir Maurice Hankey 
on 22 June 1927.
156
 In his accompanying letters to Churchill and Sir Philip 
Cunliffe-Lister, the President of the Board of Trade, Norman emphasised the 
principle of rationalisation. Meanwhile, Lawrence and Peacock discussed the 
proposals in person with Sir Laming Worthington-Evans, the Secretary of State 
for War, and Sir Samuel Hoare, the Air Minister. However, William Bridgeman‟s 
participation in the Geneva Naval Conference meant they only saw an Admiralty 
representative.
157
 Norman appears to have believed in the possibility of state 
assistance and told Peacock that it was essentially a matter of tactics. Moreover, 
Peacock and Lawrence had faith in Norman‟s ability to influence both the Prime 
Minister and Treasury, with whom the Governor had held „entirely unofficial‟ 
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interviews before he officially presented them with the merger proposal.
158
 
Norman also received advice on preliminary drafts of Plender‟s memorandum 
from an unnamed „friend at the Treasury‟, who was presumably Sir Otto 
Niemeyer, the Controller of Finance, who subsequently left the Treasury in 
August to become a director of the Bank.
159
 Intriguingly, Niemeyer‟s departure 
from the Treasury followed increasing resentment by Churchill about the 
inflexible attitude of certain individuals at the Bank and on the permament staff of 
the Treasury: in particular, Churchill regretted his decision to restore sterling to 
the Gold Standard on the advice of Norman and Niemeyer.
160
 
It is worth looking more closely at the argument of the memorandum 
handed to the government. It not only offers an insight into the self-identity of two 
major arms firms after a tumultuous period of reflection and reorganisation, but it 
also put forward a definite case for the retention of private manufacture, nearly 
eight years before the Royal Commission‟s public hearings. Therefore, the 
government‟s response to the memorandum was invested with great significance, 
not just for British industry in general, but also for the relationship between the 
arms manufacturers and the state. 
The memorandum stated that the merger‟s purpose was „an attempt to 
rationalise industry [...] in harmony with the latest recommendation on such 
subjects, namely the Economic Conference at Geneva. To rationalise industry is 
surely to maintain it.‟161 It invoked the success of similar policies in the United 
States and Germany, and suggested the scheme would complement the 
government‟s efforts to encourage coal amalgamations. Therefore, Vickers and 
Armstrong hoped the government would extend the principle of the Trade 
Facilities Act, which had helped maintain other industries and employment, to 
meet their needs. To this extent, the scheme appeared to conform to existing 
thinking and policy regarding industrial reorganisation. 
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More contentiously, the whole approach to the government was based on 
the „thoroughly logical‟ argument that it was impossible and unfair to expect 
Vickers and Armstrong to exist as a „National reserve‟ in the event of war without 
reasonable compensation, and that the „National character of the new Company 
must be recognised‟.162 Lawrence had commented in January that, although the 
amount of armament business was „not sufficient to occupy profitably the 
capacity of either Company‟, it was „essential that such capacity should be 
available in the national interests in case of emergency.‟163 Although non-
specialist „commercial‟ factories had manufactured smaller items like shells and 
cartridge cases in bulk during the war, they could not easily or cheaply convert to 
the manufacture of larger armaments, such as heavy guns and mountings. 
Similarly, most commercial shipyards could not be „readily adapted‟ for warship 
building. The two firms therefore sought the government‟s „active cooperation in 
bringing about what is desirable in the interests of the country and of the 
Companies alike‟. Yet the idea of maintaining uneconomic capacity for national 
defence purposes conflicted with the pursuit of rationalisation. Indeed, the 
memorandum recognised that the „greatest economy would be effected if certain 
of the works were shut down and dismantled‟ but indicated the new company‟s 
willingness, if assistance was provided, to maintain otherwise unnecessary plant 
and skeleton staffs „in such condition that production could be restarted at any 
time should the Government require an increased output of armaments‟. The 
memorandum further suggested that, without such assistance, the existing works 
would be dismantled and the government could eventually find itself compelled to 
spend several million pounds on the extension of its own works and dockyards in 
the event of emergency.
164
 Therefore, this was not strictly „rationalisation‟, but 
rather a hybrid concept, designed to achieve a certain level of reorganisation while 
reflecting the arms industry‟s view of how its specialist capabilities fitted into 
industrial mobilisation. 
The new company, Vickers-Armstrongs, hoped to earn £1.25 million 
annual profits for dividend off share capital of £18 million (nearly 7 percent). 
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Plender‟s memorandum requested the government‟s help in reaching this figure 
during the initial transitional period and suggested these predicted earnings were 
reasonable given the „special nature‟ of the arms industry.165 Norman and Peacock 
felt that asking for a direct subsidy would „consolidate opposition‟ to the merger, 
owing to the Treasury‟s cost-cutting, the probable unpopularity of additional 
expenditure on armaments, and the likely outcry from other armaments firms.
166
 
A „rental‟ scheme, Norman noted, would likely prove more satisfactory to the 
service departments, particularly the Admiralty: it would give them the feeling 
they had certain rights in the armament business; it would be easier for the 
government to appear to be doing something for the Admiralty‟s benefit, rather 
than to be making up the profits of an arms company; and it would differentiate 
the new company from others that might ask the state for help.
167
 Alternatively, 
the government was offered the opportunity to purchase or guarantee profit notes 
to make up the difference if the new company‟s annual profits fell below £1.25 
million, which appeared likely in spite of various foreign orders already booked. 
This contribution would not exceed £300,000 per annum for the first five years 
after the merger and would be repaid, with interest, through subsequent profits 
over a ten year period after the last note was taken up on the condition that a 
sufficient number of profitable orders were obtained.
168
 
To protect the new company‟s domestic position, the memorandum asked 
the services to provide „definite guarantees‟ that they would provide the same 
proportion of armament contracts to the amalgamated works as they had given to 
Vickers and Armstrong separately, including those for finished guns, armour plate 
and naval gun-mountings.
169
 It also requested that, for a specified number of 
years, no orders for these products would be placed with any other company other 
than those presently supplying, and that the Barrow and Newcastle naval yards be 
treated as distinct for allocation of work.
170
 Therefore, the government would not 
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only have to provide monetary assistance, but also reduce competition and 
maintain a certain level of armament orders. In the prevailing political and 
economic climate, these requests raised controversial issues. First, the Geneva 
Naval Conference had opened on 20 June and forced the government to take a 
cautious line on matters concerning armaments. Second, the government was 
increasingly divided on the question of safeguarding for the iron and steel 
industry, which limited the government‟s ability to formulate a cohesive industrial 
policy and reflected a wider bickering in the Cabinet between free traders, of 
whom Churchill was amongst the most vocal, and protectionists such as Cunliffe-
Lister, Leopold Amery, the Colonial Secretary, and William Joynson-Hicks, the 
Home Secretary.
171
 Finally, industrialists were increasingly critical of the City of 
London‟s influence on official policy, especially the government‟s decision to 
return to the Gold Standard, which had handicapped the country‟s export trade 
and further exacerbated the divisions within the government.
172
 
Montagu Norman‟s personal support for the merger scheme was related to 
this milieu of criticism and represented a dramatic change in his attitude towards 
state assistance for industry. When Beardmore had applied for government aid in 
late 1926, Norman strongly advised against supporting the ailing Scottish firm. He 
had argued that the Exchequer could not afford it and state help would only hinder 
the introduction of „new blood and economy‟ through a receivership.173 Niemeyer 
shared Norman‟s orthodox view and feared that assistance would have the same 
disruptive effect as the subsidies given to the coal industry in the months before 
the General Strike.
174
 While the government considered Beardmore‟s plight, 
Cunliffe-Lister took the opportunity to raise the possibility of „some wider scheme 
of Government assistance with a view to the reconstruction of the iron and steel 
industry as a whole‟, involving state guarantees for £10-15 millions of fresh 
capital. Yet Churchill was already set against subsidising the steel industry, 
probably on Norman‟s advice, and discontinued the Trade Facilities Act in the 
1926 budget to demonstrate his disapproval.
175
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Yet just a few months later, Norman sent Niemeyer a copy of Plender‟s 
memorandum on the Vickers-Armstrongs scheme and asked „I hope you will 
somehow give support to these proposals‟.176 Norman‟s change of heart seems to 
have arisen from his feeling that Armstrong, unlike Beardmore, was already on 
the path to reorganisation, and the knowledge that receivership would cause the 
firm‟s armament contracts to dry up with fatal consequences. If Armstrong 
collapsed, it not only meant embarrassment for the Bank, but would also mean no 
chance of it recouping any of its losses, and it would have wider implications on 
the banking and industrial sectors owing to Armstrong‟s intricate web of 
subsidiaries, guarantees and debts. The traditional relationship between the 
government and the armaments industry offered the Bank a chance to free itself 
from these increasingly awkward obligations. Moreover, despite the proposal‟s 
„national‟ rhetoric, the state would not obtain any direct control over Vickers-
Armstrongs, even if it agreed to provide assistance. 
On 13 July the Cabinet appointed Churchill as chairman of a committee to 
analyse the merger proposals.
177
 The committee never actually met, but Churchill 
considered the written views of the services and his own department. Although 
Cunliffe-Lister was part of the committee, the Board of Trade appears to have 
submitted no memorandum. Tellingly, the heavy steel industry had renewed its 
application for safeguarding in July 1927: Cunliffe-Lister, favouring protection, 
appealed for an early decision, but the Cabinet rejected the application, adhering 
to its previous decision of December 1925.
178
 Meanwhile, Niemeyer took the 
opportunity to clarify his orthodox opposition to the Vickers-Armstrongs scheme. 
He supported the fusion in principle, as a lead for other firms in the steel trade, 
although he was unprepared to keep works open if it was not „economically right‟ 
to do so. He rejected the guarantee of profit notes, as this would require ad hoc 
legislation, carried the danger of further demands from the steel industry and other 
interests such as coal or agriculture, and went against the policy of reducing the 
government‟s claims on the investing public. The purchase of profit notes 
involved the same drawbacks and raised the difficulty of the government holding 
securities issued by a private firm that undertook business with government 
                                                 
176
 TNA, T 161/656/S.33094, Norman to Niemeyer, 22 June 1927. 
177
TNA, CAB 27/353/AFC(27)1, Armament Firms Committee: Composition, 18 July 1927. 
178
 Self, Tories and Tariffs, p.456. 
 144 
 
departments in competition with other firms. Niemeyer accepted that the rental 
scheme provided a certain „insurance benefit‟ with regard to national arms 
producing capacity and suggested that it was up to the service department to 
decide whether they would pay the premium, although he affirmed that this would 
be hard to defend while the Geneva Naval Conference was taking place.
179
 
The service departments‟ response was equivocal. Neither the Admiralty, 
despite its traditional sympathy towards the private arms industry, nor the War 
Office was willing to defend what was essentially a subsidy (the Air Ministry was 
not really concerned with the merger because it did not significantly affect the 
branches of the two companies that dealt in aircraft).
180
 The War Office 
questioned the specifics of the rationalisation scheme and pointed out that, before 
the question of government assistance arose, the new firm needed to prove its 
efficiency, give definite proof of its emergency capacity and show how it would 
provide value for money. Like Niemeyer, the service departments believed that 
other companies would perceive government assistance to one armament firm as 
unfair and that it would set an awkward precedent. 
In terms of wider thinking about industrial mobilisation, the War Office 
particularly disliked the suggestion to limit competition in favour of the new firm, 
because its policy was to encourage „new firms‟ and general engineers to 
manufacture deficient stores and increase capacity. Moreover, it argued that a 
programme of continuous orders, if combined with internal rationalisation 
measures, would enable the firms to carry on without direct government 
assistance.  
The services believed only certain parts of Armstrong‟s design department 
and manufacturing capacity were indispensable. The Admiralty admitted the vital 
importance of Elswick‟s gun-making and gun-mounting plant, but also compared 
Armstrong unfavourably with Vickers, whose „more judicious management‟ of 
resources meant that its continued existence did not require „extraneous help‟. It 
argued that Vickers had gone a long way towards reorganisation without 
assistance and they wondered why Armstrong could not do the same. Indeed, the 
services believed that even if Armstrong was forced into liquidation, „Vickers, or 
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possibly some other firm‟ might snap up some of Armstrong‟s resources for arms 
production. The War Office pragmatically suggested that if Armstrong went out 
of business, other firms could supply the same material and would also be able to 
produce items, such as the „dragon‟ tank and Browning gun, for which Armstrong 
currently held an exclusive licence. Moreover, the Admiralty felt the remaining 
members of the armour pool were „quite capable‟ of producing all the armour 
plate it required, even if Armstrong disappeared. 
The War Office based its estimation of the firms‟ importance to national 
defence upon the Principal Supply Officers Committee‟s findings to date, 
although it admitted that these investigations were not advanced enough to make 
any definite statements and that in some cases the PSOC was working on 
exaggerated requirements for war stores. Indeed, the War Office pointed out that 
the question of the two firms‟ importance for national defence would require a 
great deal more time and investigation than was available. Given Vickers was 
clearly the stronger party, Barstow at the Treasury commented that the foundation 
of the whole problem was whether Armstrong was indispensable, either for 
current peace requirements, for a minor war, or for a war of national effort in 
which all three Fighting Services were simultaneously engaged to the maximum 
extent. Barstow suggested that this latter postulate be further developed by the 
government giving directions to the services, and not the other way round: 
 
That the nations of the world should, with 1914-18 
fresh in their minds, be so misguided as to embark 
on another such war seems unthinkable, but whether 
the Government would be justified in framing their 
defence policy on the basis of the impossibility of a 




The opportunity for further discussion along these interesting lines was curtailed 
on 25 July, when Niemeyer seized Churchill with the urgency of giving Norman 
an answer to prevent the merger scheme dying of „boredom and inanition.‟ 
Niemeyer recognised that Armstrong faced a „very large collapse‟, but thought 
that even if the government refused to help, the merger would probably still go 
ahead, albeit in a different form.
182
 Therefore, on 29 July Churchill informed 
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Norman that, although the government was anxious to encourage amalgamations, 
it could not agree to support the proposals financially.
183
  
Given the constraints acting upon politicians in the summer of 1927, this 
rejection was hardly surprising. The significance stemmed more from the 
nonchalant manner with which the scheme was dismissed and the government‟s 
apparent confidence that the arms industry, and Britain‟s overall arms-producing 
capacity, would not be significantly affected by its decision. This resulted from a 
combination of orthodox economic theory, the relative infancy of industrial 
mobilisation planning and probably a degree of strategic complacency. 
Continuing to suspect a civil service conspiracy, Taylor heard rumours that junior 
Admiralty officials, as opposed to the „higher ups‟ were against the merger.184 In 
fact, officials assumed that Vickers‟ stronger position gave it the ability to 
promote reorganisation from within the industry, a much more palatable and 
orthodox solution for the government than the alternatives offered in Plender‟s 
memorandum. Yet this did not solve Armstrong or the Bank‟s particular 




Despite the government‟s refusal to invest in the Vickers-Armstrongs scheme and 
after nearly a decade of failure and upheaval, the arms industry had a number of 
reasons to be optimistic in the summer of 1927. Many of its problems since 1918 
were caused less by the availability of money and more by the way finance was 
handled: a lack of careful accounting, combined with a paucity of vision on the 
ageing boards of the individual companies meant that funds were not channelled 
in productive directions. Through their pursuit of costly and disastrous 
diversification projects in slump conditions, the firms were forced to realise that 
their pre-war managerial structures and personnel could no longer cope. As the 
Daily Herald put it, the relative lack of arms orders exposed their „incompetent 
boards of directors‟.185 Therefore, it was unsurprising that so many accountants 
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and bankers became involved in what practically amounted to a revolution in the 
management of the arms industry. The Times even suggested that many of its 
troubles could have been avoided had the directors included competent financial 
experts from the beginning.
186
 In a harsh but necessary lesson, diversification 
unintentionally cut away the dead wood, prompted a series of internal enquiries, 
and ultimately enabled the stronger units to survive.  
Successive governments, mired in the general difficulties facing industry 
and labour, appeared to ignore the arms manufacturers‟ struggles. Instead, the 
financial community, and particularly the Bank of England, became increasingly 
involved and it is not far-fetched to refer to an active financial-industrial 
relationship supplanting the state‟s own comparatively stagnant relationship with 
the arms industry, although the bankers obviously could not provide the firms 
with arms contracts. The Bank‟s importance was not just monetary but also 
psychological, for even though the Bank acted largely in its own interests, it was 
at least doing something in the face of a succession of apparently indifferent 
governments. For instance, the Bank provided a new channel of communication 
with the all-important Treasury, although continued civil service antipathy 
forestalled a more active collaboration. 
The Vickers-Armstrongs rationalisation project was the centrepiece of the 
unusual collaboration between the armourers and bankers. Nonetheless, the 
government rejected the scheme, not only because it went against its orthodox 
economic instincts, but also from the industrial mobilisation perspective. The 
Principal Supply Officers Committee was not yet fully operational as a means of 
gauging a particular firm‟s importance and the services did not see any immediate 
need either to maintain Armstrong individually or to ensure the retention of its 
capacity, especially in the face of Vickers‟ apparent health. Crucially, the services 
concluded that the arms industry as it stood was sufficient to meet the country‟s 
short-term needs or any realistic contingencies. It is perhaps unfair to criticise the 
government too harshly for this, given the difficult conditions of domestic finance 
and relatively peaceful state of international relations, but its rejection of the 
scheme further confirmed the suspicion that it did not much care about the fate of 
the private armament manufacturers. 
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Despite this, and perhaps most importantly given its identity crisis in the 
immediate post-war years, the arms industry gained a much stronger sense of 
direction and purpose from its struggles. From the mid-1920s firms were 
increasingly prepared to admit that they were primarily armament manufacturers, 
rather than wide-ranging commercial concerns with a sideline in armaments. 
Crucially, this meant the industry would sink or swim by making guns and 
warships, rather than sewing machines and toys. With Vickers keen to take 
advantage of its rivals‟ weaknesses, and the Bank of England fearing the 
consequences of inaction, the stage was set for a comprehensive restructuring of 




4. Reorganisation and Renaissance: Vickers and the Bank of 
England, 1927-36 
 
It must now be clear to the minds of all concerned, that the Industries in 
this Country engaged in the manufacture of Heavy and Special Steel, of 
Armaments, Naval Shipbuilding and the industries allied to these 
undertakings, if it had been practicable, should have been dealt with by 
some method of amalgamation or cooperation after the close of the War. 






Most inter-war British industrialists were largely indifferent to reorganisation and 
preferred to believe their troubles were primarily external, blaming high wage 
costs, high taxation, restrictive practices and, by the end of the 1920s, free trade.
2
 
Vickers Limited was a dynamic exception: having restructured itself in the mid-
1920s, it now sought to consolidate and improve its position as Britain‟s pre-
eminent armament manufacturer. At the same time, the Bank of England 
continued its unusual relationship with the arms industry. Montagu Norman, the 
Bank‟s idiosyncratic Governor, has frequently been credited with „rescuing‟ the 
arms industry; and this has been viewed as a precursor to his more ambitious 
involvement in wider industrial regeneration projects.
3
 His interventions have also 
drawn the attention of historians who have sought to explain this deviation from 
the Bank‟s usual policy of standing aloof from industrial affairs.4 In fact, 
Norman‟s primary motivation remained his desire to cover up the Bank‟s over-
generous loans and ill-advised investments. Certainly, in the absence of 
government assistance he offered valuable support but he also shied away from a 
more active role. Although he subsequently had grandiose visions of „rescuing‟ 
British heavy industry more generally, he rarely addressed the specific issues of 
armaments production.  
Norman‟s caution left the door open for more visionary leadership and 
Vickers was able to use the Bank‟s involvement to its own advantage. In his study 
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of the inter-war steel industry Steven Tolliday has argued that the Bank ended up 
as Vickers‟ „unwilling accomplice‟.5 This idea rewards further exploration in the 
context of armaments manufacture. The Bank displayed little understanding of the 
political aspect of arms production and tended to view the problem from a rather 
one-dimensional economic perspective. The potentially disastrous consequences 
of this attitude were graphically revealed when the Bank became involved in the 
faltering reorganisation of Beardmore, a company which possessed little in the 
way of vitality. By contrast, Vickers actively pursued its vision of a modern, 
streamlined and competitive armaments industry, able to cope with the prevailing 
economic conditions as well as political developments. It emerged as the 
dominant force in an unequal partnership with Armstrong and weathered both 
depression and disarmament to become a powerful and competitive holding 
company. Under its guidance, the British arms industry was kept in a much 
healthier state than the contemporary ministers and policymakers assumed, and 
Vickers was well-placed to take advantage of rearmament. 
The Bank of England Steps in: Montagu Norman’s Involvement and Motives 
 
A merger with Armstrong was always going to be unattractive from Vickers‟ 
perspective unless the savings from the amalgamation proved substantial and 
direct help was obtained to cover the cost of maintaining reserve plant.
6
 Indeed, 
Vickers appeared to make government assistance an „absolute condition‟ of the 
scheme.
7
 Even before the official approach to the government in summer 1927, 
Peacock observed how Vickers was worried „particularly about the income to be 
received for the next two years, because they see a substantial amount in sight in 
their own business, and fear they may not get it out of the merger.‟8 Indeed, an 
„intensely disappointed‟ Vickers interpreted Churchill‟s negative reply „to mean 
that the Government can afford to be indifferent and that there will be little 
armament business going over, say, the next 10 years.‟ Taylor responded that this 
gave a „stronger reason than ever for fusion‟, although he also felt that, if the 
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scheme fell through, Armstrong could be „rejuvenated‟ by „suitable mergers in 
other directions.‟9 
At the Bank of England, Norman was determined for the merger to go 
ahead. On 20 June, two days before he delivered the proposals to the government, 
he had written that the Bank should conditionally provide the required financial 
assistance in the event of rejection, describing the scheme as „desirable‟ from 
Vickers standpoint, but „essential‟ for Armstrong, the Bank and the country.10 
Therefore, after receiving Churchill‟s negative reply, he asked Taylor and 
Peacock to consider the lines on which progress could be made. Surprisingly, 
Norman hoped the merger could be „turned the other way‟ and made entirely 
rational under peace conditions. He stated: „It is important that the new Company 
detach itself openly from the armament business to the extent that that business 
will not be remunerative.‟11 This meant no skeleton staffs or reserves for national 
emergency, but only the retention of economical industrial units.
12
 Indeed, 
Norman had been concerned about the „physical difficulties of separating 
armament from commercial works‟ from the outset of the merger negotiations.13 
Norman‟s attitude worried Frater Taylor, who wanted to forget the word 
„commercial‟ altogether, given the supplementary nature of the non-armament 
business undertaken by the works proposed for fusion. For example, Vickers did 
not want Armstrong‟s Scotswood locomotive plant included in the merger 
because of its predominantly „commercial‟ character, whereas Armstrong did 
want it included, suggesting it was essentially an ammunition factory with 
capacity for shell production.
14
 Norman was presumably confused, and was likely 
referring to the works that would remain with Armstrong after the fusion. These 
were purely „commercial‟ undertakings, involving shipbuilding, marine 
engineering, locomotives, iron castings and various other light and heavy 
engineering products. Taylor believed he could turn these into an effective profit-
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making enterprise, although he admitted he was possibly „seeing visions and 
dreaming dreams‟.15 
The Bank of England‟s involvement with the Vickers-Armstrongs merger 
was one of its earliest interventions into inter-war industrial affairs and 
represented a controversial break from Norman‟s traditional views. His 
motivations therefore require closer examination although, as with many of his 
dealings, his actions are often hard to fathom. He certainly gave the impression he 
was undertaking a national burden. In May 1926 he had described the Armstrong 
question to Lord Weir as „important from the industrial and perhaps from the 
national standpoint‟.16 The following November, he wrote how „the future of 
these huge armament or iron and steel concerns should really be treated as 
national questions.‟17 He considered the best way forward for the merger was an 
altered version of the profit note scheme, for which he obtained the consent of the 
Bank‟s Committee of Treasury on 3 August 1927.18 Such support was an unusual 
step for the Bank of England and Norman elaborated his motives at a meeting on 
23 August, explaining how he was less concerned with Armstrong or Vickers 
individually, but that „it was absolutely vital to the Country to rationalise industry, 
and unless a leader could be found, this seemed likely to be long delayed‟. 
Norman also hoped to maintain employment and provide a „worthy example to 
follow.‟19 He warmed to this theme the following day, while addressing the 
Bank‟s Committee of Treasury:  
 
The object of the Bank‟s contribution might be 
explained as an endeavour to bring about the 
rationalisation of the iron and steel industry and to 
avoid the increase of unemployment and 
disturbance of labour which would be involved by 
the closing of works by the Receivership of 
Armstrong Whitworth and Co.
20
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However, Norman‟s support for the merger did not meet with wholehearted 
approval within the Bank. E. N. Travers, of the Bank‟s Branch Office, held the 
personal view that the „accounts of huge trading and industrial concerns who in 
the aftermath of Wars are bound to be affected to their very depths are not 
accounts which should be accepted by the Bank of England at all.‟21 Not only was 
such business gravely affected by industrial, political and international 
disturbances but Travers also feared that direct support could be construed as 
Bank approval of the company‟s general policy.22 Indeed, the Bank‟s 
simultaneous existence as an orthodox central bank and Armstrong‟s commercial 
banker, posed a tricky dilemma.
23
 Walter Layton observed how Armstrong‟s 
account, probably the largest of the Bank‟s industrial customers, was something 
of a historical oddity, and „would certainly not be on its books at all if the Bank of 
England were starting afresh.‟24 
Certainly Norman and others within the Bank were unhappy at the 
appearance of the huge loans they had granted showing up on Armstrong‟s 
balance sheets.
25
 In the aftermath of Taylor‟s initial report in April 1926, 
Anderson, the deputy governor, suggested that  
 
it would be wise to clear up the mess while the 
recent Vickers enquiry is fresh in everyone‟s mind 
and while it is common knowledge that, even with 
the best and most prudent management, an 
Armament Company, a Shipbuilder, a Steel and 
Iron concern, are all of them bound to have had 
serious trade losses, still more a concern like 
A[rmstrong].W[hitworth]. which had by the divine 
will of Providence combined all the most losing 
businesses. It seems to be that the spring cleaning 
has got to be public – the Armstrong Board must 




Yet although the Bank wished to distance itself from Armstrong, it could not 
simply walk away in view of its huge financial commitments and those of certain 
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clearing banks, and therefore continued to play an important behind-the-scenes 
role in the company‟s affairs. Nonetheless, the assistance it provided to the new 
armaments company remained hidden from the public until 1936.
27
 For example, 
when the merger scheme was publicly announced, the Financial News on 4 
November 1927 referred to the Bank‟s „generous assistance‟ to Armstrong, but 
only in the context of the 1926 moratorium scheme. 
The unique nature of the Bank‟s support meant that it possessed no 
machinery through which to transfer money to Vickers-Armstrongs and it 
therefore improvised a rather convoluted arrangement. Norman „wished the help 
he was prepared to give arranged by an outside party, and not as coming from the 
Bank of England‟ although the Bank would fully safeguard the guarantor.28 He 
suggested the Sun Insurance Company could act as guarantor, trustee „or whatever 
the lawyers may wish to call it‟, because using a bank like Barings would imply 
Norman‟s involvement. Lawrence approved of the idea and Norman noted: „From 
the public standpoint such an Insurance Company would seem an obvious concern 
to give the required guarantee and from our standpoint the camouflage should be 
complete.‟29 For the insurance premium, Vickers-Armstrongs paid £400 per 
annum.
30
 Although the circulars asking the two companies‟ shareholders to 
consent to the fusion referred to the Sun contract, the Bank‟s involvement 
remained „absolutely secret.‟31 This was a strange attitude in view of Norman‟s 
previous declarations that he had hoped to provide national leadership to promote 
further reorganisation! 
Through the Sun Insurance arrangement, the Bank offered to provide up to 
£200,000 annually to bring Vickers-Armstrongs profits, if required, up to 
£900,000 for the year in question. This assistance would last for five years, with 
repayment coming out of profits over a period of fifteen years from the date of the 
last profit note taken up.
32
 The accountants Deloitte, Plender, Griffiths and 
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Company would certify the amount payable to the new company under the 
guarantee, or the amount payable to the guarantor, in each financial year.
33
 At a 
meeting of the involved parties on 23 August, Norman, on „his best form‟, 
outlined the help he was prepared to give.
34
 Taylor and Lawrence expressed their 
gratitude, although the latter grumbled that fifteen years was too lengthy a period 
of repayment. However, the Bank did not want its generosity to end in further 
losses.
35
 Although the final agreement was less satisfactory than had been hoped 
for by the Bank and Armstrong, it was also considered the only course affording 
„immediate relief‟ and „in all probability some eventual means of recovery.‟36 
Despite Norman‟s enthusiasm, his ability to provide leadership for the 
Vickers-Armstrongs merger was limited by his innate caution, and desire for the 
Bank to cover up its involvement as much as possible, combined with his lack of 
understanding of the armaments business. Taylor‟s reports had exposed the 
embarrassing and potentially disastrous extent of Armstrong‟s difficulties, and the 
Bank, through its function as a commercial bank, had helped fund the company‟s 
road to virtual ruin. Unsurprisingly, it wished to maintain a low public profile 
during reconstruction, leaving the door open for more visionary leadership. 
The Vickers-Armstrongs Merger and the Arms Industry’s New Structure 
 
The negotiations to finalise the merger arrangements naturally involved a certain 
amount of give and take and Vickers took a much larger share than Armstrong. 
Based on Plender‟s calculations, Webster Jenkinson argued that Vickers could 
earn £600,000 annual profits for the next few years and predicted that Armstrong 
would make only half that amount. Taylor responded that Armstrong‟s 
reconstruction needed time to come into effect and that Jenkinson‟s appraisal did 
not take into account the goodwill attached to the Armstrong name. Nonetheless, 
in mid-August Vickers increased its demands and requested a 2.55:1 profit 
sharing ratio in its favour, compared to the previous, tentative arrangement for 
1.65.1. Unsurprisingly, Taylor rejected these terms.
37
 Norman wondered if 
„breaking point‟ had been reached but Plender brought the key individuals to the 
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table on 17 and 18 August and, after lengthy negotiations, they agreed to split the 
dividend 2:1 in Vickers‟ favour.38 
Armstrong‟s representatives gloomily accepted this agreement. Taylor 
pointed out the alternative to the terms „imposed‟ by Vickers was „war to the 
knife‟ between the two companies.39 Peacock commented that though the 
outcome was less favourable to Armstrong, it was still the best way out.
40
 Norman 
bluntly described it as „suicide for the [Armstrong] shareholders: suicide of course 
which merely translates the implicit into an explicit position!‟41 On 25 August, the 
Armstrong advisory committee unanimously agreed to recommend acceptance of 
these terms, while Vickers‟ board had expressed its approval the previous week 
albeit with a certain amount of opposition.
42
 Taylor described it as „the least of 
two evils‟ and later reflected that, had it not been for some uncertainty on existing 
contracts, he would have stood up for better terms from Vickers. He also criticised 




As a result of the merger, Vickers-Armstrongs would obtain a monopoly 
over gun-mounting manufacture. At the end of August, Sir Charles Craven and 
Taylor worried that the government might attempt to break its hold over this „very 
special and profitable‟ field, by giving contracts for such work to Beardmore. 
They therefore suggested that Vickers-Armstrongs should acquire a measure of 
control over the Scottish firm, although Peacock did not quite see how to bring 
this about, and a subsequent talk with Jenkinson apparently calmed Taylor 
down.
44
 Their suggestion was not without precedent: an earlier draft of the merger 
scheme had suggested that the formation of the new armaments company would 
facilitate the acquisition of the corresponding interests of Beardmore, although 
this idea vanished from later revisions.
45
 Interestingly, Lord Weir, who felt the 
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government „ought to‟ help Vickers and Armstrong, suggested he could be of 
some use after the scheme was officially turned down: Armstrong‟s 
representatives felt Weir‟s close connection to Lord Invernairn implied a desire to 
help Beardmore at the same time.
46
  
Beardmore‟s advisory committee admitted the firm was „in a bad way‟ and 
in need of rationalisation. Therefore it approached Norman to see if the Vickers-
Armstrongs scheme could admit a third party.
47
 Lawrence wrote to Norman on 7 
October that the scheme was undoubtedly elastic enough to include Beardmore 
although he wondered whether it was worth further delaying the merger to 
accommodate the Glaswegian firm. Instead, he suggested that Sir Gilbert 
Garnsey, who was a member of the Beardmore committee and well-versed in 
Armstrong‟s problems, should hold preliminary discussions with Jenkinson.48 
Garnsey subsequently informed Taylor that Vickers seemed entirely averse to any 
arrangement with Beardmore in the immediate future.
49
 For his part, Taylor was 
more interested in tactfully using Beardmore as a „Club‟ against Vickers.50 
Therefore, Beardmore was left out of the fusion and Vickers-Armstrongs‟ 
executive committee decided to continue this policy in spring 1928: Taylor 
personally concluded that the new company should get its „own house into good 
going order‟ first.51 
On 1 November 1927 Armstrong‟s board of directors affixed the 
company‟s seal to the agreement with Vickers. Lord Southborough suggested the 
agreement „may become famous or infamous, but the former I hope‟.52 Many of 
the initial press reactions were positive: The Times stated that it „would be hard to 
name an amalgamation in industry equal in importance‟, but affirmed that its 
impact lay more in the economic significance to general industry, rather than the 
advantages to the individual companies. The Manchester Guardian similarly 
viewed it as an „important step‟ in the much-needed reorganisation of the British 
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iron and steel industry. The Daily Telegraph remarked that the merger was 
symbolic of general confidence that the engineering world would emerge 
strengthened from depression by a process of amalgamations. The Financial News 
singled out Vickers‟ own prior reconstruction for praise.53 The press attention 
therefore focused more on the economic impact of the fusion, and its wider 
significance for the heavy engineering and iron and steel sectors, rather than the 
specific consequences for armaments production.  
On 28 November Armstrong‟s beleaguered stock and shareholders were 
told that the company needed to write down £11 million of capital and that the 
amalgamation was a matter of urgent necessity. Taylor informed the shareholders 
that 65 percent of Armstrong‟s loss resulted from poor investments, and described 
the failure of Newfoundland and firm‟s civil engineering projects. The only hope 
for the shareholders remained in the company‟s commercial non-armament 
operations, which remained outside the merger.
54
 Sir Edwin Cornwall told the 
debenture holders that the amalgamation would release these works from the 
„heavy financial drain of the Armament business‟, and pointed out that the new 
arms company, once rationalisation had taken effect, should yield £350,000 
annually to Armstrong.
55
 The audience voiced a great deal of criticism about the 
firm‟s past mismanagement, in contrast to the relatively sanguine atmosphere at 
Vickers‟ meetings.56 Nonetheless, both companies‟ stock and shareholders 
sanctioned the merger at the end of November.
57
 
After a year of hard work and bargaining, Vickers-Armstrongs was 
incorporated as a new company on 31 December 1927 with a share capital limited 
to £21 million. Of the issued share capital, Vickers held approximately £8.5 
million to Armstrong‟s £4.5 million and Vickers also held the bulk of the seven 
percent preference shares.
58
 Taylor, feeling Vickers‟ had „driven too hard a 
bargain‟, managed to re-negotiate the capital division in October, so that 
Armstrong‟s shareholders were more assured of dividends.59 Even so, Vickers 
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„scored heavily at the expense of its rival‟, but this was neither surprising nor 
unfair given its much stronger financial position.
60
 It now used its strength to 
provide a clear direction for Vickers-Armstrongs‟ operations during a period of 
continued external difficulty for the armaments business. 
 The process of reorganisation began immediately. At the start of 1928 
Craven, drawing upon his earlier success at Barrow, set to work at Elswick. A 
year later he had attained significant economies, although the works were only 
employing 5,000 men out of a capacity of 12,000 and desperately required more 
armament work. At Sheffield, the gun and tank department also needed more 
work, but was helped by a Spanish order for fifteen-inch guns. Erith and Dartford, 
employing 2,800 and 800 individuals respectively, undertook smaller scale 
armament work, and were in a generally satisfactory position. The Naval Yard at 
Newcastle, with an employment capacity of 5,000 people, was closed and could 
not be economically re-opened unless the Barrow yard became fully occupied, or 
an order for a „huge vessel beyond the capacity of Barrow‟ was received.61 
One of the merger‟s explicit purposes was to retain arms-producing 
capacity, but this did not stop some of Vickers‟ directors questioning how 
Vickers-Armstrongs could flourish on current orders. In February 1928 General 
Birch informed Lawrence that „it will be impossible to pay a reasonable dividend 
to the shareholders if we continue to make armaments our principal source of 
revenue.‟ Birch suggested that the firm should look to industrial and commercial 
products to earn its profits, given that land orders only covered working costs and 
to cover any slackening of naval contracts. He was not advocating a return to 
diversification, but rather suggesting that the firm use its plant in a pragmatic 
fashion, such as employing its tank producing facilities to make commercial 
tractors. He argued that this policy would enable the firm to gather any „windfall‟ 
that arose from an exceptional increase in arms orders, owing to a revised military 
programme or a war.
62
 George Vickers, a special director at the Sheffield works, 
expressed similar views a few days later and emphasised the necessity of 
improving the company‟s steelworks.63 On 17 March, George Buckham, a 
Vickers director, countered that Vickers was primarily an armament firms rather 
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than a general industrial firm, and put forward his own answer to the question 
„Are Armaments dead?‟ 
 
In these days we hear much about the restriction of 
armaments, and if all we read is correct, then they 
are certainly dying, but I think in spite of all 
arguments, that the only way to prevent war is to be 
ready for war, and if this is true, then armaments 




Buckham suggested that the worldwide mechanisation of armies and continued 
international disturbances improved the prospects for arms work, and urged the 
firm to modernise its plant so that it could manufacture steel as economically as 
its overseas rivals.
65
 The net result of this internal debate was that Vickers should 
remain predominantly identified with arms production, although it would not put 
all of its eggs into the one basket.
66
 
George Taylor, Buckham‟s colleague at Sheffield, believed that Vickers-
Armstrongs was only a starting point for rationalisation, although Frater Taylor, 
Peacock and Norman suspected him of being a „crook‟ up to „hanky panky‟.67 
Vickers had worried for some time about its ability to produce steel and its 
representatives visited Germany, Belgium and the United States for inspiration. 
After the merger, it became clear that Armstrong‟s Openshaw steelworks was 
even more outdated. Therefore Vickers-Armstrongs possessed two steelmaking 
plants neither of which was efficient or able to compete globally. George Taylor 
believed that the new firm‟s survival depended on its ability to supply heavy 
industrial products competitively and that this required the construction of a 
world-class steelworks and forge: the alternative was „oblivion‟.68  
These ideas formed the basis of George Taylor‟s proposal of September 
1928 that Vickers-Armstrongs should amalgamate with other armament steel 
producers to reduce obsolete and uneconomic plant and improve efficiency, 
including in armour plate manufacture.
69
 The resultant English Steel Corporation, 
formed by agreement on 17 December 1928, fused the steelmaking plant of 
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Vickers, Vickers-Armstrongs and Cammell Laird, although it did not include 
Beardmore, John Brown and Thomas Firth.
70
 The agreement covered the 
manufacture of armour plate, bullet-proof plate and forgings for guns, although 
the ESC was forbidden to produce warships, ordnance or other kinds of 
armaments.
71
 With its armour plant included in the ESC, and the previous closure 
of its Coventry Ordnance Works in 1925, Cammell Laird‟s activities were 
subsequently confined to shipbuilding and repair work.
72
 
As 1928 drew to a close, it marked the end of a tumultuous decade for the 
British private armaments industry. The arms-producing elements of Vickers, 
Armstrong and Cammell Laird were now reorganised into Vickers-Armstrongs 
and the English Steel Corporation, both of which primarily came under the 
umbrella of Vickers Limited. Yet amidst the optimism surrounding these 
developments, Beardmore remained in great difficulty. It had only just presented 
its own reorganisation proposals to its shareholders and noteholders, which 
involved the writing down of nearly £3 million of share capital. Despite this, Lord 
Invernairn, the firm‟s chairman, hoped that news of its reconstruction would bring 
in much-needed orders. Beardmore‟s representatives also pointed out this 
reorganisation contained „special provisions [...] enabling the company to sell to, 
or amalgamate any part of its undertaking with, others having objects similar to its 
own‟.73  
Frederick Szarvasy, the chairman of Beardmore‟s advisory committee, 
continued to believe that Beardmore should ultimately end up in the Vickers-
Armstrongs group. In late 1928 he asked Frater Taylor to join Beardmore‟s board 
and keep the matter warm until the appropriate time. However, Taylor, supported 
by Norman, did not wish to join the board, while Peacock felt that Paine, who was 
already on the Beardmore committee, could play the role anticipated for Taylor.
74
 
Subsequently, Sir William McLintock agreed to talk to Beardmore from Vickers‟ 
standpoint. Norman said nothing beyond warning that if more water were allowed 
to run under the bridge, Beardmore would be reduced simply to a nuisance 
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 It appeared that another of Vickers‟ old rivals faced absorption or 
obliteration. 
Beardmore and the Bank 
 
Montagu Norman, rather than Vickers, ultimately took on responsibility for 
Beardmore. The Bank of England had refused to assist the Scottish firm with a £1 
million mortgage scheme in October 1928, but Norman panicked the following 
summer when the new Labour government seemed ready to intervene in 
Beardmore‟s affairs. Fearing a socialist solution, he pre-emptively stepped in 
himself. The Bank aimed to place the company on a self-standing basis, with a 
fully reorganised management, although it concentrated more on the liquidation 
and retrenchment of Beardmore‟s assets rather than full-blown rationalisation. 
Frater Taylor was reluctantly persuaded to help in the reorganisation but he grew 
increasing tired of the City of London‟s „ultra-conservative‟ attitude and left the 
project in early 1930.
76
 
The Bank‟s involvement with Beardmore was quite different from its 
experience with Armstrong. The latter case had been an ad hoc response to an 
ailing customer‟s problems but, partly as a result of this, the Bank subsequently 
became interested in the structured reorganisation of entire industries, including 
steel and cotton. Beardmore fitted, somewhat awkwardly, into this ambition. 
While the Vickers-Armstrongs merger was surreptitiously financed under the Sun 
Insurance „camouflage‟, the Bank required more permanent and visible machinery 
to sustain its new projects. To this end, it created the Securities Management Trust 
(SMT) in November 1929, to look after its holdings of industrial securities, which 
included Armstrong and Beardmore, and to scrutinise future reorganisation 
projects. It also formed the Banker‟s Industrial Development Company in 1930, 
which arranged finance for reconstruction schemes and sponsored the formation 
of the National Shipbuilders Security Company.
77
 Davenport-Hines has suggested 
that had such a financial trust existed in 1918, it might have helped Vickers adjust 
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more effectively to post-war conditions.
78
 Clearly the same is applicable, if not 
more so, to Armstrong, which definitely lacked sensible financial direction in the 
immediate post-war era. 
Frank Hodges, a director of Securities Management Trust and a former 
leader of the Miners‟ Federation of Great Britain, suggested that Norman‟s 
motives towards Beardmore were twofold: to prevent social unrest in Glasgow 
and to provide enough money to maintain the company during an „orderly 
liquidation‟ of its assets. The Bank advanced £750,000 for these purposes, which 
was secured by debenture stock. In 1931 Hodges lamented that this money had 
not been applied towards Norman‟s objectives but that instead virtually all of it 
had been used to pay off outstanding liabilities to other banks, creditors and 
debenture holders. Therefore, Beardmore was left in an impossible situation: it 
had to pay the interest and charges on the £750,000 advance, but hardly any cash 
was coming into the business to fund the improvements that would allow an 
efficient liquidation. Hodges suggested that the Bank had been wrongly advised in 
putting its money forward and wrote that „No scheme more calculated to thwart 
the attainment of the Governor‟s two objectives could have been devised than the 
one which came into operation.‟79 
Beardmore‟s problems were not limited to financial matters. In June 1930, 
a report on the company‟s administration painted a bleak picture: Beardmore 
possessed a poor costing system and selling organisation while it had no 
centralised control or independent inspection arrangements. Overall, the firm‟s 
lack of drive was symbolically reflected in its inefficient and run-down works, 
where tattered corrugated roofing let in the rain and damaged the valuable plant 
beneath. Some optimism remained, based on the reserves of loyalty and 
enthusiasm amongst the workforce, but the value of this was contingent on the 
firm‟s leadership.80  
The Bank of England, having emerged from the lengthy process of 
recovering Armstrong‟s armament business, now found itself in a similar situation 
with Beardmore. Hans Reincke, formerly the senior manager of John Brown, 
became Beardmore‟s chairman in February 1930. He wrote in July 1931 that the 
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outside „talk‟ about the firm‟s difficulties contributed to its internal problems, 
which included poor management, the dilapidated condition of the works and the 
resultant inevitable losses. Reincke also reported that Norman had made 
representations to the Admiralty regarding Beardmore‟s ability to carry out a 
contract for destroyer machinery.
81
 As with Armstrong before, Beardmore 
required Admiralty orders to remain afloat, but it could not provide the required 
guarantees. A large contract in 1932 placed Norman in a dilemma: as the 
government‟s banker he could not advise that it should place the contract with a 
firm whose continued existence was uncertain, but at the same time, if Beardmore 
did not get the order, the firm‟s demise would be inevitable. He was therefore 
forced to make another exceptional arrangement and reloaned Beardmore the 
interest it had paid on its previous loans so that it could undertake the contract.
82
 
Reincke‟s overall vision was for a wider scheme of rationalisation between 
Parkhead, the most competitive and promising of Beardmore‟s works, and the 
Sheffield armament grouping of the English Steel Corporation and John Brown. 
However, he feared that certain personalities stood in the way of this, and hoped 
the bankers or even the government would set up a committee to force it through. 
He also hoped that the government could be prevailed upon to give industry a 
protective tariff for the period of reorganisation.
83
 In the meantime, Beardmore 
continued to struggle. Sir James Lithgow wrote in November 1932 that 
Parkhead‟s personnel were below par and lacked a first-class manager. As a 
result, Beardmore was looked upon locally as „a kind of ragtime crew‟. Lithgow 
suggested that A. G. MacFarlane, a director at Parkhead, was a „tower of 
strength‟, but with limitations: he was „suffering from boils in an awkward place 
and generally seems to be badly run down.‟84 MacFarlane rather personified the 
firm‟s problems in general and, overall, Beardmore‟s plight perhaps represented 
what Armstrong could have expected had it not merged with Vickers. The Bank 
of England simply did not have the independent knowledge or will to save an 
individual arms firm: moreover, as Tolliday has pointed out, the Bank proved 
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Vickers’ Ascendancy  
 
In stark contrast to Beardmore‟s lethargy, Vickers possessed a range of dynamic 
individuals, who reflected its forward-thinking ethos. In its drawing office it had 
Sir John Carden, the gifted tank designer who, between his arrival in 1928 and 
premature death in 1935, helped to bring in £3 million of tank and tractor orders.
86
 
The firm‟s financial affairs were directed by Jenkinson, a man with clear views on 
industrial organisation and who believed that industry needed men „with a future‟ 
rather than individuals who got by on name alone.
87
 In charge of the works were 
unique individuals like Craven, who was as adept at handling people as he was at 
reorganising the plant.
88
 At the head of this talented group stood the enigmatic 
character of General Lawrence. After talking with Lawrence in December 1926, 
Norman was puzzled, „partly because the principle involved in this armament 
question is so vast and national and difficult, and partly because the General was 
so honest that his intention to gobble the rest is now clear.‟89 Much more than 
Norman, Lawrence personified and understood the unique connections between 
heavy industry, the City of London and national defence that characterised the 
inter-war armaments business. Besides his chairmanship of Vickers, Lawrence 
was also a director of Glyn Mills, the Army‟s bank, and he had served in the Boer 
War and as General Haig‟s Chief of Staff in the Great War.90 Crucially, he 
provided clear leadership which, combined with the other firms‟ weaknesses and 
the Bank of England‟s caution, enabled Vickers to emerge as both the dominant 
force in both Vickers-Armstrongs and the British armaments industry more 
generally.  
Vickers‟ attitude and policies towards the new company nonetheless 
provoked antagonism with Armstrong‟s representatives. Frater Taylor vocally 
criticised the bureaucratic „management by theorists‟ that he felt prevailed at 
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Vickers-Armstrongs. He even made the „wild‟ suggestion to Peacock that those 
involved in Armstrong‟s affairs should acquire a big block of Vickers‟ shares, to 
gain „a measure of control in the Company which really matters.‟91 More 
realistically, Taylor felt Vickers-Armstrongs needed a „first class fellow at the top 
who, if necessary, will knock a lot of those Directors heads together.‟ He did not 
desire this position himself but did feel that Armstrong‟s organisation was 
superior to Vickers-Armstrongs, perhaps reflecting his frustration at being unable 
to implement his own theories within the new company.
92
 At the end of May 1928 
he unhappily suggested to Lawrence that Vickers-Armstrongs was carrying on in 
much the same way as the individual companies had done before: „When the 
merger was contemplated, everyone agreed that there should be reasonable 
compression – in other words, that one Works should be used where prior to the 
merger there were two in use.‟ He argued that without a definite policy, „we are 
groping and shall continue to grope.‟93 He later predicted that „unless a policy of 
compression and rationalisation is pursued to the bitter end as was the intent of the 
merger, the expected results will not be forthcoming.‟94 
In June 1928 Lawrence outlined Vickers-Armstrongs‟ future management 
from Vickers‟ head office in London. George Taylor continued as deputy 
chairman; George Sim, Vickers‟ secretary since 1926, was appointed a director 
and given responsibility for administration in London; Jenkinson was made 
financial director; Trevor Dawson and Craven were given responsibility for naval 
sales and shipbuilding; Birch was appointed sales director for army and cognate 
work; and Sir George Hadcock, Armstrong‟s artillery expert, was appointed as a 
technical adviser. This Vickers-dominated board met on a weekly basis, to ensure 
that it exercised proper control with a general awareness of what the company was 
up to, and it also held monthly board meetings.
95
 Nonetheless, Frater Taylor felt 
this organisation meant that the directors were still „sailing off on their own 
account‟, and he urged Lawrence to implement stronger central direction.96 
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Partly because of tensions surrounding the formation of the English Steel 
Corporation, Frater Taylor had become thoroughly „fed up‟ with Vickers by late 
1928 and wished to concentrate his diminishing energies on Armstrong‟s 
commercial projects: otherwise, his doctor had warned he was „courting 
disaster‟.97 The bickering continued into 1929 and Norman could only suggest the 
advisability of keeping Vickers-Armstrongs‟ directors away from Armstrong‟s 
directors.
98
 Armstrong initially had four directors on the Vickers-Armstrongs 
board: Peacock, Hadcock, Frater Taylor and Niemeyer.
99
 When Taylor and 
Niemeyer retired from the board in early 1929, they were replaced by just one 
man, Sir James Cooper, an accountant and SMT director with experience of the 
Ministry of Munitions.
100
 In all probability, Taylor was the only man who could 
have imposed the Bank‟s will to any significant extent on Vickers-Armstrongs: 
his departure removed this possibility. Even Norman admitted Lawrence‟s 
directorial shake-up was part of a strategic reorganisation „about which I know 
nothing.‟101 By 1934, six of Vickers-Armstrongs‟ board were appointed by 
Vickers and held executive directorships (Armstrong had no executive directors) 
and five were also directors of Vickers. Therefore, Vickers-Armstrongs was 
essentially controlled by Vickers. Sir James Cooper suggested that the policies 
adopted by the Vickers-dominated board had accentuated Armstrong‟s relative 
weakness and in 1934 concluded that „Vickers began as the stronger party: to-day 
they are the dominant party.‟102 
Vickers‟ ascendancy did not immediately translate into positive economic 
results. The full benefits of rationalisation required time to emerge and Lawrence 
anticipated that Vickers-Armstrongs would only give a moderate showing during 
its first year of operations.
103
 Between 1928 and 1933 it made nearly £1.3 million 
net profits, but £1 million of this came from the Sun guarantee, which represented 
the maximum assistance possible (Table 5). In 1929 the firm bore a loss of 
£200,000 from its involvement in the English Steel Corporation and paid 
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£150,000 to clear up an outstanding liability on old Turkish contracts.
104
 Profits 
earned on pre-merger contracts were retained by Vickers and Armstrong 
individually, which precluded the payment of dividends in 1928 and 1929. The 
new company was £2.5 million in debt to its shareholders by the end of 1933, and, 
when it was able to pay, the dividends went primarily to Vickers‟ preference 
shareholders.
105
 Moreover, any early repayments under the Sun Insurance policy 
seemed unlikely.
106
 Armstrong bore the worst of the unsatisfactory results because 
continued depression and several years of bad trade weakened its junior 
shareholdings far more than Vickers‟ preferential holdings. Moreover, Vickers-
Armstrongs borrowed money from Vickers to pay a dividend, which made 
Vickers a creditor for the amount borrowed and the interest on the loan became a 
charge on the new company‟s future profits.107  
The English Steel Corporation also had little initial success and its 
constituent works soon required further investment and reconstruction. In 1929, 
Vickers-Armstrongs‟ profits were reduced by the Corporation‟s £200,000 
losses.
108
  The Bank of England, unhappy with the ESC‟s direction, refused to 
undertake any further investment in this direction. Meanwhile, the Bank‟s existing 
influence, exerted through the profit guarantee to Vickers-Armstrongs, was 
steadily eroded by Vickers‟ independent ability to finance its subsidiaries. For 
example, Vickers provided a loan to the ESC when it needed cash to buy the 
Darlington Forge Company in 1929 and, subsequently converted its loans to 
debentures in the Corporation, strengthening its control.
109
 Therefore, in both 
Vickers-Armstrongs and the ESC, Vickers‟ dominance came at Armstrong‟s 
expense. 
Vickers Limited was now essentially a holding and financing company, 
and practically performed the functions of an industrial bank in relation to its 
subsidiaries, which included Vickers-Armstrongs.
110
 Nonetheless, General 
Lawrence recognised that the armament and shipbuilding industries, upon which 
Vickers‟ interests were so predominantly dependent, were not in good health. In 
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1930 he predicted „a difficult period‟ ahead but was not pessimistic, telling 
shareholders: „Your great strength lies in your financial position. That enables 
you, with comparative equanimity to pass through even a prolonged period of bad 
trade and to be ready on the first sign of revival to make the most of the 
opportunities which may occur.‟111  In March 1931, in the midst of the „abnormal 
depression‟ which had especially affected heavy industry, The Times commented 
on Vickers‟ financial strength and the „gratifying exhibit‟ of its annual report.112 
As a measure of its success, since Vickers‟ internal reorganisation in 1926, its 
main competitors in the armaments business had either been integrated 
(Armstrong and Cammell Laird) or were in serious financial difficulties 
(Beardmore). That Vickers managed to weather the storm in the prevailing 
conditions was an impressive achievement.  
Vickers-Armstrongs, through a combination of rationalisation, the Sun 
guarantee and Vickers‟ financial power was able to surmount depression and 
disarmament and enjoyed its best annual trading profits during 1933, the first year 
without Bank assistance.
113
 Orders increased by £3 million and the company 
obtained a large share of Admiralty work, enabling part of the Elswick Naval 
Yard to re-open. Niemeyer felt that Vickers-Armstrongs, based on its accounts for 
1933, remained in a fundamentally unsound position, as nearly £5 million of its 
investments had not been written down to anything approaching their actual 
worth, and the English Steel Corporation‟s true value caused him particular 
concern.
114
  Yet the ESC made a profit for the first time in 1933, partly owing to 
Craven‟s oversight of the firm‟s reconstruction and rationalisation.115 The impact 
of trade recovery, internal reorganisation and the beginning of rearmament meant 
that, according to The Statist, the ESC‟s accounts for 1935 exceeded „even the 




Vickers, Vickers-Armstrongs and the ESC were all well-placed to take 
advantage of rearmament, not least because Vickers possessed considerable 
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floating assets to finance large construction projects such as battleships.
117
 With 
the population fearing air attack, Lawrence commented in March 1934 that land 
armament orders had increased, partly due to sales of anti-aircraft equipment. The 
darkening international situation certainly impacted favourably upon Vickers-
Armstrongs‟ profits (Table 5). Nonetheless, Lawrence told the shareholders in 
March 1934 that „the inflated profits of private Armament firms exist only in the 
imagination of ill-informed critics‟, and, the following year, he pointed out that 
the overall returns on the heavy capital outlay involved in arms manufacture had 
been „meagre‟ for the past fifteen years. 118 Yet Vickers-Armstrongs‟ prospects 
were undoubtedly rising, and the „ill-informed critics‟ forced the government to 
appoint the Royal Commission to investigate the armament industry‟s alleged 
malpractices. Although the Commission was inconvenient for Vickers it also 
helped the firm to consolidate its position, by shaking off the remnants of the 
Bank of England‟s influence. 
 
Table 5: Vickers-Armstrongs’ Net Profits 1928-1936 
 
 
1928 1929 1930 1931 1932 
£169,800* £135,000* £337,400* £282,200* £160,700* 
     
1933 1934 1935 1936  
£188,400 £357,534 £609,374 £768,267  
 
* Figure includes £200,000 from the Sun Insurance Company guarantee. 
 
Sources: The Statist, 23 March 1929, p.506; 2 April 1932, p.527; 1 April 1933, p.489; 24 March 
1934, p.450; 30 March 1935, p.529; 28 March 1936, p.512; 27 March 1937, p.487. The 1929 
figure is from BoE, SMT 2/127, Note on Profits, 11 March 1930. 
 
The Royal Commission and the Bank’s withdrawal 
 
In mid-1935 Vickers was summoned to appear at the Royal Commission and 
Norman fretted that the Bank‟s secret role in the Sun transaction would come out 
during the hearings. Therefore, he wanted the reasons for the Bank‟s involvement 
in the Vickers-Armstrongs merger to be rightly understood and to avoid „any 
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attitude which could be represented as an attempt to resist enquiry.‟119 The 
Treasury advised Norman to call Plender as a witness and to justify the Bank‟s 
actions „not so much on grounds of national defence but on the fact that this was 
the first of a great series of rationalisation schemes‟, which, after all, had been 
Norman‟s stated motive all along.120 The Sun had no objections to any revelations 
and Leese pointed out that, without mentioning the Bank, Lawrence could not 
otherwise explain the Sun contract.
121
 Therefore, Lawrence was briefed to 
emphasise the transaction‟s national importance if, as seemed likely, the question 
was raised at the Commission.
122
 
In April 1935 Lawrence publicly stated that Vickers‟ board welcomed the 
Royal Commission as „an opportunity to dispel misconceptions‟ about the 
behaviour of arms firms.
123
 On 6 January 1936, he informed the Bank that, in 
view of the attacks made upon him in earlier Royal Commission sittings owing to 
his chairmanship of banking as well as armament interests, he intended to raise 
himself the question of „several delicate financial transactions‟ including the Sun 
contract.
124
 In the event, this revelation occurred without much publicity when 
Vickers appeared before the Commission on 8 and 9 January 1936.
125
  
The Commission also enquired asked about close financial directorial 
connections between the Bank and Vickers, and whether a large Bank loan was 
made to foster German armaments and if Vickers had benefited from it. Craven 
replied he had never heard of such a loan and the only director associated with the 
Bank had been Niemeyer and that Vickers had received no benefit as a result of 
Niemeyer‟s visits to the Dominions.126 Even so, Niemeyer was subsequently 
compelled to write to Sir John Eldon Bankes, the head of the Commission, 
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In any case, the Bank was eager to end its involvement in the armament 
industry and Vickers was equally keen to consolidate its position. In summer 1935 
Vickers moved to purchase the balance of shares in Vickers-Armstrongs. Though 
inclined to sell, the Bank made agreement contingent on a satisfactory settlement 
of the Sun contract and whether such a transaction was desirable during the Royal 
Commission hearings.
128
 The existing terms of repayment under the Sun 
agreement lasted until 31 December 1947, and if the Bank was to recover its 
money, Vickers-Armstrongs would have to earn total profits of £14.2 million.
129
 
Outweighing this consideration, Norman wanted „the Bank to take the opportunity 
of freeing themselves from the connection with armaments‟ and the Committee of 
Treasury decided to accept £200,000 for the shares, and hoped Vickers would 
make an early offer on the Sun debt.
130
 Therefore, in July 1935 Vickers Limited 
obtained possession of Vickers-Armstrongs‟ entire £17.5 million share capital.131 
In March 1936 the Bank‟s Committee of Treasury agreed to accept Vickers offer 
to pay back the money provided by the Sun with simple interest of 3 percent per 
annum, which was half of what was specified in the original contract.
132
 Norman 
expressed gladness that this „peculiar transaction‟ was over, while Lawrence 
expressed his „real satisfaction [...] that we have not let you down in this 
matter.‟133 On 31 March Vickers paid £1,116,135 and discharged its obligation.134 
The conclusion of the Bank‟s formal association with Vickers-Armstrongs 
did not mark the end of its involvement in the arms industry. As a consequence of 
the Vickers-Armstrongs merger, the Bank was left with an 80 percent controlling 
interest in the Armstrong Whitworth Securities Company, which it had created to 
deal with Armstrong‟s non-armament assets. However, these remaining works 
were easily adaptable to arms production, although this was forbidden under the 
terms of the merger. The Scotswood works particularly suffered from an 
enormous overcapacity for locomotive production despite the fact many of its 
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workshops were „eminently suitable for the manufacture of certain classes of 
munitions‟, particularly shells. As the government moved towards rearmament, 
Vickers-Armstrongs temporarily waived the embargo on arms production at 
Scotswood and Armstrong received large orders from the Admiralty and War 
Office.
135
 Reviewing its investment in June 1936, the Bank of England recognised 
that Armstrong‟s future was likely to rest increasingly on armament orders and, 
ironically, this could fill the gap left by insufficient „commercial‟ work. The chief 
problem was 
  
that the Bank of England might in future, through 
their holding which carries control of the Company, 
be more closely connected with the manufacture of 
Armaments than is desirable on general grounds: 
while their true aim would continue to be the 
promotion of employment they would automatically 
expose themselves to the slings and arrows of the 




The Bank wished to dispose of its interests to a firm that could maintain 
Armstrong as a going concern, and Vickers-Armstrongs, now owned completely 
by Vickers, seemed an obvious choice.
137
 Subsequently, by purchasing the 
Scotswood works, Vickers finally gobbled up its traditional rival. On 31 




 Rearmament also thwarted the Bank‟s planned liquidation of Beardmore‟s 
assets as the government‟s needs meant the firm required a more dynamic 
chairman, rather than a liquidator. In the interests of coordinated industrial policy 
on the west coast of Scotland, Sir James Lithgow relieved the Bank of its main 
financial commitments.
139
 By the end of 1936, Beardmore‟s fortunes had rapidly 
turned around and the reorganised Parkhead works were expanding to produce 
armour plate and howitzers for the rearmament programme. Yet the Bank‟s 
involvement only finally came to an end after protracted and acrimonious 
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negotiations, which ended with Lithgow taking sole control in mid-1938.
140
 This 
relieved Norman of the „moral responsibility‟ for Beardmore.141 Therefore, before 
the Second World War broke out, the Bank of England had ended its direct 
association in the private armaments industry, leaving behind a considerably 




In 1933 Fenner Brockway wrote that he was unable „to penetrate fully behind the 
veil which hides the intimacy of the relationship of the Money Trust and the 
Munitions Trust.‟142 Certainly, the government‟s orthodox refusal to help the 
Vickers-Armstrongs scheme resulted in the Bank of England taking further 
unorthodox steps into the industry‟s affairs. At times Montagu Norman held the 
fate of a significant portion of Britain‟s private arms manufacturing capacity in his 
hands. Yet he rarely, if ever, viewed this as important from a strategic or national 
defence viewpoint. Instead, he considered the arms business through much the 
same prism of economic viability as he did with more commercial undertakings. 
As a result, the Bank could not provide a clear direction beyond a vaguely 
expressed ideal of „rationalisation‟ that was in some ways inappropriate for the 
armament industry. Instead, Vickers emerged as the real master of the new 
relationship, either absorbing the capacity of its rivals or simply standing by as 
they withered away. By contrast, Armstrong‟s interest and influence in Vickers-
Armstrongs fell away, while Beardmore would likely have been liquidated if not 
for the rearmament programme, while it lacked suitable leadership until Sir James 
Lithgow took over. 
To cope with peaks and troughs in demand, a successful armaments firm 
required industrial and financial strength, the capacity to design and produce 
advanced weapons and, more intangibly, possess strength of character and vision. 
In each of these areas Vickers-Armstrongs excelled, under the guidance of its 
gigantic parent company, Vickers Limited. In 1937 General Lawrence hailed the 
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double success of Vickers‟ policy, which had not only given good financial results 
but had also helped provide the government with the arms it required for the 
national defence programme.
143
 Under modernised management and with up-to-
date financial advice, Vickers-Armstrongs offered the government a vital nucleus 
for wartime expansion. Meanwhile, as armaments became an increasingly 
controversial political issue, the Bank of England ended its long and remarkable 
association with the industry. In the context of arms production, it is hard to agree 
with Sir Henry Clay‟s assertion that Norman, in pursuit of his industrial policy, 
could act without delay and „never lacked courage‟.144 Conversely, Vickers‟ 
amalgamations and ruthless tactics made the British armaments industry more 
efficient, cutting its costs while maintaining important reserve capacity. 
Obviously some firms disappeared, and much wartime capacity was lost while, 
perhaps most worryingly, Vickers-Armstrongs began to assume a virtually 
monopolistic position. But had Vickers not taken this course, it seems certain that 
an even greater amount of plant would have been unavailable when the 
government decided to rearm. 
The profits earned by armament manufacturers provide a crude barometer 
of international tensions and, as the world lurched towards another total war, 
Vickers-Armstrongs‟ and Beardmore‟s fortunes duly improved.145 Both showed 
that they had learned from their past mistakes and prudently used some of their 
increased profits to make financial preparations for a contraction in work, to help 
avoid another calamitous adjustment to „normal‟ conditions.146 The firms clearly 
realised that while the government depended on their specialist facilities during 
emergencies, they could not themselves rely on the state to help them during more 
peaceful periods. In this regard, the private manufacturers were traditionally able 
to supplement their income during periods of relatively low demand by selling 
their wares overseas. Yet post-1918 state-industry relations in the matter of arms 
exports were undermined by familiar problems: the government placed the 
industry‟s considerations beneath its wider strategic planning, while the firms felt 
increasingly marginalised and were forced to adjust independently. Moreover, the 
arms trade was more politically controversial than domestic manufacture. 
                                                 
143
 The Economist, 10 April 1937, p.110. 
144
 Clay, Norman, p.359. 
145
 For example, see The Economist, 10 April 1937, p.110; Hume and Moss, Beardmore, p.248. 
146
 The Times, 3 April 1937 and 4 April 1939; Financial News, 24 June 1937. 
 176 
 
Nonetheless, the following chapters demonstrate that these antagonistic relations 
did not represent an official desire to end the international arms trade, and neither 




5. International Rivalry and Unilateral Regulation: Britain and 
the Global Arms Trade 
 
A Nation like the United Kingdom which is a small military Power in 
peace, but may need to become a large one in war – a position in which 
we differ from every other great Power in the world – except possibly the 
United States of America – must foster an export trade in armaments 
(subject to proper supervision) in order to maintain its productive 
capacity: for productive capacity cannot be equated with idle plant. This 
is the fundamental fact which must govern our arms export policy so 
long as armaments are unrestricted and war a possibility. 
- Report of an Interdepartmental Committee on the Report of the Royal 





Overseas sales held an important, well-established and controversial place in the 
private armaments industry‟s activities. Unpredictable home government orders 
did not cover the vast overheads incurred in the development and production of 
cutting edge weaponry, so manufacturers sought foreign markets as a vital means 
of boosting their income.
2
 By the end of the nineteenth century British firms 
exported more armaments than any other power and possessed an outstanding 
global reputation for heavy guns and warships.
3
 After the Great War the market 
became more competitive and the relatively small number of large-scale private 
armament companies, particularly in Britain, Czechoslovakia, France and Italy, 
vied to attract the custom of newly-independent states and other emerging powers. 
Although the traditional economic motive behind overseas sales remained the 
same, the trade became increasingly associated with official policy. Indeed, recent 
scholarship has demonstrated that while the pre-1914 arms market was marked by 
a pioneering laissez-faire spirit, inter-war governments sought to obtain political 
advantages by exercising greater control over arms transactions.
4
 Moreover, states 
which helped their firms to attract orders could potentially gain an edge over their 
rivals in terms of capacity for wartime industrial expansion. In this regard, the 
international arms trade offered the British government an opportunity, which it 
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repeatedly turned down, to rebuild its stagnant relationship with the private 
manufacturers and enhance its dubious industrial mobilisation credentials. 
In January 1936 Lord Weir, after studying some figures on arms exports 
supplied by Sir Hugh Elles, the Master General of the Ordnance, wrote that 
Britain had become „deplorably weak‟.5 Similarly, some historians have argued 
that the government‟s lack of initiative in this regard weakened the arms industry 
and, as a consequence, reduced British national strength.
6
 In particular, Richard 
Davenport-Hines has suggested that other countries provided much greater 
support to their firms and possessed more effective state-industry coordination, 
whereas British companies suffered from „negative discrimination‟ in the form of 
restrictive policies.
7
 Certainly, every consignment of armaments from the British 
Isles was subject to a comprehensive system of regulations and had to carry a 
licence. Moreover, the government staunchly refused to guarantee long-term 
credit for exports of weapons and warships. Yet these policies were not intended 
to prevent or reduce the trade in armaments. Instead, officials simply wished to 
monitor such transactions and ensure that they conformed to Britain‟s overall 
economic, foreign and strategic policies. The government admittedly had little 
success with its unilateral attempts to control the arms trade and became 
increasingly concerned by the extent to which its efforts unintentionally 
disadvantaged British firms. Even so, the negative impact of its regulatory 
measures was undoubtedly overstated, in part through over-reliance on the 
manufacturers‟ own exaggerated complaints. In reality, as David Edgerton has 
pointed out, Britain remained a major exporter of arms even though orders were 
harder to come by.
8
 Indeed, the arms industry‟s performance on the international 
market mirrored its domestic experience in several ways: although it had to adjust 
to difficult post-war conditions with little positive help from the government, it 
maintained a stronger position than was admitted at the time. 
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A Self-Denying Ordinance on Ordnance: The Export Licensing System 
 
During the Great War, the British government introduced export licensing to 
prevent all kinds of strategic goods from reaching enemy states and as a means of 
influencing neutral powers. The post-war retention and adaptation of licences 
specifically to keep armaments out of the hands of „native races, subversive 
elements and disarmed ex-enemy countries‟ indicated official recognition that 
unregulated arms exports posed a potential risk to national interests.
9
 These 
measures were initially intended to administer the safe disposal of wartime 
surplus small arms and ammunition, but they were also used to supervise and 
control the wider trade in privately manufactured weapons.
10
 The system 
incorporated domestic law, international treaty provisions and ad hoc procedures: 
it imposed certain all-encompassing regulations but also allowed for the pragmatic 
consideration of individual cases. The subject concerned officials from a range of 
departments and a combination of economic, political and strategic considerations 
dictated what was allowed to be exported and to which states. However, licensing 
also provoked some controversy as to whether such unilateral measures actually 
had any real effect on regulating the global arms trade or if they simply made the 
British arms industry a less attractive proposition for potential customers. 
The Arms Export Prohibition Order (1921, revised in 1931) required all 
arms, ammunition and various other potentially warlike items to bear a licence 
issued by the Board of Trade (for the items covered see Appendix IV). An open 
general licence was issued for certain materials, including smooth bore shotguns 
and industrial explosives, which effectively made these items freely exportable 
except to certain prohibited areas in Africa and Asia.
11
 A licence application took 
two to seven days to process although urgent cases could be dealt with in 48 
hours. Once issued, licences normally lasted for three months and were revocable 
at any time, although this rarely occurred.
12
 In 1925 the Board of Trade described 
how it normally received between 200 and 300 applications per week, which 
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mostly consisted of personal luggage cases, small trade requests and colonial 
government transactions (see Appendix V for licenses granted and refused 
between 1929 and 1935). The large arms manufacturers submitted relatively 
fewer applications although these involved significant and valuable quantities of 
specialist war material. In these cases, the Board of Trade consulted the Foreign 
Office and service departments, a process which arose from custom rather than 
statutory obligation. The Foreign Office weighed up various factors, including the 
nature of the consignee and consignment (the general practice was to deliver only 
to governments or their accredited agents), the internal conditions in the export‟s 
destination, any relevant treaty provisions or special circumstances, and a general 
assessment of the international situation. The services based their decisions 
largely on whether the proposed export should be kept within the British Isles for 
national needs or if it was of a secret nature.
13
 This interdepartmental consultation 
ensured that sales of domestically produced armaments conformed to Britain‟s 
overall defence and foreign policies. Moreover, although the granting of an export 
licence did not necessarily mean that the contract would be fulfilled, the 
application procedure enabled the government to keep an eye on general trends in 
the arms trade and to monitor any unusual developments.
14
 
Unlike land armaments and aircraft, the construction and export of 
warships was subject to the Admiralty‟s independent licensing authority and was 
governed by the Treaties of Washington Act (1922) and London Naval Treaty Act 
(1930). These prevented the Admiralty from refusing a licence unless the ship in 
question violated these treaties, although naval armaments sold separately still 
required a normal licence from the Board of Trade. Additionally, the Foreign 
Enlistment Act (1870) forbade any warship exports to a belligerent power when 
Britain remained neutral. Of course, it would have been virtually impossible to 
surreptitiously construct and export a warship and the Admiralty‟s overseers, in 
cooperation with Customs officers, monitored activity in the country‟s various 
shipbuilding centres.
15
 Nonetheless, when China made enquiries to Vickers about 
the purchase of a £1.5 million cruiser in late 1929, the government had „no legal 
means‟ of preventing the transaction, even though the Foreign Office drew 
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attention to existing unpaid Chinese debts to British creditors, suggested that the 
cruiser went against the government‟s disarmament policy, and pointed out that 
the Anglo-Chinese naval contract of 20 June 1929 provided for police vessels 
rather than competitive expansion.
16
 The Chinese Admiral in charge of naval 
organisation apparently desired a cruiser to gain „face‟ with other powers, but the 
negotiations were ultimately interrupted by continued unrest in China and its 
difficulties in securing the necessary finance.
17
 
The arms export system‟s flexibility and multifaceted nature occasionally 
caused confusion amongst politicians and public opinion. Surprisingly for an 
architect of the pragmatic Locarno agreement, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the 
Foreign Secretary, did not fully grasp the methods employed and asked the CID in 
February 1926 to formulate definite principles for the supply of arms to foreign 
countries.
18
 Lord Robert Cecil, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster, 
subsequently consulted the relevant departments and reported that „a sufficiently 
definite general policy‟ already existed.19 When faced with growing public 
clamour against the private arms trade in 1934, which Cecil had ironically helped 
to instigate, the Cabinet regretted public opinion was so „ill-informed‟ on the 
subject and suggested the government‟s record and system of export regulation 
provided an unmatched level of regulation compared to other states.
20
  
In principle, the licensing system offered the government a range of 
controls. For example, it could be used to prevent the leakage of secret designs 
and models to foreign military establishments although, in practice, the services 
usually relied on their own close arrangements with the manufacturers.
21
 Despite 
this, the secrecy issue occasionally caused friction. The firms naturally wished to 
increase their competitiveness abroad and sought permission to sell their most 
modern designs. In 1930 Birch wrote to the War Office: 
 
I think we cannot too often remember that we did 
not use one single weapon in the Great War that we 
used in the South African war, and the interval 
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between them was not very great. All sciences and 
all engineering progresses so quickly that we can 
hand everything out to everybody without danger, 




The War Office did not agree. Tanks were considered a British speciality and the 
Army was keen to maintain its head start. Birch complained that while the 
Admiralty had demonstrated a new type of eight-inch naval gun to Chilean 
representatives, the War Office imposed strict secrecy on the latest light tank 
models. He contended that the War Office „would not go to the Motor Show and 
stop manufacturers selling improvements.‟23 In response, the War Office 
suggested Birch had operated a similarly restrictive policy during his previous 
career as the Master General of Ordnance.
24
 Moreover, in spite of Vickers‟ 
complaints, Britain held a 34 percent global market share for tank sales between 




Besides monitoring trade flows and protecting secret designs, export 
licensing enabled the government to enforce arms embargoes, which were 
occasionally imposed to comply with the 
 
general principle that munitions should not be sent 
to foreign countries at times when the political 
horizon is clouded, when there is risk of the 
outbreak of war foreign or civil, and, of course, 
above all when there is any danger of the munitions 




The latter consideration provoked especial moral revulsion. For example, in 1934 
James Ramsay MacDonald, the Prime Minister, recalled his shock at discovering 
„a brass label bearing the name of a British armaments firm‟ on guns that had 
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mown down British Empire troops in the Dardanelles during the Great War.
27
 
Presenting the opposite case, Sir Maurice Hankey told the Royal Commission in 
May 1936 that out of 234 guns reportedly used in the Dardanelles, only thirteen 
had originated in Britain and the rest had been made in Germany. Hankey 
suggested that German war potential had undoubtedly benefited from 
manufacturing these guns and that this had made Turkey dependent on Germany 
for supplies and that this might have influenced its decision to enter the war on the 
side of the Central Powers.
28
 Similarly, the service departments occasionally 
argued it was preferable for troops to face familiar weapons rather than those of 
unknown design or suggested that Britain could potentially gain influence via its 




Most inter-war arms embargoes were multilateral and international (see 
Chapter 6) but the government also enforced unilateral prohibitions, although the 
only example of this during the 1920s was a sporadic embargo on arms exports to 
the Soviet Union.
30
 In November 1924 the incoming Conservative government 
adopted this policy as a matter of political principle and its decision was held to 
include licences already granted. As a result, Vickers and BSA incurred losses of 
£9,100 and £36,600 respectively on contracts with Moscow for machine guns, 
Lewis guns and spare parts.
31
 Denied compensation, BSA subsequently refused to 
take a large contract for the supply of rifles and machine guns to Greece and 
Lithuania unless the government granted a firm licence covering the entire period 
of manufacture, estimated at up to three years. Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, the 
President of the Board of Trade, suggested that substantial contracts for land 
armaments be treated like warships in that the licences should cover the period of 
the contract and warned that British manufacturers would otherwise only take on 
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„small jobbing orders‟ and refuse more valuable work.32 The Cabinet agreed and 
made long-term licences available which did not contain the usual stipulation that 
they could be modified or revoked at any time, but instead offered the reassurance 
that „they will not be withdrawn save in the event of circumstances of an 
altogether exceptional nature arising which the Board are at present quite unable 
to foresee.‟33 Despite this concession, in 1933 the Board of Trade reported it had 
not issued any firm licences since 1928, with companies apparently preferring to 
rely on the ordinary three month licences.
34
 
The Soviet embargo raised questions about the efficacy of unilateral 
measures in regulating the global arms trade and the resultant impact on British 
interests. Although the Conservatives abhorred the communist regime, no 
international treaty obligations operated on the Soviet Union, allowing it to easily 
obtain its requirements from other sources. Following an enquiry by Vickers in 
October 1925, the government subsequently modified its policy to allow exports 
„of a purely defensive character‟, such as small coastal defence vessels and 
submarine mines. Every licence application still underwent the usual checks, 
along with an assessment of the proposed consignment‟s „defensiveness‟ and of 
the risk that it posed to national interests, ranging from the turbulent Indian 
frontier to British fishing boats on the Murman coast.
35
 In 1929, following 
Labour‟s return to power, the prohibition was completely removed and in March 
1930 the Board of Trade issued a licence for the export of 60 Vickers and Carden-
Loyd tanks worth £300,000 to the Soviet Union.
36
 
If companies considered the licensing arrangements and the possibility of 
embargoes too restrictive, or the government unresponsive to their appeals, they 
could technically circumvent the system by establishing branches abroad.
37
 Yet, 
unless the Foreign Office or services raised particular objections, any firm 
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obtaining a contract to export arms could „broadly speaking‟ rely on the issue of a 
licence. In 1930 the Board of Trade claimed that very few orders had been lost 
owing to the system and stressed that, even if individual licensing was abandoned, 
some form of restriction was inevitable if demanded by political conditions in 
other countries.
38
 However, this theory was seriously tested after 27 February 
1933 by the National Government‟s imposition of a unilateral arms embargo on 
both sides in the Sino-Japanese conflict, a policy which resulted from 
considerable domestic pressure for Britain to „give a lead‟ in the matter and 
demonstrate the efficacy of its unilateral measures.
39
 Significantly, this was also 
the first time licensing was used to try and „starve‟ a war by withholding 
armaments although no attempt was made to define the aggressor and, as with the 
Soviet experience, the policy was little more than a gesture given the continued 
availability of arms elsewhere.
40
 This consideration ended the embargo after two 
weeks and prompted a lengthy high-level debate on whether export licensing in 
general was damaging to the domestic arms industry and national defence, and 
how far it was possible to modify the system to put British manufacturers on an 
even footing with their overseas rivals. 
On 15 March the Principal Supply Officers Committee appointed a 
subcommittee to examine these questions, while the Cabinet appointed its own 
interdepartmental committee a month later.
41
 The PSOC subcommittee, which 
represented the Board of Trade and service departments, claimed that the 
licensing system „severely handicapped‟ the British arms industry in two ways. 
First, it meant firms were unable to clinch deals immediately because any contract 
was contingent on the issue of a licence. Second, it allegedly generated a „feeling 
of uncertainty‟ in the minds of both customer and producer, which the Sino-
Japanese embargo had exacerbated.
42
 The PSOC claimed that fears of future 
restrictions deterred foreign governments from placing orders and discouraged 
British companies from taking on business, while manufacturers subsequently 
found it difficult to recapture customers who had, in the meantime, become reliant 
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on another country‟s designs. Certain commercial goods were also apparently 
affected by the embargo owing to fears that the government might expand the list 
of forbidden supplies to include items purchased for wartime use, such as jute 
bags. Indeed, the subcommittee felt that the existing policy had wide impact on 
general trade because armaments contracts tended to involve a large number of 
ancillary firms besides the major producers. Therefore, the PSOC reported that the 
licensing system had caused unemployment, damaged industry and, ultimately, 
weakened the country‟s capacity for emergency expansion.43 Walter Runciman, 
the President of the Board of Trade and chairman of the PSOC, subsequently 
suggested that it had reduced British industrial mobilisation potential „very much 
below the danger point.‟44 
On 6 April Sir Bolton Eyres Monsell, the First Lord of the Admiralty, 
compared the number of British firms ceasing armaments production with the 
apparently thriving continental situation and told the CID:  
 
we had been internationally hoodwinked as this 
[licensing] system was self-imposed and its 
existence, though perhaps an example to other 
countries, had certainly frightened away possible 
purchasers. 
 
Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, recognised that an effective control of the 
arms trade required international rather than unilateral measures and believed the 
only solution was for other countries to adopt a national licensing system along 
British lines. The difficulty remained that „unscrupulous governments‟ would not 
apply the necessary oversight and British firms would remain disadvantaged. For 
example, MacDonald complained that while France already had arrangements in 
place to control its arms exports, it had never actually enforced any prohibition.
45
 
Indeed, the Foreign Countries Industrial Intelligence committee had previously 
reported that Sweden was the only country besides Britain in which the arms 
industry was apprehensive of any government hindrance.
46
 Although the Board of 
Trade and Foreign Office prepared a list demonstrating that most countries 
possessed export regulations, ministers felt that Britain administered the only truly 
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 However, given the perceived detrimental 
impact of the existing system, the government decided that it required immediate 
modification. 
The PSOC subcommittee suggested issuing an open general licence to the 
handful of firms who manufactured the bulk of Britain‟s exported war material. 
Based on a pre-existing scheme controlling aircraft sales, these firms would then 
be able to freely export all items covered by the Arms Export Prohibition Order 
except to regions prohibited by international treaty. To maintain a certain level of 
supervision, the service departments reserved the right to demand information 
from the manufacturers regarding overseas business, while all other arms 
transactions would still require an individual licence.
48
 The proposed open licence 
also contained a qualifying statement indicating that the government had no 
intention of terminating it, unless the manufacturers broke the conditions under 
which it was granted, or in the interests of imperial security, or in pursuance of an 
international agreement. Though sweeping, these recommendations neither 
rejected the principle of export licensing nor advocated a change in the law. The 
government retained the right to revoke a licence at any time but the proposed 
modifications offered slightly more reassurance that this would not happen under 
normal circumstances, although a similar clause had been available since 1925. 
The subcommittee maintained that its suggestions adhered to previous 
international agreements on the subject and were fully compatible with the 
government‟s policy at Geneva.49 In this regard, the British delegation to the 
Disarmament Conference had consistently opposed proposals to replace the 
private manufacture of armaments with a strictly controlled international system 
and had advocated domestic licensing as a more effective and realistic 
alternative.
50
  Nonetheless, the Foreign Office complained in July 1933 that the 
PSOC‟s proposed modifications would completely undermine this argument and 
voiced strong opposition to their implementation.
51
 However, on 8 December, the 
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Cabinet Committee on the Private Armaments Industry pointed out that no other 
country had shown the least inclination to follow Britain‟s lead.52 With this in 
mind and, with some ministers arguing that the result of the government‟s policy 
to date had been „to throw British workmen on the streets without stopping other 
countries from piling up arms‟, the Cabinet approved the PSOC‟s 
recommendations on 13 December.
53
 
MacDonald felt the Cabinet had made the right decision, but feared it 
would be subjected to widespread international and domestic criticism once the 
news was made public. At a meeting of ministers on 18 December, he suggested 
writing a circular letter to other powers, inviting them to adopt the British system, 
and then publishing the responses as a demonstration that the government had 
done everything possible to secure an international settlement before modifying 
its policy. The Foreign Office, represented by Sir Robert Vansittart, the 
Permanent Under-Secretary of State, and Anthony Eden, the Parliamentary 
Under-Secretary, suggested that this idea would not work because certain states, 
including major producers such as France and Czechoslovakia, had supported 
international proposals which went much further than Britain was prepared to 
accept. To avoid a potentially damaging public announcement, the assembled 
ministers decided to abandon the PSOC‟s proposals. Instead, MacDonald 
recommended supplementing the existing system of individual licences with an 
informal arrangement whereby the approved group of arms firms would be 
informed in advance that particular licences would be granted for specific 
transactions and not revoked except under exceptional circumstances. Monsell 
and Runciman suggested that this involved more secrecy and less control than the 
measures originally contemplated.
54
 Regardless, MacDonald informed the Cabinet 
on 20 December that the fresh proposals constituted „the bare minimum which 
will be of any value in allaying the uncertainty at present existing in the minds of 
prospective customers of the British Armament Industry.‟55 Wishing to give as 
little publicity to the existence of the „approved‟ list as possible, the policy‟s 
application was limited to informing the relevant firms that they should anticipate 
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few difficulties in gaining export licences for sales to foreign governments.
56
 The 
whole episode had placed the government in an impossible dilemma: the existing 
system was viewed as damaging to national interests; whereas any modification 
threatened to provoke an angry response from domestic and international opinion. 
In one sense, it came down to a debate between the PSOC, which spoke for 
trading and defence interests, and the Foreign Office, which sought to avoid 
damaging Britain‟s diplomatic credibility. In attempting to solve this dilemma 
unilaterally, the government adopted an informal and secretive policy which 
further reduced the effectiveness of its licensing system as a means of control. 
It is difficult to gauge accurately the financial impact of the licensing 
system on the arms industry. Until 1933 the Board of Trade recorded £100,000 
worth of orders lost as a result of applications turned down or licences 
subsequently revoked.
57
 Yet firms tended not to apply for licences in cases when 
they knew they would be unsuccessful so this only reveals part of the picture.
58
 It 
is also difficult to assess whether the government‟s informal change of policy 
made a positive impact after 1934, not least because of the lack of publicity given 
to the new measures. At the Royal Commission in late 1935, Major C. S. Napier, 
a War Office representative, avoided the „delicate subject‟ of how many orders 
Britain had lost owing to its „superior efficiency‟ in regulating its exports. 
Nonetheless, he claimed that the arms industry had undoubtedly „suffered.‟59 
However, the big firms rarely complained about licences. In fact, Vickers gave 
„wholehearted support‟ to licensing and claimed that it allowed „reputable firms‟ 
to do business while preventing „small mushroom armament firms of doubtful 
standing‟ from „flood[ing] the market with inferior materials to the severe 
detriment of British industry and prestige.‟60 
The Royal Commission‟s report criticised the licensing system as „largely 
negative‟ because it did not seek to discourage the arms trade. The commissioners 
recommended a more positive outlook, which would establish the purchaser‟s 
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definite need for armaments in each particular case.
61
 In response, an 
interdepartmental committee chaired by Sir Maurice Hankey suggested that a 
more intrusive policy risked upsetting potential customers and reiterated that the 
existing procedure afforded the government sufficient and unmatched control over 
arms exports.
62
 However, although export licensing certainly provided a useful 
monitoring function, it was not a very effective political tool. Although officials 
took pride in the thoroughness of Britain‟s arrangements, even the most stringent 
regime in the world was relatively useless when other countries could evade an 
embargo simply by purchasing elsewhere. Given that the government only 
enforced a handful of unilateral prohibitions, much of the debate was confined to 
a theoretical discussion, which revolved around a series of conflicting 
departmental interests. Nonetheless, politicians always had one eye on public 
opinion, at home and abroad, which created a moral barrier towards changing the 
existing system, regardless of its ineffectiveness. To try and force a change of 
attitude, the Board of Trade and service departments overstated the impact of the 
system on the arms industry. In doing so, they contributed to the growing sense 
that British firms were disadvantaged against their international competitors. 
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Competition and Official Assistance in the Post-War Arms Market 
 
In spite of generally poor economic conditions, the post-war world offered arms 
manufacturers many opportunities to sell their wares abroad. The collapse of the 
Austro-Hungarian, Ottoman and Russian empires left a patchwork of new states 
that were keen to increase their security and prestige but, in most cases, unable to 
produce significant quantities of modern armaments. Regional conflicts in the 
Aegean, Far East and South America generated further demand. Although smaller 
powers purchased large quantities of relatively cheap ex-government surplus 
weapons, they also looked to private manufacturers to supply them with warships 
and more up-to-date military items, such as anti-aircraft guns and tanks.
63
 The 
market covered a wide geographical area and Vickers‟ important customers 
included the governments of Argentina, Belgium, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, China, 
Denmark, Estonia, Finland, Greece, Holland, India, Japan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Nepal, Peru, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Spain, Thailand and Turkey.
64
 
The number of major manufacturing countries was comparatively small: nine 
countries exported almost ninety percent of the world‟s land armaments and 
ammunition between 1929 and 1936, while only three powers accounted for over 
half of foreign naval sales from 1930 to 1934.
65
 Vickers, particularly after its 
merger with Armstrong, was Britain‟s principal exporter of naval and military 
weapons systems, and viewed its main international rivals as Bofors (Sweden), 
Schneider-Creusot (France), Skoda (Czechoslovakia) and Ansaldo (Italy). Along 
with these firms‟ desire to boost their profits, their governments also wished to 
encourage overseas business in order to maintain efficient capacity for industrial 
mobilisation. However, owing to a perceived gap between British and continental 
practice, Vickers-Armstrongs frequently gave the impression that, despite its best 
efforts, it was losing ground in the worldwide battle to secure the largest possible 
share of available work. 
Vickers-Armstrongs dominated British military-naval exports. For 
example, Firth Brown had a total armament turnover of just under £1 million 
between 1930 and 1934, of which 15 percent represented foreign business.
66
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During the same period, Beardmore only exported £6,865 of boiler equipment.
67
 
By contrast, nearly 40 percent of Vickers-Armstrongs‟ total armament turnover of 
£23.6 million resulted from exports to non-British destinations (Table 6). Foreign 
naval revenue generated slightly more business overall than land armaments, 
although the latter provided a steadier source of income. Interestingly, nearly 
three-quarters of Vickers-Armstrongs‟ naval exports comprised the armour and 
armament for warships, rather than the hulls and machinery; which meant that 
much of the firm‟s foreign trade helped to maintain specialist gun-mounting and 
armour plate capacity and skilled labour. 
Vickers-Armstrongs maintained a large network of overseas agencies to 
promote its products to prospective customers. At the time of their merger in late 
1927, Vickers and Armstrong together possessed representation in 33 countries 
throughout Europe, Asia and the Americas.
68
 In February 1928 Sir Mark Webster 
Jenkinson wrote to Sir Basil Zaharoff, the legendary pre-war arms dealer, that the 
new company would not obtain orders „by sitting still in the London Office‟ but 
should survey the field, streamline its overseas organisation and advertise the 
Vickers-Armstrongs brand. Jenkinson also wished to ensure that the company‟s 
representatives were „the right people with the necessary influence to obtain 
orders.‟69 The right person differed depending on local context. In the South 
American market, „great gentlemen‟ were required because the „good name of 
Vickers has been brought to the dust by half Sirs.‟70 In the Far East, the influential 
Jardine Matheson Company advised Vickers-Armstrongs to send out a man who 
could „mix with anyone from the most exorbitant general to the lowest coolie.‟71 
Regardless of the region, the company‟s agents had to be politically sound, well-
connected and discreet, and Birch observed in September 1928 that: „The old bad 
days of wide corruption are, generally speaking, coming to an end.‟72 
Nonetheless, it remained in an agent‟s interest to attract as much work as possible. 
For example, Birch informed Vickers-Armstrongs‟ Polish representative in July 
1929 that: „A big order brought off your own initiative will, I trust, mean a 
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bonus.‟73 Yet, although successful agents were paid an average of 3.4 percent 
commission, the firm vehemently denied that its salesmen made any effort to 
stimulate or influence levels of demand but would only endeavour to secure a 




Davenport-Hines has confirmed that bribery took place abroad, although it 
was small in scale, and based on local custom. Moreover, he has demonstrated 
that it was used to win contracts against competitors, rather than to generate 
unnecessary demand for armaments.
75
 In trying to promote a cleaner image, 
Vickers also attempted to distance itself from the legends surrounding Sir Basil 
Zaharoff, who had become an agent for the firm‟s overseas business in the late 
nineteenth century.
76
 He was particularly infamous for developing the système 
Zaharoff, whereby he would play one country off against another to stimulate 
demand.
77
 At the Royal Commission in 1936, the journalist Sir Philip Gibbs 
described how in „the popular imagination of the world there is no doubt that Sir 
Basil Zaharoff is regarded as a very sinister figure stalking through the Courts of 
Europe and acting as an agent for the sale of munitions of war.‟78 In response, 
General Lawrence implied much of this reputation came from Zaharoff‟s 
tendency to talk at large although he admitted that Sir Basil had brought in a „vast 
amount‟ of business prior to the 1920s.79 In any case, the company claimed it had 
possessed no official connection with Zaharoff since 1924.
80
 Nonetheless, Vickers 
continued to seek his counsel on matters connected to the arms trade until his 
death in November 1936. 
Individual government departments also assisted the arms industry in its 
efforts to obtain overseas work. The services were particularly helpful and Sir 
Charles Craven‟s speech at the launch of HMS Resource at Barrow in November 
1928 publicly demonstrated Vickers‟ gratitude to the Admiralty:  
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I think the presence here to-day of my friend the 
Chief of the Chilean Naval Commission, for whom 
we have very important work in hand, is due very 
largely to the assistance and kindly help the 
Admiralty have given us in allowing us to use their 
designs for the vessels we are building for the 
Chilean Navy. I assure you [...] that we are very 





Indeed, the Admiralty continued to help British shipbuilders with their designs 
and supplied them with other pertinent materials to improve their ability to 
compete with Italy, whose navy apparently released such information as required. 
It also provided „the full weight of Admiralty backing‟ by sending Royal Navy 
ships to visit other countries as floating advertisements, and by allowing foreign 
officers to see its vessels and equipment.
82
 At a conference in February 1931, 
representatives of the main naval shipbuilders agreed that the Admiralty had done 
as much as possible to assist the industry and were particularly thankful that it had 
released confidential material „in order that firms could offer what in many cases 
was practically identical with British Admiralty material.‟83 The War Office was 
generally less helpful, although Birch acknowledged in early 1930 that it had 
become more cooperative.
84
 Many purchasing states lacked military experience of 
items such as tanks and machine guns, and Vickers-Armstrongs claimed that the 
French General Staff included a section specifically to provide tactical education 
in the use of these weapons to potential customers. The War Office subsequently 
agreed to „consider favourably‟ any request to place its own technical experts at 
the disposal of foreign purchasing missions, but reserved the right to judge each 
case on its merits.
85
 
The service departments and Foreign Office also provided a degree of 
support via their attachés and diplomats, who acted on the provision that they 
would not favour one company over another.
86
 In 1927 General Sir Webb 
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Gillman, the Master General of Ordnance, warned Birch not to expect too much 
from these arrangements:  
 
our military attachés are being told to help, but you 
must realise that they cannot be touts: whatever the 
French and Germans do in that matter, the British 




The Foreign Office implemented a similar policy, which Sir John Simon outlined 
to concerned Members of Parliament in November 1934: 
 
we never allow our diplomatic or consular 
representatives abroad to act as travellers or 
canvassers for armament firms – never. Our 
diplomatic help is given only when a foreign State 
has announced its intentions to purchase from 
abroad. Then our service naturally does its best to 





These arrangements provided firms with access to a wide range of important 
contacts and knowledge of local conditions. For example, on a visit to Poland in 
February 1929, Birch discovered that its General Staff, which was considering a 
contract for machine guns, was not formally allowed to meet with the trade. To 
evade this restriction, the British Military Attaché arranged a dinner party for 
Birch and invited the Polish Chief of Staff and his deputy. On his return to 
England, Birch commented that the legation in Poland had been „most helpful‟.89 
More formally, the commercial secretaries of the Athens and Helsinki legations 
provided the manufacturers with useful advice and information concerning 
potential Greek and Finnish business in 1931.
90
 However, Lancelot Leveson, one 
of Vickers‟ overseas salesmen, suggested that the embassies and legations were 
too „dignified‟ compared to their French and Italian counterparts, and far less 
willing to take advantage of political situations for material gain. He also 
complained that British military and naval missions tended to adopt an 
excessively proper and impartial attitude when advising foreign governments, 
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often to the detriment of domestic manufacture.
91
 Conversely, the Commercial 
Secretary in Athens recommended that British shipbuilders should put more effort 
into their tendering arrangements when trying to secure potential Greek naval 
business, pointing out as an example that „the Italian tenders were submitted in the 
form of a small printed book, stated to be much more complete and in much 
greater detail than British tenders.‟92 Following a trip to Athens in mid-1931, the 
British Naval Attaché in Rome reported that Greece, owing to previous 
satisfaction, was apparently keen for its ships to be built in Britain. However, one 
Greek official warned that British firms needed to „wake up and take a little more 
trouble in trying to obtain orders and to please their clients‟.93 
 Notwithstanding the incentives offered to its agents, regardless of 
government assistance and despite accusations that it was not trying hard enough, 
the British arms industry complained that the primary reason for its difficulties 
was that its foreign rivals received much greater and more blatant state support. 
For example, Birch wrote to Lawrence in January 1928 that: 
 
Our Government are also helpful, but the nation is 
very much tied by our activities at Geneva and Sir 
Austen Chamberlain‟s prominent position there. 




Later in the year he suggested to General Milne at the War Office that „if other 
nations are going to subsidise the armament business, (i.e. the Italians are now 
doing so) it is going to make our mobilisation for war extraordinarily difficult.‟95 
Indeed, on an unsuccessful business trip to Turkey in late 1928, Birch discovered 
the Italian Foreign Minister paying a visit in connection with a naval order: „I may 
be wrong‟, he ruefully observed, „but I do not see our Austin [sic] doing this!‟ On 
his outbound journey, he also encountered Walter Guinness, the Agriculture 
Minister. Guinness apparently hoped Birch was not going to sell armaments to 
Turkey, which provoked a predictably angry response: 
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I told him quite plainly in the most severe language 
at my command that I hoped to get the munition 
order that I was going after and that it appeared to 
be left to the manufacturer and not the Cabinet to 
look out for our insurance as a nation, and had he 
any idea of the state of manufacture that Europe is 




The artillery contract in question eventually went to Bofors, and Birch suspected a 
German subsidy.
97
 In January 1929 he informed the Foreign Office: 
 
Any nation abroad possessing an armaments firm is 
bringing every possible pressure for the increase of 
their armament work, the French of course being the 





 In April he wrote to Milne again: 
 
we are being had for fools. Other nations are 
pushing all they know to get orders for their 
armament firms for two reasons. One is to produce 
their own armaments cheaply, and the second is to 
keep their armament firms alive. Further, they 
cannot be unmindful that they are reducing the 




Birch‟s vociferous complaints on this issue presumably derived from his earlier 
experience as chairman of the Principal Supply Officers Committee, which had 
given him high-level experience of Britain‟s preparations for industrial 
mobilisation. As Vickers-Armstrongs‟ director of land armament sales he 
repeatedly complained, both to his fellow board members and his old comrades at 
the War Office, about the assistance that foreign governments, especially France 
and Italy, allegedly granted to their armament firms to secure contracts and of the 
debilitating effect this had on Britain‟s relative capacity for emergency expansion. 
The Foreign Countries Industrial Intelligence committee supported much 
of Birch‟s criticism. It reported in 1933 that in all other arms-producing countries, 
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except Sweden, the state either encouraged exports as a source of revenue or, 
more frequently, provided direct assistance. This took various forms and included 
subsidies, long-term loans, remissions on import duties for raw materials and 
armament plant, the imposition of import duties on products likely to compete 
with the domestic arms industry, and even directly soliciting orders in the course 
of diplomatic and trade negotiations. In France, Schneider had reportedly lost 
ground in the export market but had retained connections throughout the world 
and allegedly received considerable political and financial assistance from the 
French government. Schneider also exercised influence over the relatively small 
Romanian, Yugoslav and Polish arms industries and, more significantly, 
collaborated closely with Skoda to supply the Little Entente with weapons.
100
 
Davenport-Hines has suggested that Schneider‟s „partial colonisation‟ of Skoda 
was designed to stave off German penetration and described it as indicative of the 
French firm‟s aggressive attitude to overseas sales.101 For its part, Skoda further 
boosted its dividends and capacity by selling in markets throughout the world 
(subject to Schneider‟s permission), with considerable diplomatic and financial 
support from the Czechoslovakian government.
102
 Intriguingly, even the Bank of 
England helped to finance loans for Skoda to supply armaments to the „cordon 
sanitaire‟ during the 1920.103 
The Italian government attached great importance towards developing its 
war industries and apparently lavished large sums on naval and mercantile 
shipbuilding.
104
 Vickers‟ directors enviously admired the fascist regime‟s 
supportive attitude towards exports, with Birch complaining to the War Office in 
January 1928: 
 
That devil Mussolini has knocked us right out of 
Brazil. I knew he would. His diplomatic pressure is 
absolutely tireless and he gives deferred payments, 
special railway rates, etc., etc. I wish he and not 
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Sir Arthur Trevor Dawson, the head of Vickers-Armstrongs‟ naval sales, prepared 
a statement which demonstrated that Italian shipbuilders had nearly 30,000 tons of 
foreign work-in-hand at the end of 1929, including two cruisers for Argentina, 
which he estimated at £6.8 million based on British costs. This compared to less 
than 10,000 tons in British yards, worth just over £1 million, although this did not 
take into account the recent delivery of almost £4 million worth of British-made 
ships to Chile and Argentina. In November 1930 Dawson argued that, since these 
figures were prepared, Italy had signed further contracts for overseas destroyer 
work while Britain had obtained nothing. He perceived a „great divergence‟ of 
orders and blamed Mussolini‟s encouragement, claiming that the Duce had 
threatened to deflect Italian emigration in other directions if Argentina did not 
place large naval contracts in Italy. Dawson contended that British firms would 
prosper on a level playing field, owing to their superior workmanship, and he 
alleged that the Argentine naval minister had since regretted not placing his orders 




In the face of Italian competition and echoing Birch‟s industrial 
mobilisation arguments, Dawson urged the „necessity of England securing the 
maximum of foreign orders‟ in order to retain a core naval productive capacity in 
the face of „very scanty‟ home government contracts. Developing his case, he 
highlighted the „great extent‟ to which the Royal Navy had been strengthened at 
the outbreak of the Great War by requisitioning ships on order for Brazil, Chile, 
Turkey and Norway.
107
 However, this also risked generating serious political 
controversy. Noel-Baker later pointed out that the requisitioning of the Turkish 
battleships had 
 
undoubtedly created great resentment in the Turkish 
Empire, and some good judges hold the view that it 
was a most important factor in determining 
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Turkey‟s decision to take part in the war on the side 




Turkey also made a post-war claim for compensation which involved Vickers and 
Armstrong in tiresome legal proceedings and costs, while the British government 
told the firms not to assume that it would meet any judgement against them.
109
 
Subsequently, Count Leon Ostrorog, Vickers‟ foreign legal adviser, suggested that 
the company‟s ability to obtain large contracts in Turkey was hampered by the 
lack of a settlement regarding the Fatih warship.
110
 Therefore, in December 1929 




An international pooling arrangement offered one way to avoid excessive 
competition, although Sir Charles Craven was sceptical:  
 
If we really did have all Armament Firms in the 
World in the Combine and we were all honest 
people, I think it would be a very wonderful affair, 




Indeed, a mutual lack of trust proved the key inhibiting factor when 
representatives of Bofors, Schneider and Vickers-Armstrongs met at Paris in 
November 1928 to discuss pooling Turkish land armament orders. While Birch, 
representing Vickers, appreciated that the proposed arrangement offered potential 
benefits, he trusted neither of the other parties. Moreover, he assumed that the 
details of the combine would leak out and diminish Vickers‟ trustworthiness. For 
example, he feared that if the Turkish government heard of the agreement, it 
would impair the firm‟s future opportunities and divert work to companies outside 
the combine, such as Beardmore or the Italian manufacturers. More significantly, 
Birch worried about the damaging effect it would have „on our present excellent 
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arrangements with the Foreign Office, Admiralty and War Office, and our 
reputation as straight and open dealers.‟113 
 Vickers-Armstrongs certainly valued the diplomatic and technical help 
provided by individual government departments, although the company 
repeatedly questioned whether this was sufficient for post-war trading conditions. 
The cut-throat competition of the international arms market was increasingly 
framed in the language of industrial mobilisation, and armament firms in other 
countries appeared to enjoy considerably more state support in attracting orders. 
However, British policymakers refused to emulate French and Italian practice and, 
as a result, Vickers-Armstrongs complained that it was unable to compete against 
the big continental manufacturers on an equal basis. Therefore, the government‟s 
comparatively passive attitude fostered a great sense of injustice in the mind of 
the country‟s leading arms manufacturer, and promoted dissent in state-industry 
relations. Furthermore, it contributed to the widespread sense that other powers 
were outpacing Britain in their preparations for industrial mobilisation, even 
though Vickers-Armstrongs still obtained a considerable share of its income from 
foreign business and maintained a reputation for quality naval products. 
Prudence, Politics and the Question of Credit 
 
When contemplating large and expensive armament purchases, customers often 
demanded long-term credit arrangements. These often formed a crucial part of any 
deal and Britain‟s naval shipbuilders believed their inability to offer suitable terms 
constituted the principal stumbling block to attracting foreign business.
114
 
Although the Overseas Trade (Credit and Insurance) Act (1920), Trade Facilities 
Act and Export Credit Guarantee Scheme offered financial support for the export 
industries in general, they did not apply to transactions involving armaments.
115
 
This omission dated from a House of Commons debate on 27 October 1921, when 
Commander Kenworthy, a Liberal MP, proposed the exclusion of „munitions of 
war‟ from the Trade Facilities Bill on the grounds that Britain did „not want to 
bolster up any more wars‟.116 Although the government accepted this amendment 
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without Cabinet discussion, subsequent claims that British firms were losing out 
provoked a long-running debate on the wisdom of the credit prohibition, which 
approached the problem from a wide range of perspectives including orthodox 
finance, disarmament, public opinion, industrial mobilisation, trade and 
unemployment. While these discussions demonstrated a certain degree of 
sympathy for the arms industry, they revealed that official policy was ultimately 
determined, and to some extent constrained, by other priorities. 
The Treasury argued that credit guarantees for armament purchases would 
contradict the government‟s desire to promote European economic reconstruction. 
For example, in 1924 it criticised the projected defence programmes of the Baltic 
states as „fantastically beyond‟ their economic capabilities: 
 
We may think a country like Lithuania ill-advised to 
incur heavy expenditure for armaments, but if she 
has to pay cash down she will not spend enough to 
ruin herself, the damage is limited to her having 
spent on arms money which could more profitably 
have been spent in other directions. 
 
Policymakers feared that borrowing governments would either default on the 
creditor, or ruin their economies trying to repay the debt, while the British 
taxpayers‟ reaction to their money being diverted to assist with foreign armament 
sales also caused concern. The Treasury considered that the government‟s credit 
ban effectively solved the problem, as private lenders were unable to offer 
reasonable terms on the required scale. Yet a unilateral British prohibition was 
relatively useless if other governments continued to offer financial incentives. 
Indeed, France provided armament loans to Poland and Serbia in the early 1920s 
which prompted strong British protestations.
117
 Vickers later complained that it 
was impossible to obtain orders from Poland until the French loan expired in 
1925.
118
 In the City of London, Sir Edward Peacock at Barings later supported the 
Treasury‟s view that the smaller states had developed bad habits as a result of 
being „spoilt‟ by lavish credit from the other great powers and, despite his 
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connections to the armaments industry, he agreed that Britain could not possibly 
offer credit on the same scale.
119
 
Vickers-Armstrongs paid little regard to these orthodox concerns and 
Birch complained to the Board of Trade in June 1929 that „the development and 
expansion of our business is hampered by the difficulties in connection with 
foreign credits.‟120 The Board responded that there was „no hope‟ for an extension 
of the Export Credit Guarantee Scheme to include armaments.
121
 Undeterred, 
Vickers sent a deputation of local Members of Parliament and James Wilson from 
the firm‟s Erith works to the Treasury on 6 November. This group put its case 
before Sir Oswald Mosley, the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster who, 
together with J. H. Thomas, the Lord Privy Seal, George Lansbury, the First 
Commissioner of Works, and Thomas Johnston, the Secretary of State for 
Scotland, had special ministerial responsibility for addressing the unemployment 
problem. In particular, Vickers complained that its inability to offer sufficient 
credit had diverted £3 million worth of armament work to Italy.
122
 Sir Maurice 
Hankey also provided a sympathetic ear and passed details of the „terrible‟ 
situation directly to Thomas.
123
 From an economic point of view, Hankey recalled 
that Britain‟s pre-war supremacy in naval exports had helped to carry the 
overhead expenses of the arms industry and „was a real factor in enabling us to 
compete in the heavy industries with foreign countries, notwithstanding our 
higher standard of living.‟124 Birch felt that the service departments should 
support Vickers‟ plea, but General Milne disagreed:  
 
The services could only urge the importance of the 
mobilisation aspect, whereas the firms could lay 
greater emphasis on the standpoint of reducing 
unemployment and it is on this ground rather than 
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Therefore, Vickers-Armstrongs provided the government with further details of 
the work that it believed it had lost in China, Greece and Turkey. It also outlined 
prospective Chinese and Turkish business, which was heavily contingent on the 
financial terms offered. For example, Turkey‟s latest tender for destroyers and 
submarines, worth an estimated £1.5 million, required the successful manufacturer 
to accept at least 70 percent of the price on long-term credit. Although Vickers 
possessed the financial strength and liquid resources to meet these terms, it was 
unwilling to carry the entire risk in the event of default by the purchasing country. 
In the company‟s eyes, this amounted to unfair competition because the Italian 
government apparently did not flinch from offering the required support to its 
domestic firms. Vickers also protested that it could not compete effectively with 
Germany and the United States for non-armament work: in this regard, it wished 
to secure better credit terms to undertake commercial business with Russia. 
However, the government was unsurprisingly anxious to keep armaments and 
possible Russian credit separate.
126
 
Vickers also complained about the Little Entente‟s behaviour. In March 
1930 Captain E. G. Boxshall, the firm‟s influential Romanian representative, 
reported Bucharest‟s intention to purchase armaments worth £6 million on ten 
year credit terms from France and Czechoslovakia. Michael Palarait of the British 
legation considered it „strange‟ that Romania contemplated such expenditure at a 
time when its financial position demanded strict economies and when it faced no 
serious danger, while Boxshall blamed a combination of French pressure, Polish 
insistence, and alarmism about a possible Soviet attack on Bessarabia.
127
 Vickers 
felt particular indignation because it had been involved, since the mid-1920s, in 
the formation and fortunes of the Societe Usinele Metalurgica Copsa Mica si 
Cugir, a Romanian arms factory. The British firm had agreed to supply equipment 
and technical assistance and, in return, Bucharest had promised to place its 
armament orders with the new company.
128
 Vickers subsequently protested, but 
found that it did not possess the legal means to enforce its agreement and, 
moreover, it was unable to offer the same financial incentives as its rivals. Indeed, 
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Boxshall reported in April 1930 that Schneider had obtained £2 million of state-
backed credit to offer the Romanian government for land armament work.
129
 
In response to Vickers‟ evidence, Eady mooted the idea of an international 
agreement to prevent governments from giving „direct or indirect financial 
assistance‟ to their private armament manufacturers.130 However, the Department 
of Overseas Trade considered that this was „bound to prove ineffective.‟ First, it 
was extremely difficult to trace indirect assistance and impossible to do so without 
generating excessive interference and friction in trade matters. Second, 
distinguishing between warlike and „commercial‟ goods often caused insuperable 
problems of definition. Third, any prohibition could easily be evaded through an 
international loan. For example, the French government sponsored such 
arrangements on the condition that the money was spent in France. Finally, an 
international agreement threatened to raise potentially awkward questions about 
the training of foreign officers by the British services, or regarding the supply of 
war material to the Dominions. Overall, the Department of Overseas Trade 
suggested that any agreement risked bickering and recrimination and would also 
foster mistrust amongst those excluded from it.
131
 Indeed, later efforts to raise the 
question at the Disarmament Conference met with „great opposition‟ from both 
manufacturing and purchasing states, and also raised certain legal objections.
132
 
J. H. Thomas suggested that Vickers-Armstrongs probably exaggerated the 
amount of credit granted by foreign governments but agreed that it was strange for 
the government to stand by and watch other countries take the available contracts. 
Nonetheless, he conceded that facilitating such transactions was incompatible 
with the Labour government‟s stated disarmament policy.133 Eady also suspected 
that credit was not always the primary factor and particularly pointed to the 
evidence of indirect political pressure employed by other countries, and suggested 
that, in at least one case, British firms had been beaten on the price offered.
134
 Yet 
when the Cabinet met on 30 July 1930, it concluded that a re-examination of the 
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credit question was justified in view of rising unemployment and mounting 
evidence that Britain was missing out on potential work.
135
 
The Admiralty put forward a strong case which described the negative 
impact of the credit prohibition on trade, employment and industrial mobilisation 
and pointed out that if warships were not purchased in Britain, they would simply 
be obtained elsewhere.
136
 A. V. Alexander, the First Lord of the Admiralty, told 
the Cabinet on 30 September that the fascist government‟s comparatively 
energetic policy meant that the current value of warships under construction in 
Italy was ten times greater than in Britain.
137
 The Foreign Office, in conjunction 
with the Department of Overseas Trade, subsequently produced a review of the 
global arms trade, which supported the contention that British arms manufacturers 
were disadvantaged by their inability to offer long credit, particularly when 
dealing with the smaller European powers. The Foreign Office also corroborated 
many of the Admiralty‟s suspicions regarding Italian practice, but nonetheless 
concluded that the government was 
 
in the forefront of the struggle to secure world wide 
limitation and reduction of armaments, and it would 
be totally inconsistent with their principles and their 
policy to promote legislation permitting them to 




Therefore, it emphatically urged the Cabinet to reject any extension to the Export 
Credit Guarantee Scheme, while Margaret Bondfield, the Minister of Labour, also 
supported this recommendation in spite of the possible effect on employment.
139
 
Nonetheless, on 17 December the Cabinet concluded that the situation was 
detrimental to British shipbuilders and appointed a committee to undertake further 
investigation.
140
 Although the Treasury was not represented, the committee 
included ministers with responsibility for unemployment, disarmament and 
industrial mobilisation: Vernon Hartshorn, who had replaced Thomas as Lord 
                                                 
135
 TNA, CAB 23/64/46(30), Cabinet Conclusions, 30 July 1930. 
136
 TNA, CAB 24/215/CP314(30), Alexander Memorandum, 22 September 1930. 
137
 TNA, CAB 23/65/57(30), Cabinet Conclusions, 30 September 1930. 
138
 TNA, CAB 24/217/CP406(30), FO Memorandum, 2 December 1930. 
139
 Ibid., CP412(30), Bondfield Note, 9 December 1930. 
140
 TNA, CAB 23/65/73(30), Cabinet Conclusions, 17 December 1930. 
 207 
 
Privy Seal; Arthur Henderson, the Foreign Secretary; William Graham, the 
President of the Board of Trade; and the three service ministers. 
The committee met during the first quarter of 1931 and faced up to 
realities. First, it lacked absolute proof that foreign firms received monetary help 
from their governments, although the available evidence strongly suggested this 
was the case. Second, the ministers accepted that the Treasury would not commit 
to any form of armament credit. Finally, the Foreign Office reaffirmed its own 
opposition, and the committee recognised that arms credit guarantees would 
encourage criticism in parliament and at Geneva. Conversely, the service 
departments suggested the supply of weapons to non-manufacturing countries for 
defensive purposes was not inconsistent with disarmament and Tom Shaw, the 
Secretary of State for War, even claimed that: „It was not impossible that by 
neglecting our own armament firms we might be assisting rather than preventing 
war.‟ However, in the face of the Treasury and Foreign Office‟s emphatic 
opposition, Alexander proposed approaching the problem from a less 
controversial angle. He suggested that British firms were, in fact, partly to blame 
for their own problems owing to excessive individualism and a disinclination to 
work together to gain orders. Alexander proposed that a grouping of the best 
companies would help convince commercial bankers or the Bank of England to 
offer the required financial assistance. Pessimistically supported by the President 
of the Board of Trade and the Lord Privy Seal, he suggested that the government 
should therefore apply its influence in this direction.
141
 For their part, the 
shipbuilding firms complained that they could not obtain advances from their 
bankers to build foreign warships because the banks did not regard such vessels as 
a marketable security in the event of default by the purchaser.
142
 Admiral Roger 
Backhouse, the Third Sea Lord, and Sir Horace Wilson, the Permanent Secretary 
of the Ministry of Labour, subsequently pursued the matter with Sir Edward 
Peacock at Barings, who promised to help as much as possible.
143
 
As if to prove Alexander‟s point about individualism, Vickers-
Armstrongs, Thornycroft and Hawthorn Leslie enjoyed some success with a joint 
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tender for Portuguese naval work in spring 1931. Craven later described this as „a 
miniature attempt to bring the most efficient group together to try and knock out 
the foreigner.‟ The policy worked to an extent, as the grouping obtained orders for 
naval armament, submarines and sloops, although Yarrow, working alone, 
secured the order for destroyers.
144
 During April, and with some Foreign Office 
assistance, British firms obtained £1.9 million worth of Portuguese contracts, 
including four destroyers and two sloops, out of a total expenditure of £3 million, 
with the remainder going to Italy.
145
 Backhouse admitted it „might have been 
better, but it might also have been much worse‟ and bemoaned Portugal‟s 
apparent desire for a „paper Navy‟ rather than quality ships. The British group 
obtained its finance through insurance companies and underwriters and, given the 
banks‟ continued refusal to secure loans on warships, the Admiralty and Board of 
Trade decided to take no further action regarding Barings.
146
 Later in the year, 
Britain‟s departure from the Gold Standard and the resultant devaluation of 
sterling convinced Portugal to place further orders with British firms.
147
 
Despite the Portuguese business, the lack of government financial 
assistance continued to exasperate the arms industry. At Vickers‟ 1932 meeting 
Lawrence reiterated that the government‟s export credit policy „severely 
prejudiced‟ the company‟s trading activities and he argued that the resultant 
diversion of armament work to France and Italy constituted a „serious menace‟ to 
British employment and industrial mobilisation.
148
 Yet, while the arguments for 
and against changing the policy remained much the same, the external situation 
grew more urgent. In April 1933, faced with the PSOC‟s alarming reports on the 
alleged decline of the arms industry and Britain‟s consequent shortage of war 
capacity, the Committee of Imperial Defence pressed the government to take 
action. Walter Runciman, the President of the Board of Trade and chairman of the 
PSOC, argued that the comparative lack of foreign orders placed with British 
firms was a major cause of this dangerous position.
149
 He also pointed out that, 
while the government had implemented a degree of safeguarding for certain vital 
war industries, including optical glass and chemicals, it refused to actively 
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encourage armament exports. To improve matters, Runciman reported that the 
Export Credit Guarantee Department would 
 
welcome any widening of the basis of its operations 
which would secure a greater spread of risks and for 
this reason would favour the inclusion in the scheme 
of munitions of war, especially as, according to their 
information, foreign Governments are normally 
most reluctant to default in respect of such 
purchases. 
 
Therefore, Runciman perceived little danger that the government would lose 
money, although he doubted if it could offer sufficient long credit to guarantee the 
large sums involved in warship construction. Moreover, the Treasury remained 
firmly opposed to any such measures.
150
 
Conversations between the manager of the Export Credit Guarantee 
Department and French and Italian officials in May 1933 provided convincing 
evidence that these powers were using government credits to sponsor their arms 
manufacturers‟ overseas trading activities.151 In December, the Cabinet 
Committee on the Private Armaments Industry recommended that, from the 
perspective of industrial mobilisation and national defence, the lifting of the 
prohibition on export credit for armament.
152
 However, against the background of 
the Disarmament Conference, the Cabinet again decided that the political 
disadvantages of changing the policy outweighed the alleged negative impact of 
maintaining it.
153
 Subsequently, the government turned down a Turkish enquiry 
about warship construction because the proposed contract was contingent on the 
granting of adequate credit facilities. The CID remained concerned that Britain‟s 
defence preparations were affected „very considerably‟ by the lack of work, but 
rather helplessly could only recommend that the FCI committee maintain its 
watch on overseas developments.
154
 
The intensification of rearmament in the mid-1930s unsurprisingly 
changed the parameters of the armament credit debate. Patrick Kyba has shown 
how British pro-rearmament opinion intensified between 1934 and 1935, before 
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overtaking the previously dominant attitude of „peace through disarmament‟ after 
Mussolini‟s invasion of Ethiopia in October 1935.155 No longer shackled by the 
need to appease pro-disarmament opinion, the Foreign Office subsequently 
viewed arms exports as a means to prevent the smaller European powers from 
falling under German influence. Therefore, it pressured the Exchequer to provide 
as much assistance as possible. Although the Treasury remained opposed to 
excessive credit, it now framed its argument in the context of preserving Britain‟s 
financial strength in the event of a long war. Meanwhile, the service departments 
wished to limit the transfer of essential military hardware out of the British Isles. 
Overall, the government became much more willing to accept the idea that credit 
could be used to purchase potential political-strategic benefits although, as Glyn 
Stone has recently demonstrated, its endeavours met with limited success.
156
 
Until rearmament the armaments industry undoubtedly felt disadvantaged 
by the government‟s refusal to provide credit guarantees and vocally expressed its 
dissatisfaction. In support of the firms, Davenport-Hines has described official 
policy as „hypocritical‟ and „inconsistent‟ because, while ministers admitted the 
vital importance of the arms trade for industrial mobilisation, they feared the 
electoral repercussions of providing assistance.
157
 This is an unfair assessment: 
British policy resulted from an ongoing and thorough debate, during which both 
sides presented consistent albeit irreconcilable arguments. On the one hand, the 
Board of Trade and service departments unsuccessfully suggested that providing 
credit guarantees would improve Britain‟s potential and relative industrial 
capacity for war, while improving trade and employment in the short-term. In 
presenting the opposing case, the Treasury and Foreign Office approached the 
problem from different angles, but both implied that refusing to guarantee credit 
for armaments would help to preserve peace and thereby diminish the need for 
future industrial mobilisation. These arguments were far from hypocritical: the 
Treasury not only considered excessive arms expenditure by non-producing states 
as wasteful but genuinely believed that facilitating such purchases went against 
international economic reconstruction and stability. Rising unemployment and 
protectionism challenged standard financial orthodoxies during the depression but 
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the credit prohibition remained, not least because foreign policy and public 
opinion also heavily influenced policymakers. This was especially obvious before 
and during the Disarmament Conference, when the government wished to 
maintain the appearance of commitment towards the conference‟s goal. Fearing 
accusations of bad faith, it refused to change its arms credit policy, despite 
mounting evidence that other states were not following such a principled line. 
Quantifying the Arms Trade: Problems and Patterns 
 
When lobbying the government to change its attitude towards armament exports, 
the industry and its supporters consistently presented evidence to demonstrate that 
British firms were losing out to their continental rivals. Conversely, the League of 
Nations produced an annual compendium of statistics which suggested that 
Britain retained a major share of the international arms market, particularly in 
military goods. This provoked some partly justified dissent from the government, 
not least because of irregularities in the League‟s methods of data collection. 
Unfortunately it remains impossible to assess the scale of the inter-war arms trade 
with any certainty, let alone gauge market allocations on an accurate country-by-
country basis. However, the available evidence does enable some general 
observations on whether Britain really did slip behind the other major exporting 
powers. It also helps to explain the government‟s perennially cautious attitude 
towards the arms trade, and illuminates the way in which statistics were used by 
contemporaries to support differing interpretations. 
 The League of Nations strongly believed that publicity, particularly 
concerning armaments, would promote greater confidence and trust in 
international relations.
158
 In pursuit of this ambition, in 1924 it published the first 
volume of its yearbook of statistics concerning the arms trade, which presented 
information on the imports and exports of 23 countries. The League harvested the 
material for this and subsequent editions from published official documents, 
which meant that the level of accuracy and detail reflected the specific procedures 
of each participating country.
159
 Of course, the lack of an international standard 
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for recording such information meant the numbers were not strictly comparable 
and in the 1930s some major producers, such as Germany, Italy and the Soviet 
Union, were known to have under-reported their figures.
160
 More generally, 
countries used different methods to estimate the value of national arms exports, 
while the distinction between the trade in armaments and „normal‟ business was 
never the same in any two places. The principles behind international customs 
systems also varied and some states‟ figures included goods in transit. In spite of 
these reservations, the League collated the data into tables to facilitate an 
international comparison of market shares although it pointed out that this could 
„only afford an approximate idea of the relative positions of the various 
countries‟.161 
The yearbook figures for arms and ammunition exports included guns, 
machine guns, mountings, rifles, side-arms, shells, torpedoes, bullets, propellants 
and explosives but excluded warships, naval armaments and aircraft. They 
revealed a stable demand during the 1920s, which peaked between 1928 and 
1930, before a sharp fall (Table 7), although the depression affected arm exports 
less than general trade (Table 8). Indeed, as Birch of Vickers-Armstrongs 
admitted in September 1931: „Everybody is hard up, many countries are 
disturbed, and yet since the 1st of January of this year we have sold armament to 
twenty-nine countries, mostly in small quantities.‟162 Between 1923 and 1933 
Britain annually obtained over a quarter of reported exports, reaching a height of 
38 percent in 1931, although this had a lower monetary value than its 30.6 percent 
share of the preceding year. No individual state registered more exports of arms 
and ammunition, and even the combined figures for France and Czechoslovakia 
only exceeded the British level in 1924, 1932 and 1933.
163
  
These revelations only added to the government‟s caution in matters 
concerning the arms trade. In December 1933, while ministers debated how to 
make the export licensing system less restrictive, Sir Robert Vansittart pointed out 
that other countries were unlikely to accept that the British armaments industry 
was dying, in view of its alleged 38 percent share of the global market. Although 
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Runciman doubted the accuracy of the League‟s statistics, Vansittart assured 
ministers that „this figure, which purported to be based on material supplied by the 
United Kingdom, would certainly be used against us.‟164 Indeed, at the Royal 
Commission in 1935, the Communist Party of Great Britain submitted a 
memorandum which used the League‟s data to condemn British „predominance‟ 
and suggest that the „heaviest responsibility for the evils of the world arms traffic 
thus rests with Britain.‟165 Yet, given the international controversy surrounding 
the arms trade in the mid-1930s, David Edgerton has expressed surprise that few 
other witnesses at the Royal Commission addressed the size of Britain‟s role.166 
At a later sitting, Sir Maurice Hankey unsurprisingly took a different view from 
the Communists and criticised the League‟s portrayal of Britain as the world‟s 
largest exporter. Instead, he suggested that 
 
our real share in the world‟s arms export trade is 
certainly considerably lower than the percentages 
here shown, both because the proportion of 
industrial explosives, etc., in the British total is 
probably higher than in the case of other countries, 
and still more because our returns are more 





Therefore, the thoroughness of the licensing system, which had previously 
attracted criticism for allegedly restricting British firms, was now condemned for 
fostering an inaccurate impression of dominance. Hankey also argued that the 
League‟s data was skewed by the inclusion of shipments to India, the Dominions, 
and the colonies. To prove his point, he presented the Commission with a set of 
revised export figures, covering 1929 until 1934, which excluded colonial 
transfers (Table 9). Although the adjusted statistics indicated a more substantial 
challenge from France and Czechoslovakia after 1932, Britain still retained a large 
share of the market and was the leading exporter for four out of the six years 
presented, including the comparatively lucrative period between 1929 and 1930. 
Moreover, even if Hankey did not consider colonial business as part of the general 
arms trade, such transactions still generated armament work for British firms and, 
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therefore, helped to maintain capacity for industrial mobilisation. In this regard, 
the proportional reduction in Britain‟s market share when these exports were 
excluded suggests that inter-imperial trade provided British firms with a definite 
advantage against their competitors. 
In the naval sphere, the available statistics appeared to corroborate British 
shipbuilders‟s complaints about Italian competition. The League‟s figures, though 
far less comprehensive than its corresponding data for land armaments, indicated 
that Britain lagged behind Italy, with France in a distant third place (Table 10). 
However, it is highly unlikely that these values reflected the actual scale of 
international naval business. For example, the League‟s figures suggest that 
Britain exported roughly £3 million of war vessels between 1931 and 1934 but 
Vickers-Armstrongs‟ foreign naval turnover alone totalled £3.4 million during the 
same period (Table 6).
168
 Similarly, Philip Noel Baker supplied the Royal 
Commission with figures from Brassey’s Naval Annual, purporting to show the 
annual value of British warship exports (Table 11), which also stated lower total 
figures than Vickers-Armstrong‟s yearly naval turnover for certain years. 
 Gaps in the existing data and the different methods employed in recording 
the value of naval exports means it is more accurate to compare the numbers and 
types of ships constructed by each country. Between 1923 and 1933, Britain and 
Italy obtained broadly similar numbers of overseas contracts for destroyers, 
submarines and other vessels, although Italian yards gained the benefit of two 
cruisers on foreign account (Table 12). However, Britain‟s domestic construction 
programme during this period comprised nine more cruisers than Italy, and twenty 
more destroyers, so it is hard to argue that it lost much ground in terms of 
industrial mobilisation.
169
 In early 1931 the Board of Trade complained that while 
Britain had obtained 90 percent of pre-war foreign naval orders, its yards now had 
just 5,000 tons of overseas work, compared to 30,000 tons in Italy.
170
 The PSOC 
painted a similarly bleak picture by pointing out that British shipyards in August 
1914 were filled with 111 warships, including 22 vessels on foreign account, of 
which four were valuable capital ships. Conversely, only a single ship out of a 
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total of 38 under construction in August 1930 was destined for another country, 
while capital ships were forbidden by treaty. Meanwhile, Italy was reportedly 
building nineteen large ships and four coastal motor boats for its foreign 
customers.
171
 However, comparing 1930 with 1914 was slightly disingenuous, 
given the vastly different conditions prevailing in international relations and 
economic affairs. Furthermore, Tables 6, 10 and 11 demonstrate that overseas 
naval construction was subject to peaks and troughs. Even though larger ships 
took a long time to build, a particular month taken in isolation did not indicate a 
general trend. In fact, as Robert Harkavy has demonstrated, Britain exported 76 
warships in total during the 1930s. This represented a 58.9 percent market share 
and was a long way ahead of Italy (17.8 percent) and France (10.1 percent).
172
 
Britain dominated the market in warships and submarines, although Italy held a 
much larger share of the market for smaller patrol vessels (Table 13).
173
 
Therefore, although Britain had lost some of its pre-war supremacy, it remained 
the world‟s leading naval exporter. 
Politicians, industrialists and critics of private arms manufacture used 
statistics to reflect their specific concerns and support their contradicting 
arguments as to the level of Britain‟s armament exports. The industry and its 
supporters attempted to project an image of moderation or relative weakness, both 
to deflect domestic and international criticism, and to try and encourage greater 
government assistance. Moreover, officials viewed other countries‟ statistical 
returns with a degree of scepticism and contrasted foreign data with the accuracy 
of Britain‟s licensing system. It was entirely natural for certain interest groups to 
pressure the government to provide more help in obtaining foreign orders: 
Vickers-Armstrongs desired an increased turnover, the Board of Trade wished to 
stimulate commerce, and the services wanted to improve emergency war capacity. 
However, their complaints should not be taken as evidence that Britain failed to 
attract orders. Indeed, despite the alleged disadvantages under which British firms 
allegedly laboured, their products, both military and naval, were still exported in 
sizeable quantities. 
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Table 7: Total Values of World Exports in Arms and Ammunition (Excluding 







British %  French % Czech.  % Swedish % US % 
1923 100 [*] 36.9 20.3 3.3 2.4 23.5 
1924 116 28.3 26.8 5.5 3.4 21.7 
1925 122 34.3 14.9 1.9 5.5 22.2 
1926 130 28.4 11.8 16.2 4.1 20.5 
1927 122 31.9 9.6 7.9 6.1 19.6 
1928 149 34.0 14.8 3.7 4.7 18.2 
1929 165 33.6 14.5 4.9 4.6 16.6 
1930 141 30.6 12.5 9.4 7.7 11.6 
1931 89 38 7.5 11.1 10.5 11.1 
1932 86 29.9 27.5 4.2 11.0 8.7 
1933 92 28 23.4 8.8 9.4 9.0 
 
* = 39.4 million gold dollars. 
 
Sources: LN, 1930.IX.1, Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms, Ammunition and Implements 
of War (Geneva, 1930), p.166, and 1935 edition, 1935.IX.7, p.196. 
 
 
Table 8: Index Figures Demonstrating the Impact of the Depression on General 
Exports Compared to the Global Arms Trade, 1929-1936 
 
 1929  1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 
General Exports 100 80.2 57.3 39 35.5 34.3 35 37.8 
Armaments Exports 100 86.1 56.9 52.9 57.2 61.4 60.4 71.5 
 
Source: LN, 1937.IX.4, Statistical Year-Book of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition (Geneva, 
October 1937), p.202. 
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Table 9: World Exports in Arms, Ammunition and Explosives: (Percentages 
Excluding Colonial Transactions), 1929-1934 
 
 1929 1930 1931 1932 1933 1934 
United Kingdom 21.8  19 28.1 21.9 20.9 11.1 
Belgium 5.7 4.9 4.8 5.1 4.4 6 
Czechoslovakia 6 11.7 13.5 5 10 25.2 
Denmark 2.9 2.4 1.4 0.7 2 1.2 
France 15.4 12.3 6 29.4 24.9 21.3 
Germany (1) 4.7 4.5 5.2 3.5 3.1 2.8 
Holland (3) 2.3 3.6 0.3 5.4 2.1 0.9 
Italy (2) 6.9 8.2 7.7 1.9 4.4 4.5 
Japan (1) 0.1 2.1 0.3 - 0.6 0.4 
Norway (3) 1.3 1.2 1 0.6 2.2 1.9 
Spain (3) 5.5 3.3 1.2 0.8 0.7 0.4 
Sweden 5.6 9.5 12.7 12.8 10.7 10.8 
Switzerland (3) 1.4 2.6 4.3 2.7 3.7 2.7 
United States (3) 19.4 13.7 12.5 9.2 9.3 9.8 
Other Countries  
(Assumed %) 
1 1 1 1 1 1 
Value of World Arms 
Trade (1000s Gold Dollars) 
53,143 44,875 29,012 29,088 31,883 34,593 
 
(1) Explosives only declared 
(2) Excluding blasting powder  
(3) Including sporting arms and ammunition 
 
Source: RC, Evidence, p.648. 
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Table 10: Exports of War Vessels (in 1000s of Gold Dollars) 
 
 1931 1932 1933 1934 1935 1936 Total 
France  3,980.8     3980.8 
Italy 21,720.4 5,602 4,168 1,022 223.9  32,736.2 
Great Britain 2,721.9 1,840.2 2,249.4 1,795 2,543.7 350.0 11,500.2 
 
Source: LN, 1937.IX.4, p.204. 
 
Table 11: Exports of New Ships from the United Kingdom  
(War Vessels including Machinery and Armament), 1925-1933 (£) 
 
1925 1926 1927 
14,354 19,300 45,388 
   
1928 1929 1930 
5,143,150 3,820,250 707,400 
   
1931 1932 1933 
600,000 525,000 254,928 
 
Source: RC, Evidence, p.279. 
 
Table 12: Major New Naval Construction for Foreign Powers, 1923-1933 
 
 Cruisers Destroyers Sloops Gunboats Submarines 
Great Britain - 12 6 5 8 
Italy 2 10 2 9 6  [*] 
 
* = and a portion of submarines sent to Russia for assembly. 
 




Table 13: Market Shares for Major Suppliers in Naval Building, 1930-34 
 
 Submarines Warships Patrol Vessels 
United Kingdom 26.8 42.7 16.7 
United States 9.8 0 1.3 
France 12.2 2.4 0 
Germany 0 0 10.3 
Italy 14.6 19.5 20.5 
Japan 0 1.2 0 
USSR 0 0 2.6 
 




Vickers and Armstrong were two of the world‟s biggest pre-war arms exporters 
and, following their merger in 1927, maintained an international reputation for 
innovation and quality. In promoting specialist products to potential customers 
across the world, Vickers-Armstrongs refined a comprehensive agency system 
and made use of its close ties with the service departments. These endeavours 
brought significant rewards: overseas business comprised a large proportion of the 
firm‟s turnover for armaments, while foreign sales of land equipment added some 
balance to its naval-dominated domestic sales. Fewer contracts were available 
than before 1914, but Britain still obtained a large share of military and naval 
work. Nonetheless, Vickers-Armstrongs repeatedly protested that it faced a 
number of obstacles which reduced its international competitiveness. In particular, 
it considered that the government‟s disinclination to guarantee credit on arms 
contracts was an especial handicap in view of the lavish financial and diplomatic 
assistance that it assumed to be the norm elsewhere. The government was 
sympathetic to these complaints and conceded that helping arms firms 
internationally could boost its preparations for industrial mobilisation. However, 
mirroring its attitude towards the industry‟s domestic struggles, it consistently 
placed the industry‟s concerns beneath its wider policy considerations.  
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The arms trade covered a huge variety of transactions, from the sale of a 
£4 revolver to warship deals worth several millions of pounds, and the 
government attempted to monitor and regulate the entire range of this business. 
Officials recognised that this unilateral oversight of international commerce was 
relatively ineffective, given that other states did not adhere to similar principles, 
and worried that Britain‟s export licensing system diverted trade to countries with 
less restrictive regimes and more generous credit facilities. In reconsidering its 
self-denying stance, the government never contemplated unrestricted arms 
trading, but did explore ways to enable British firms to obtain a greater share of 
the available work. However, its ability to modify existing procedure was 
seriously limited. The Cabinet was faced with irreconcilable and often 
contradictory trading, defence and foreign policy interests, and feared the reaction 
of domestic and international opinion to any action which appeared to give the 
British arms industry more freedom. Ultimately, and rather negatively, the 
government concluded that the potential drawbacks of changing its policy 
outweighed the alleged disadvantages of maintaining it. This attitude added to the 
disillusionment which marked inter-war state-industry relations. The 
government‟s approach towards the arms trade, although intended to protect the 
national interest, therefore also contributed to the exaggerated sense that Britain‟s 
defence preparations lagged behind other countries. 
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6. Statesmen, Smugglers and Sideshows: International Efforts to 
Control Armaments Manufacture and the Arms Trade 
 
 
An international agreement to monitor the arms trade offered the government one 
possible way to maintain or strengthen its existing levels of national control while 
simultaneously enabling British armament firms to compete more fairly with their 
overseas rivals. In this regard, the pursuit of an international treaty to regulate 
arms manufacture and trading formed a subset of the League of Nations‟ wider 
ambition to achieve international security and disarmament, and received near-
constant attention throughout the inter-war period. Nonetheless, this aspect of the 
League‟s work has received remarkably little scholarly consideration. This 
oversight perhaps reflects the frequently repetitive and tedious nature of the 
negotiations. For example, A. C. Temperley, a British officer whose 1938 book 
The Whispering Gallery of Europe recounted a decade of experience at Geneva, 
decided not to „inflict‟ the discussions on trade and manufacture upon his 
readers.
1
 Recent scholarship has largely concentrated on the League‟s initial 
attempts to address these questions before 1925. In particular, David R. Stone and 
Andrew Webster have argued that the League made promising early advances in 
its efforts to control the arms trade, although they have also pointed out that 
conflicting national interests, especially regarding the regulation of private 
manufacture, curtailed further success.
2
 Webster has also analysed the remainder 
of the inter-war period and recognised that the fundamental cause of disagreement 
and failure was the major powers‟ reluctance to undermine their armament 
industries or the effectiveness of their armed forces.
3
 Gerald Silverlock has 
severely criticised the British government‟s negative attitude towards the 
League‟s arms trade negotiations until 1925 although he is less damning of its 
concurrent policy towards the international control of private manufacture.
4
 
Beyond these assessments, little is known about the specifics of British attitudes 
                                                 
1
 A. C. Temperley, The Whispering Gallery of Europe (London, 1938), pp.268-69. 
2
 David R. Stone, „Imperialism and Sovereignty: the League of Nations‟ Drive to Control the 
Global Arms Trade‟, Journal of Contemporary History, vol. 35, no. 2 (Apr., 2000), 213-30; 
Andrew Webster, „Making Disarmament Work‟, 556-59. 
3
 Ibid., 563-64 and Webster, „From Versailles to Geneva‟,  234-36. 
4
 Gerald Anthony Silverlock, „Issues of Disarmament in British Defence and Foreign Policy, 
1918-1925‟ (Ph.D. thesis, King‟s College, London, 2000), Chs. 2-3, esp. pp.55, 73-4. 
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and policy. The years after 1925 have remained virtually unexamined, even 
though they involved considerable debate on the regulation of arms production 
and growing public agitation for greater progress in this direction. 
Britain actually formulated and pursued a consistent dual policy towards 
international efforts to control armaments manufacture and the arms trade during 
the inter-war period. First, it aimed to convince other states to adopt the principles 
of its own unilateral regulations. Second, it sought to reduce the smuggling of 
small arms in colonial areas. Indeed, policymakers believed the illicit trafficking 
of rifles was more dangerous than the trade in modern weapons between 
recognised governments. Yet Britain often found that its comparatively limited 
aims stood at odds to Geneva‟s broader sweep. In the face of unacceptable 
international proposals and rising public dissatisfaction, officials were forced to 
develop detailed arguments against the wider control of arms production. 
Although agreement at Geneva remained unlikely, the government‟s participation 
in the negotiations forced it to further clarify the position of the armaments 
industry in wider strategic thinking, although it had little dialogue with the firms 
on these matters. The issue essentially boiled down to a choice of protecting 
British arms-producing capacity or relying on the League of Nations‟ ability to 
maintain international security. In view of the government‟s industrial 
mobilisation planning and its perpetual mistrust of other states, the League 
increasingly became an awkward, or even dangerous, diversion from reality. 
 ‘Evil Effects’ and ‘Grave Objections’: The League of Nations and Private 
Manufacture, 1918-1924 
 
The League of Nations Covenant, signed on 28 June 1919, contained a 
controversial and wide-ranging reference to the private armaments industry, 
which subsequently guided international efforts to regulate the manufacturers‟ 
activities. Paragraph five of Article Eight stated that: 
 
The Members of the League agree that the 
manufacture by private enterprise of munitions and 
implements of war is open to grave objections. The 
Council shall advise how the evil effects attendant 
upon such manufacture can be prevented, due 
regard being had to the necessities of those 
Members of the League which are not able to 
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manufacture the munitions and implements of war 




When drafting the Covenant, President Woodrow Wilson originally suggested a 
clause to entirely prohibit private armaments manufacture. In December 1918 this 
idea received some support from General Jan Smuts, the South African statesman, 
although Smuts‟ considerations in favour of nationalising arms production 
received little attention from the British War Cabinet. Although the service 
departments admitted that ending the vested financial interest in the manufacture 
of war material held some attraction, they argued that a state monopoly would 
raise an insuperable problem under current international law, which forbade 
neutral governments from supplying belligerents in wartime but left private firms 
within neutral countries free to trade. In this regard, they drew attention to 
Britain‟s reliance on American private suppliers prior to the United States‟ official 
entry into the war. Therefore, the British delegation to the Paris Peace Conference 
in early 1919 did not generally agree with Wilson‟s initiative and, having failed to 
remove all mention of the subject from the Covenant, secured the wording finally 
adopted as a compromise.
6
 
David Lloyd George, the Prime Minister during the Peace Conference, and 
Sir Maurice Hankey, who had undertaken important secretarial duties for both the 
British delegation and the conference more generally, subsequently presented 
differing interpretations as to the precise origins of paragraph five. At the Royal 
Commission in May 1936, Lloyd George suggested the conference had taken a 
strongly unanimous line against the private manufacturers, based upon the popular 
feeling that Krupp had helped to foster the war spirit in Germany.
7
 On the other 
hand, Hankey described the matter as a „complete sideshow‟ which received 
consideration only on Wilson‟s insistence. After studying the conference records, 
Hankey revealed that no national or international authority had investigated the 
alleged objections or „evil effects‟. Moreover, he described paragraph five of 
Article Eight as „one of the vast interconnected complex of subjects‟ dealt with at 
Paris and suggested that it had received less attention that it deserved because of 
the „fast-moving circumstances and uncertainties‟ which had marked 
                                                 
5
 Quoted in Walters, History of the League, p.48. 
6
 RC, Evidence, pp.717, 737-41. 
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 Nonetheless, this single paragraph laid the foundation for fifteen 
years of frequently awkward and unrewarding international discussions about the 
armaments industry. 
The League initially appointed a Permanent Advisory Committee (PAC) 
to provide advice on military matters. Composed of service representatives from 
member states, it unsurprisingly concluded that disarmament was impracticable. 
In response, the first League Assembly appointed the Temporary Mixed 
Commission on Armaments (TMC) in late 1920, consisting of a broader group of 
political and economic experts whose freedom of action was not tied to any 
particular national policy.
9
 The commission subsequently prepared reports and 
proposals for the execution of Article Eight and appointed a specific 
subcommittee to address paragraph five.
10
 Nonetheless, in February 1921 the PAC 
concluded that: 
 
(1) No direct action other than that already provided 
for by the treaties of peace can be taken in the 
case of producing states against the right of their 
private factories to manufacture war materials. 
(2) Even if at some future time measures were 
contemplated to diminish production, no action 
should be taken to prevent non-producing states 





Conversely, in September 1921 the TMC‟s first interim report suggested that the 
regulation of private armaments manufacture was the most important special 
measure likely to hasten the solution of the general disarmament problem. 
Although its subcommittee noted that the alleged „grave objections‟ were neither 
defined in the covenant nor extractable from the deliberations of the drafting 
committee, it also pointed out that the „public mind‟ was strongly prejudiced 
against the arms business because of the „common belief‟ that competition 
between arms manufacturers promoted war. The subcommittee grouped the 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., pp.704, 717, 736-41. 
9
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10
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11
 Quoted in United States Department of State, Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the 
United States, 1927, vol. I, p.217. 
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general objections to untrammelled manufacture under six headings, which 
intimated that armament firms 
 
have been active in fomenting war-scares and in 
persuading their own countries to adopt warlike 
policies and to increase their armaments. 
[...] have attempted to bribe Government officials 
both at home and abroad. 
[...] have disseminated false reports concerning the 
military and naval programmes of various countries, 
in order to stimulate armament expenditure. 
[...] have sought to influence public opinion through 
the control of newspapers in their own and foreign 
countries. 
[...] have organised international armament rings 
through which the armament race has been 
accentuated by playing off one country against 
another. 
[...] have organised international armament trusts 





The report also listed eight difficulties that could arise if arms production was 
completely nationalised. These included the League‟s inability to interfere with 
domestic sovereignty and industrial production; the neutrality question and 
international law; the risk that countries would stockpile arms or that non-
producers would set up their own factories; the impact on employment and labour 
relations; the problem of firms which produced both peacetime and military-naval 
products; and the difficulty of defining war industries and how far state ownership 
should extend, given that a logical interpretation would eventually cover all 
industrial activity within a country. Therefore, at this early stage, the TMC could 
only provide a relatively inconclusive survey of conflicting opinions, and admit 
that it could not „recommend the abolition of private manufacture or advise upon 
the particular steps to be taken to control it.‟13  
 In June 1922, Rear Admiral John Segrave, a British PAC representative 
and participant in the TMC‟s deliberations, pointed that out that every previous 
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 LN, A.81.1921, Report of the Temporary Mixed Commision on Armaments (Geneva, 15 
September 1921), p.11. 
13
 Ibid., pp.11-12. 
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consideration of the alleged evils of private manufacture had „slurred over‟ the 
question of proof and that the only written evidence against the arms firms had 
appeared in various pacifist pamphlets, such as The Six Panics by Francis Hirst 
and The War Traders by G. H. Perris, both published in 1913. Although Segrave 
admitted that some elements of these pre-war arguments were „plausible‟, he also 
criticised their distortion of facts.
14
 Nonetheless, the TMC subsequently 
postponed a request by Lord Cecil, who sat on the commission in an independent 
capacity, for an enquiry to determine the extent of the „evil effects‟.15 
 Despite the lack of proof, the idea that the Temporary Mixed Commission 
had definitely condemned private manufacture became a key component in the 
arguments of a new generation of critics in the 1930s, and authors such as Fenner 
Brockway and Philip Noel-Baker cited the commission‟s six headings as 
„conclusions‟ and portrayed them as indictments brought by the League upon the 
manufacturers.
16
 The controversy led Sir John Simon, the Foreign Secretary, to 
make two statements in the House of Commons during 1934, denying that the 
TMC had made any concrete recommendations on the matter.
17
 Nonetheless, at 
the Royal Commission in 1936, Dame Rachel Crowdy, one of the commissioners 
and a previous member of the League Secretariat, suggested that the TMC had 
believed the evils existed and that the six criticisms of private manufacture had 
taken precedence over the eight points against prohibition.
18
 When Hankey 
appeared before the Commission in May 1936, he expressed his desire to finally 
dispose of this „mischievous misrepresentation‟ and presented testimony obtained 
from British officials who had participated in the drafting of the 1921 report, 
which revealed that the TMC had not taken outside evidence to support the six 
points. He argued that the report represented a „catalogue of objections‟ rather 
than definite „charges‟ against the private arms industry, balanced by the eight 
points referring to the dangers of nationalisation.
19
 Based on Hankey‟s evidence 
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and the wording of the TMC report, the Royal Commission ultimately reported 
that it was a „misconception‟ to take the six objections as „an authoritative finding 
after full investigation and inquiry.‟20 
While the critics exaggerated the authority of the 1921 report, it 
nonetheless proved an important factor in inter-war international relations, 
reflecting an influential if unsubstantiated belief. Moreover, by making 
suggestions and raising unanswered questions, it gave momentum to the League‟s 
attempts to regulate arms manufacture. In this direction, the Temporary Mixed 
Commission made nine suggestions: these included licensing and registration for 
private firms, combined with the publication of licences granted, account books 
and lists of shareholders. The commission also suggested that individuals 
connected with the armament industry be prevented from holding a controlling 
interest in newspapers.
21
 Lord Esher and Sir Hubert Llewellyn Smith, both acting 
in an independent capacity, used these principles to draft a convention which the 
TMC adopted in 1922 as the basis for a proposed conference on private 
manufacture and the arms trade.
22
  
Although Llewellyn Smith was also the government‟s chief economic 
adviser in London, his proposal at Geneva carried in the TMC against British 
votes.
23
 Subsequently, the draft convention provoked extensive opposition from 
the service departments. First, they argued that the scheme would discourage 
general non-armament firms from manufacturing war material as a sideline, which 
would weaken British industrial mobilisation and, ironically, give more power to 
the specialist armament firms. Second, they highlighted the danger that an 
unfriendly but neutral country could deny licences to its own private firms and 
prevent vital wartime supplies from reaching Britain. Finally, the services feared 
the proposed regulations would reduce British overseas sales and encourage non-




In reality, the TMC‟s efforts to control armaments manufacture met with 
little success. Crucially, the United States refused to take part in the work, citing 
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its inability to enact legislation penalising arms firms.
25
 Within the commission, 
the majority recommended basing the regulation and supervision of private 
manufacture on the national implementation of common international principles. 
The minority, which included Léon Jouhaux, the French labour representative, 
favoured absolute prohibition and demanded international control over arms 
production.
26
 With the TMC unable to agree on a future direction, the 1924 
League Assembly could only instruct it to re-examine the question of private 
manufacture „with an entirely open mind‟.27 Yet the individual governments, 
particularly the major powers, had grown frustrated with the TMC‟s independent 
spirit and, confident that the League was making sufficient progress in its wider 
disarmament and security initiatives, managed to ensure that the commission 
never met again.
28
 The task of fulfilling the Assembly‟s instructions fell instead to 
a new Coordination Commission, composed entirely of official representatives.
29
 
In early 1925 the Committee of Imperial Defence formed a subcommittee 
to draft instructions for Ronald McNeill, the Parliamentary Undersecretary for 
Foreign Affairs, who was appointed as the British representative on the 
Coordination Commission. The services again raised concerns about the neutrality 
implications of any control of private manufacture, particularly regarding the 
importance of retaining Britain‟s ability to buy and sell weapons abroad. 
Nonetheless, given the provisions of Article Eight and the government‟s 
controversial opposition to the Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of 
International Disputes, the subcommittee agreed that the British delegate must 
present some constructive suggestions to the Coordination Commission. 
Therefore, it recommended that McNeill outline five conditions to ensure British 
support: 
 
The similar consent of all the principal 
manufacturing countries, and in particular of the 
United States of America. 
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The previous conclusion of a satisfactory 
international convention dealing with the traffic in 
arms. 
The scheme must not apply to firms manufacturing 
solely for their own Government. 
The scheme must not operate in time of war. 




In this latter regard, the subcommittee held that each country adopt the national 
regulations imposed by Britain‟s own Firearms Act (1920), which was designed to 
limit the production of certain items to registered firms. By pressing for 
international acceptance of this system, policymakers hoped to subject foreign 
competitors to the same restrictions as their British counterparts. While the 
existing Act applied primarily to small arms and ammunition manufacture, the 
subcommittee argued that it could easily be expanded to incorporate ordnance, 
while the existing arrangements meant that only registered firms could export the 
heavier types of weapons.
31
 The Home Office suggested that Britain could use the 
Firearms Act to throw the onus at Geneva onto other states and reported that it 
had not appreciably injured the service departments‟ interests during the four 
years of its operation. Indeed, the control it offered was rather limited: the system 
was not used to limit the number of manufacturers nor the scope of their 
operations, while registration could only be refused on a very limited number of 
grounds. The Act also lacked any provision for regular inspections. Nonetheless, 




Although the League asked the Coordination Commission to look at the 
problem with an „open mind‟, the CID subcommittee believed that it would 
probably take the text of the TMC‟s majority report as the basis for a more 
comprehensive draft. The principles behind this document raised a number of 
problems both regarding its practicability, such as whether it would be possible to 
prevent the arms industry from having contacts with newspapers, and in terms of 
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national security. In particular, the subcommittee disliked the idea of including 
firms „partially engaged‟ in arms manufacture and expressed concern that the 
publicity provisions would give away secret manufacturing locations and facilitate 
enemy air raids and saboteurs.
33
 
Arthur Steel-Maitland, the Minister of Labour, sounded a further note of 
warning: his experience of the League‟s efforts to regulate working hours had 
fostered a belief that, while Britain would loyally adhere to its obligations, other 
states were liable to take a more „elastic‟ interpretation. In the serious matter of 
arms manufacture, he questioned whether British national safety could be 
entrusted to the good faith of foreign powers.
34
 On the other hand, the CID 
subcommittee suspected that the service departments‟ many objections applied 
with similar force to Belgium, France, Italy and, above all, the United States. 
Indeed, it suspected that the first three were simply waiting for Britain to incur the 
odium for rejecting the scheme at Geneva. Given that the United States was 
unlikely to agree to the proposed convention in any case, the subcommittee 
suggested that Britain should whittle down the objectionable features of the 
TMC‟s text and agree in principle. This tactic was intended to force the other 




Between 1919 and 1925 British policymakers were confronted by an 
inconvenient momentum, emanating from Geneva, which forced them to address 
the question of international regulation for private armaments manufacture. 
However, Britain mistrusted other governments more than its arms industry and 
aimed to protect its firms from excessive international interference by stalling the 
discussions as much as possible. At most, it could only suggest imposing its own 
unilateral regulations on other powers. At any rate, policymakers doubtless 
breathed a sigh of relief when the Coordination Commission met in February 
1925 and decided to put the matter on hold while the League focused its attention 
on the arms trade.
36
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 ‘Decent Weapons’ and ‘Inferior Races’: The International Arms Traffic and 
the Post-War World  
 
The initial motivation to secure a post-war international arms trade agreement 
mainly arose from existing imperial concerns. The rapid innovations of the 
nineteenth century revolution in armaments technology meant that weapons 
frequently became obsolete before they wore out.
37
 The resultant pre-war trade in 
second-hand arms, particularly old rifles, was mainly carried on by states rather 
than private firms and was chiefly motivated by the desire to secure diplomatic 
advantages.
38
 Britain played a comparatively minor role in this activity and 
believed that French, Italian and Russian eagerness to offload their surplus 
armaments in areas such as the Balkans and Ethiopia was dangerous and 
destabilising.
39
 However, although most of the global arms trade remained 
unregulated, the Brussels Convention of 1890, signed by the United States and the 
European colonial powers, restricted the flow of arms to certain parts of Africa as 
a means towards the wider object of ending the slave trade.
40
 However, the 
Brussels Convention proved only partially effective in stopping what Sir Mark 
Sykes, one of the government‟s Middle Eastern specialists, later called the 
problem of „decent weapons getting into the hands of the inferior races.‟41 Finding 
a solution informed much of Britain‟s subsequent policy towards the arms trade. 
The initial prospects for a reduction in post-war trafficking were not 
promising. In March 1917 a CID subcommittee, chaired by Lord Islington, the 
Under-Secretary of State for India, gravely predicted a serious escalation of the 
government‟s difficulties after the war: 
 
The world‟s total stocks of destructive weapons will 
in fact be infinitely greater than at any previous 
period in history; and the difficulty of preventing 
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The British Empire‟s extensive frontiers were particularly vulnerable to the 
dangers of arms smuggling and the government already possessed various 
unilateral safeguards against such activity. Besides strengthening these measures, 
Islington‟s subcommittee recommended that Britain take the opportunity to secure 
an international agreement at the peace conference to regulate the arms trade and 
restrict the indiscriminate distribution of small arms and ammunition.
43
 Larger 
and more modern weapons caused fewer concerns as they were less suitable for 
illicit trade and use. For example, although machine guns could be smuggled, 
their high consumption of ammunition made them relatively useless if the source 
of supply was cut off. Moreover, Sykes suggested that improvements in aircraft, 
armoured cars and machine guns would give British imperial forces a decisive 
technological advantage against tribesmen armed with second-hand rifles.
44
 
Believing each state‟s national interests would reduce the scope of any 
international arrangements, the subcommittee suggested that a more limited 
agreement would establish the principle of cooperation and foster a community of 
interests. For example, it proposed that Britain should offer to help France in 
controlling the illicit arms trade in West Africa, in exchange for similar assistance 
regarding the traffic from the French protectorate of Djibouti to Ethiopia, which 
affected neighbouring British and Italian colonial interests.
45
 The arms trade with 
Ethiopia, a sovereign state, was already subject to a 1906 treaty whereby Rome, 
Paris and London imposed strict control „to prevent disorder‟ in bordering 
territories such as Kenya and the Sudan. During the Great War, this agreement 
was used to implement a strategic embargo on arms exports to the Ethiopian 
government.
46
 Nonetheless, consignments continued to reach Ethiopia via 
Djibouti, although French officials professed ignorance of these developments.
47
 
Rowland Sperling, the head of the Foreign Office American section, 
anticipated few difficulties in obtaining the United States‟ support, given 
Washington‟s desire to cut the supply of weapons to the more turbulent Latin 
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American countries. Yet the draft convention under discussion at the Paris Peace 
Conference in early 1919 was almost entirely imperial in character, placing 
restrictions on surplus arms disposal and prohibiting the arms trade in 
troublesome areas of Africa and Asia. Sperling observed that „it is not to be 
supposed that an aeroplane or twelve inch gun would be of much use to an Afridi 
or Abyssinian raider‟, but he also pointed out that such items would be useful, for 
example, to Chile. While Britain had no objection to Chile purchasing modern 
weapons, and Italy, Japan and Spain were reportedly discussing possible arms 




As a result of the negotiations at Paris, 23 states signed the Convention for 
the Control of the Trade in Arms and Ammunition at Saint-Germain-en-laye on 
10 September 1919. Significantly, the preamble did not suggest that the arms 
trade was inherently harmful, although the first chapter established principles of 
licensing and publicity as methods of regulating the arms trade between signatory 
powers. However, the majority of the convention aimed to restrict the supply of 
arms and ammunition to specific prohibited areas in Africa, Asia and „any country 
which refuses to accept the tutelage under which it has been placed‟ (see 
Appendix VI).
49
 Indeed, Sperling later observed that the authors of St Germain 
had distinguished between the trade in weapons such as machine guns and 
artillery among „civilised‟ countries which were „fit to use them‟, and the problem 
of the traffic in small arms which „could easily be procured and misused by 
barbarous races‟.50  
Few states ratified the 1919 convention and the League particularly 
blamed the United States for not giving a lead to the other major arms exporting 
countries.
51
 However, although St Germain remained inoperative, its protocol 
bound its signatories to act within the convention‟s articles and spirit.52 In July 
1920 Britain, France, Italy and Japan also made a „rather informal agreement‟ to 
implement the prohibited area regime.
53
 Therefore, Britain achieved a certain 
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measure of success in its primary post-war ambition regarding the arms traffic and 
the Foreign Office suggested in 1924 that the informal arrangement, while not 
perfect, did at least „check the supply of arms to turbulent races in Africa and the 
Middle East.‟54 
Britain also participated in other international agreements to prevent the 
supply of armaments to specified regions. In May 1919 rampant Chinese 
factionalism led Britain, the United States, Japan, France, Italy, (non-Soviet) 
Russia, Spain, Portugal, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Brazil to impose an arms 
embargo, in an attempt to discourage civil unrest until the establishment of a 
strong central authority in China. The Foreign Office later claimed that some 
states had interpreted their obligations very loosely, while certain countries, 
notably Soviet Russia, Germany, Czechoslovakia and Norway, had freely 
exported arms to China. Although the existing situation was prejudicial to British 
industry, the Foreign Office refused to allow a breach of the agreement, fearing 
that Britain would then incur „the odium of breaking down an arrangement which, 
although partially ineffective, has certainly, to some extent prevented a general 
scramble to supply the Chinese with arms‟. It also refused to entertain suggestions 
from British officials in China that the government could use its control of the 
arms trade as a „political weapon‟ in supplying one or other of the warring 
factions. Indeed, Sir Austen Chamberlain, the Foreign Secretary, argued in 1927 
that the existing policy of neutrality among the factions was eminently correct: 
„Nothing else has prevented us at one time or another from backing the wrong 
horse, and it is still too soon to pick the winner.‟55 
The Allied powers also imposed an embargo on Greece and Turkey, as a 
result of the conflict which erupted between these states during the post-war 
partitioning of the Ottoman Empire, although one Foreign Office official 
suspected that it was „not very loyally observed‟ by France and Italy. 
Furthermore, the creation of the Turkish Republic in 1923 caused a fresh 
complication for imperial security: the informal agreement arising out of St 
Germain was specifically designed to prevent arms reaching disturbed territories 
where „uncontrolled importation was likely to increase the risk of war and unrest‟, 
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and the Asiatic portion of Turkey was in close touch with many of these areas.
56
 
Faced with the laissez-faire attitude of France and Italy, and without the 
adherence of the United States to the informal agreement, Britain withdrew from 
the embargo in 1924 to prevent its exporters from losing out in the Aegean. 
Policymakers remained puzzled as to how to prevent the re-export, via Turkey, of 
armaments throughout the Middle East, while the Foreign Office recognised that 
pressing for a restriction on Turkey‟s arms imports was probably not the best way 
to induce it to join the League of Nations.
57
 In the face of these political realities, 
Britain allowed arms to go to Turkey „in practically unlimited quantities‟ after 
1924, although the Foreign Office retained the ability to hold up export licence 
applications in moments of crisis.
58
 
Beyond these limited diplomatic arrangements, arising out of specific local 
contexts, most of the post-war momentum for controlling the general arms trade 
came out of Geneva. St Germain was not a League of Nations initiative, although 
it would have used the League‟s machinery to promulgate statistical information 
on licensed exports.
59
 Moreover, the League Covenant referred to the arms trade 
twice. The fifth paragraph of article 22 placed responsibility for the administration 
of certain territories, especially in central Africa, upon specified mandatory 
powers. This obligation included the prohibition of various abuses including the 
arms traffic. Section (d) of article 23 entrusted the League „with the general 
supervision of the trade in arms and ammunition with the countries in which the 
control of the traffic is necessary in the common interest‟.60 Like St Germain, 
these elements of the Covenant reflected Britain‟s imperial concerns, lent 
credence to its paternalistic approach and demonstrated a community of shared 
interest towards this question, while effectively leaving the general trade in arms 
between sovereign states untouched. 
Yet the Temporary Mixed Commission compelled the League to take its 
consideration of this issue a step further. It reported in 1921 that the control of the 
international arms traffic was „an essential feature‟ of any scheme to bring the 
alleged evils of private manufacture under control. In this regard, it viewed St 
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Germain as a limited step, because its primary aim was not disarmament „among 
civilised states‟ but was rather designed  
 
to prevent arms from getting into the hands of 
private persons or organisations, or of certain 
barbarous or semi-civilised peoples, whose 
possession of those weapons would be a danger to 
the world. 
 
The TMC suggested that this could act as a starting point for controlling the 
general trade in all forms of armament and recommended that St Germain be 
brought into operation at the earliest opportunity. The commission also recognised 
that the cooperation of the United States was vital, as no state would ratify a 
convention that simply diverted trade into American hands, while it also predicted 
complications surrounding the position of the Soviet Union.
61
 After receiving 
another formal rejection of St Germain from Washington in September 1923, the 
League decided to start afresh. To secure the participation of the American 
representative in Switzerland, the proposed new convention was separated from 




Meanwhile, the United States‟ refusal to ratify St Germain offered the 
service departments an opportunity to develop their objections to the convention. 
For example, the Admiralty felt that the general trade in armaments deserved 
more consideration than a single chapter in a convention largely designed to deal 
with gun running.
63
 In this latter regard, the services not only suggested an 
enlargement of the prohibited zones but also advocated a tightening up of 
international export controls in order to reduce the naval commitment involved in 
patrolling these areas. More generally, the services reiterated that the government 
must preserve its freedom to purchase from neutral private sources in wartime, 




In January 1924 Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, argued that further 
action was unnecessary as the informal agreement to restrict arms exports to the 
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prohibited areas had made St Germain „practically operative‟ and had prevented 
weapons from reaching „turbulent races‟ in Africa and the Middle East.65 
However, the system was not watertight and the Admiralty doubted whether the 
other powers had taken the same strict interpretation of their obligation not to 
export arms to the prohibited zones.
66
 Nonetheless, Curzon warned that the more 
wide-ranging general convention now suggested by the League would endanger 
the more limited agreement‟s precarious authority. Indeed, owing to these 
considerations Lord Cecil, representing Britain at the League Council in late 
1923, had been instructed to resist reopening the question. However, the maverick 
internationalist disobeyed his instructions and not only supported the 
recommendation to invite the United States to participate in the arms trade 
negotiations but also resisted a French suggestion that the TMC suspend its 
labours pending the receipt of Washington‟s answer.67 
The Temporary Mixed Commission‟s central role in drafting the new 
convention frustrated British officials. Angered by Cecil‟s defiance, Sir Eyre 
Crowe, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, criticised the 
commission‟s members as „absolutely irresponsible amateurs‟ who were ill-
equipped to deal with this highly complex problem. He feared Britain was being 
driven into a „wrong and dangerous position‟ and would have preferred the 
„eminently qualified‟ service representatives on the PAC to have undertaken the 
work. Crowe criticised Cecil for subscribing to the „dangerous‟ theory that the 
League represented public opinion rather than government policy, and he worried 
that Major J. W. Hills, who held no official position in the British government but 
acted as joint rapporteur to the TMC‟s drafting subcommittee, would publicise 
his meetings with various Whitehall officials in order to invest his scheme with 
unwarranted authority.
68
 Indeed, the Foreign Office continued to resist what it 
perceived as attempts by Hills and Cecil, who both sat on the TMC in purely 
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Despite these protests, the preparatory work for a new convention began in 
February 1924, based on the provisions of Articles Eight and 23(d) of the 
Covenant.
70
 At the Foreign Office, the American Department handed 
responsibility for the arms traffic question to the Western Department, 
presumably owing to the latter‟s connection with the League of Nations.71 On 26 
February Major Hills consulted the concerned government departments about the 
TMC‟s proposed draft and Sperling, who had emerged as the Foreign Office‟s 
arms traffic expert, suggested that the existing informal agreement of 1920 „was 
doing a small and unostentatious but good work‟ which was threatened by the 
discussion of a more ambitious convention.
72
 He subsequently argued that St 
Germain had failed precisely because it was overloaded by more sweeping 
provisions and predicted that the new convention would similarly fail, „because 
practical difficulties are overlooked in the pursuit of unattainable ideals.‟ While 
the common factor in the great powers‟ informal agreement was the definite 
presence of „troublous areas‟ on their frontiers, Sperling suggested that the new 
convention was too idealistic and that the principle underlying the TMC‟s work, 
 
however attractive as an ideal, is not one which can 
be carried out in the present state of the world, 
because it presupposes that all countries, where any 
arms can be manufactured, are on an equal footing 
and equally to be trusted to enforce any self-denying 
ordinance against a traffic which must become more 
and more profitable as arms acquire a scarcity 
value. 
 
Moreover, Sperling even suggested that Hills‟ rough draft would make it easier 
for certain states, including Afghanistan, the Central American republics, China, 
Ethiopia, Russia, Turkey and, eventually, Germany, to acquire arms than under 
existing arrangements.
73
 On a more positive note, the Home Office supported the 
inclusion of clauses to clarify the accreditation of legitimate government 
representatives because, at present, „people continually turned up who were not 
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only not accredited representatives but who were often open to the gravest 
suspicion.‟74 
The Permanent Advisory Committee considered the TMC‟s draft in May 
1924 and the British delegation proposed the creation of two separate 
conventions: one to deal with the general global trade in armaments and another 
to put the control of the arms traffic in certain parts of Africa and Asia on a more 
satisfactory and widely recognised basis. Britain argued that the former 
convention would probably require much discussion and therefore involve 
considerable delay before it came into force. By contrast, few difficulties were 
anticipated in negotiating an updated version of the lapsed Brussels Convention.
75
 
However, in July several members of the TMC, including Cecil, protested that 
this procedure would militate against the acceptance of a general worldwide 
convention. As a result, Rear Admiral Aubrey Smith, the official British 
representative on the Commission, withdrew the suggestion.
76
 After the PAC had 
finished its observations, the draft was completed and the League Council 




The draft convention‟s first chapter categorised and defined various 
armaments, ammunition and implements of war: category one covered arms and 
ammunition designed entirely for war; category two incorporated arms that 
possessed a military capability but were not exclusively designed for that purpose; 
while category three referred to armaments neither designed for war nor capable 
of warlike usage, such as cattle killers. The second chapter established the 
licensing and publicity regime for trade in these articles. Like St Germain, 
supervision was based upon the establishment of a Central International Office, 
which would receive and publish details of licences granted. Articles listed in 
category one were restricted to direct deliveries to recognised governments. Free 
exportation of category two articles was allowed if the high contracting parties 
decided that the material was not intended for warlike purposes, otherwise the 
category one regime applied. Trade in category three goods was uninhibited, 
except in the case of deliveries to the prohibited maritime and territorial zones 
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established in the third, fourth and fifth chapters of the convention. None of the 
material defined in chapter one could be exported to the prohibited zones unless it 
was a licensed delivery to the government of the country concerned, though the 
question of what areas should be included was left for discussion by the 
conference. The final chapter was reserved for general provisions.
78
 
Given that Britain already felt it had achieved a decent measure of control 
through its existing policy, it was highly unlikely that its delegation would play a 
proactive role at the forthcoming arms trade conference. After the Great War, 
international regulation of the arms trade only appealed to British policymakers in 
limited regional contexts, particularly in preventing small arms from falling into 
undesirable hands. To a certain extent, the League of Nations helped in this regard 
but Britain was also apprehensive of the League‟s wider ambition to control all 
trading in armaments. Like the simultaneous negotiations on private manufacture, 
this suspicion not only resulted from the government‟s continued mistrust of other 
powers but also because it wished to protect its ability to trade modern privately-
produced weapons with other states.  
The Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms and 
Ammunition and in Implements of War, 1925 
 
In May 1925 Time magazine hailed the opening of „the largest conference, after 
the Paris Peace Conference of 1919, ever to be held in the whole course of known 
history.‟79 The Conference for the Supervision of the International Trade in Arms 
and Ammunition and in Implements of War met from 4 May until 17 June 1925, 
and attracted participants from 44 states alongside observers from Argentina.  The 
president of the conference, Count Henri Carton de Wiart, the former Belgian 
Prime Minister, stated in his opening speech that „the present state of international 
opinion‟ made it 
 
inadmissible that a trade which has so great an 
influence on the security of nations and individuals 
as that in armaments should be regarded as 
exclusively commercial and should escape all 
general regulation. 
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Even so, Carton de Wiart recognised a legitimate trade in armaments because  
 
every State is not only entitled but duty bound to 
provide for its security within the scope of its 
international obligations by procuring the necessary 
armaments, either from its own factories or from 
foreign factories. 
  
Connected to the desire to protect the „good name‟ of such trade was the duty to 
keep armaments out of unsuitable hands by clamping down on „illicit and 
dangerous traffic‟.80 
These aspects of the president‟s speech corresponded closely to the British 
government‟s own two-pronged approach to the conference. First, it looked to 
maintain or enhance the prohibited zone regime. Second, it wished to eliminate 
any provisions that would unduly interfere with Britain‟s general security, trade 
and manufacture. Indeed, shortly before the conference opened, a committee of 
departmental representatives again suggested a redraft of the convention to make 
the section dealing with the prohibited areas into a self-contained whole, arguing 
that this would facilitate part-ratification if a country agreed to the special regime 
but not the wider provisions. The committee also recommended that the 
prohibited areas be renamed „special zones‟ in an attempt to remove the 
misconception that governments within them would be unable to secure weapons 
for legitimate needs, and that the British delegation should make it clear that the 
only effect of inclusion was  
 
to prevent the internal enemies of the Government 
from obtaining arms, so that logically a young 
country governing itself with difficulty should 
welcome the international support which the special 




Unsurprisingly, this rather patronising attitude won Britain few friends amongst 
the smaller powers at Geneva. 
Initially, it seemed as if the British were not taking the conference 
seriously at all. Complaining about the oppressive heat, William Beckett, assistant 
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legal adviser to the Foreign Office and a member of the British delegation, 
sardonically wrote after the opening ceremonies: 
 
A number of the delegates look as if they certainly 
ought not to be allowed any arms and should be 
kept in a prohibited area – notably the Duke of 
Entotto of Ethiopia, who does his hair with rancid 




Beckett also commented that Heinrich von Eckardt, the president of the large 
German delegation, „was a very able gun runner in Mexico during the war‟.83 
However, the British delegation was not without its own critics. On 2 May, The 
Economist noted: 
 
The Americans are coming with a powerful and 
representative delegation, under the presidency of 
Senator Burton; the French and Germans will also 
be strongly represented; Great Britain is contenting 
herself with sending the Under-Secretary of State 
for War, the Earl of Onslow. Attached to him as 
experts are the British officers on the League‟s 
Permanent Advisory Commission on Armaments – 
experts who hitherto have not been remarkable for a 





Onslow, who possessed a pre-war diplomatic background, was not the 
government‟s first choice as head of delegation, as Ronald McNeill had 
previously declined to take on the job for personal reasons and a disinclination to 
grapple with the technicalities of the question.
85
 C. W. Orde, a clerk in the 
Western Department, represented the Foreign Office, as Sperling was now 
working as a diplomat in Bern.
86
 The Labour Party‟s observers at the conference, 
Charles Buxton and Mary Carlin, reported that the apparent inadequacy of the 
British delegation was „much commented upon‟ and that its composition 
                                                 
82
 TNA, FO 371/11036, W4824/86/95, Beckett to Hurst, 5 May 1925. 
83
 Ibid. As Germany‟s wartime ambassador to Mexico, von Eckardt was the recipient of the 
Zimmerman telegram in 1917. 
84
 The Economist, 2 May 1925, p.855. 
85
 TNA, FO 371/11032, W3295/86/95, McNeill Minute, 7 April 1925. 
86
 Ibid., Villiers Minute, 16 April 1925. 
 243 
 
suggested that the government regarded the subject as being „purely military, and 
having no political importance.‟87 
Despite these criticisms, the British attitude towards the convention‟s more 
general provisions was reasonably conciliatory. For example, the Cabinet ceded 
the inclusion of warships, subject to special conditions, once the Admiralty was 
reassured that vessels would not be opened up to examination and rummaging by 
foreign countries and that domestic shipbuilders would not suffer as a result of the 
regulations.
88
 The Air Ministry strongly resisted the inclusion of aircraft, feeling it 
would deal a „death blow‟ to the British manufacturers upon whom the Royal Air 
Force relied. The conference subsequently reached a compromise whereby 
aeroplanes were excluded from categories one and two, and licensing would only 
apply to aircraft exported to the special zones (for the final categorisation of 
armaments decided by the conference, see Appendix VII).
89
 
 The negotiations on which states should be included in the special zones 
were more politically charged and provoked greater controversy. However, 
Britain again demonstrated flexibility in the means by which it attempted to 
achieve rigid defence objectives and, prior to the conference, the Colonial, 
Foreign and India Offices all offered insights into the current position of 
controversial regions.
90
 As a result, Britain‟s approach to the special zones tended 
to take into account on the ground realities rather than strict adherence to the draft 
convention‟s constraints. 
 Historically, Iran and the Persian Gulf provided a channel for illicit 
weapons to reach tribal areas on the North-West Frontier of India, where their use 
caused security problems for the Indian government.
91
 The India Office noted that 
if Iran was included in the special zones, the supply from the south would be 
checked but, given the Soviet Union‟s absence from the conference, this would 
leave considerable infiltration from the north. Therefore, this traffic could only be 
blocked by the action of the Iranian government itself. The India Office suggested 
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that Tehran, having already objected to the perceived stigma of the prohibited 
areas, would probably be more willing in this regard if Britain supported its 
exclusion from the zones.
92
 The conference duly exempted Iran from the special 
regime but further controversy erupted when Britain refused to remove Iranian 
territorial waters from the maritime zones. Sir Percy Cox, representing the Indian 
government and with considerable pre-war experience of the Persian Gulf, 
described these waters as „the home of the arms traffic‟ and, supported by 
Onslow, demanded their inclusion in the zones. In response, the incensed Iranian 
delegation withdrew from the conference.
93
 However, despite the failure to 
resolve this issue at Geneva, subsequent events appeared to justify Britain‟s 
methods. The Admiralty reported in 1932 that its naval vigilance, coupled with 
the desire of both Iran and Saudi Arabia to restrict the traffic within their 
territories, had reduced gun running in the Persian Gulf to negligible proportions. 
Smugglers appeared to think the Royal Navy possessed greater powers than it 
actually did: in fact, its ships mainly hunted for illicit arms under the cloak of anti-
slavery operations, even though it did not have a specific right of search under 




Ethiopia posed a similar problem to Iran, in that it was a sovereign state 
and a member of the League of Nations. Since the end of the war, France had 
continued to supply the African state with arms via Djibouti, despite British and 
Italian attempts to block this activity and negotiate a quota system to regulate 
supplies for the Ethiopian government. When Ethiopia joined the League in 1923, 
Britain made sure that its membership was tied to an undertaking that it would 
adhere to the provisions of St Germain, fearing that Addis Ababa would otherwise 
acquire the right to import unlimited quantities of armaments.
95
 In March 1925, 
Taffari Makonnen, heir to the Ethiopian throne, demanded that his country be 
removed from the prohibited areas, so that it could properly fulfil its obligations 
as a sovereign member of the League of Nations.
96
 However, Orde considered it 
preferable that Ethiopia refuse to sign the convention and thereby maintain the 
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status quo, rather than have it excluded from the special zones.
97
 On 30 April Lord 
Cecil, who had been appointed to the Cabinet as Chancellor of the Duchy of 
Lancaster in November 1924, suggested that the arms trade conference presented 
an opportunity to make an „outside arrangement‟, through the League‟s agency, to 
strengthen international control of the Ethiopian arms traffic.
98
 
At the conference, the Ethiopian problem was ultimately resolved through 
private talks involving the representatives of Britain, France and Italy. On 14 May 
Count Clauzel, a member of the French delegation, initiated these discussions and 
expressed his hope for an extension of the existing tripartite agreement, which 
would prove satisfactory to all parties and exclude Ethiopia from the special 
zones.
99
 These behind-the-scenes negotiations eventually led to an article in the 
final convention, whereby Ethiopia undertook „in the free exercise of her 
sovereign rights‟ to put into force all regulations necessary to fulfil the special 
zone obligations without the perceived indignity of being included in the zones.
100
  
China was a member of the League and attended the conference, but it 
remained beset by internal power struggles. Indeed, Sydney Waterlow, the head of 
the Foreign Office‟s Far Eastern department, had declared in January 1925 that 
„the increasing flow of munitions to China is a far greater danger to the peace of 
the world than is the traffic with any of the semi-barbarous countries which it is 
desired to control.‟ Waterlow also suggested that the existing arms embargo was 
inadequate for this growing problem and that Britain should draw attention to the 
issue at Geneva.
101
 Conversely, the Foreign Office did not want the British 
delegate to take the initiative in proposing Chinese inclusion in the special zones, 
fearing that this would cause resentment.
102
 However, it was not clear whether the 
arms trade convention as drafted would supersede or threaten the existing 
embargo, so Onslow was instructed to obtain a clause safeguarding the right to 
conclude separate agreements when stricter measures were deemed necessary.
103
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This right was ultimately protected by Article 34 of the final convention, which 
abrogated St Germain but explicitly confirmed that it did not affect other 
agreements pertaining to the arms trade.
104
 Thereafter, the Chinese embargo 
remained in place until 26 April 1929, when it was lifted owing to widespread 
international recognition of Chiang Kai-shek‟s Nationalist government.105 
Onslow joined most of the other conference delegates in signing the 
International Convention for the supervision of the International Trade in Arms 
and Ammunition on 17 June 1925.
106
 However, the convention never came into 
force. Britain demanded simultaneous ratification by the principal manufacturing 
countries, but the response to enquiries addressed to these states was not 
hopeful.
107
 At Vickers, General Birch sought reassurance from A. C. Temperley, 
the British military representative at Geneva, that Britain would not ratify alone 
and therefore drive foreign armament business to countries which had not 
ratified.
108
 In 1930 the government finally deposited its ratification in Paris, albeit 
with the crippling reservation that it would not come into operation without 
similar action from the other manufacturing states.
109
  
The failure of the 1925 conference did not fundamentally change the 
government‟s approach to the arms trade. First, it meant a continuation of the 
status quo of limited and informal regional agreements, a position which officials 
generally found satisfactory. Moreover, even though the convention remained 
inoperative, the Admiralty found that the special zones provisions gave „a kind of 
authority‟ to its naval activities to suppress illicit traffic in these areas.110 Second, 
Britain generally followed the convention‟s licensing procedure for exports in any 
case.
111
 Therefore, even had the convention come into force, the wider activities 
of British manufacturers would have been unaffected, beyond their international 
rivals being subjected to the same regulatory provisions. Of greater concern for 
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policymakers was that the conference‟s uncertain conclusion caused the League to 
return to the question of private arms manufacture. 
Private versus State Manufacture: International Negotiations on the Control 
of Arms Production, 1925-31 
  
The arms trade conference ultimately failed because it did not take into the 
account the League Covenant‟s warning to give due regard to those countries 
unable to manufacture „the munitions and implements of war necessary for their 
safety.‟ The non-producing states argued that the 1925 convention subjected their 
purchases to an embarrassing and potentially dangerous level of international 
publicity, while armaments produced for domestic consumption by the exporting 
countries remained a secret.
112
 To meet this complaint, the conference‟s Final Act 
declared the signatories‟ intention to press for an early consideration of the 
international aspects of arms manufacture.
113
 To an extent this aim was 
sidetracked by the appointment of the Preparatory Commission for the 
Disarmament Conference, which met between 1926 and 1931 to draw up a 
general disarmament convention.
114
 Yet the League still held several meetings on 
the subject of private and (eventually) government manufacture, forcing British 
policymakers to clarify their objections and prepare further obstructionist tactics. 
 In December 1925 the League Council despatched a questionnaire to 
governments, including non-member states, asking each country to outline its 
existing national control measures, provide observations on any „grave objections‟ 
connected to private arms manufacture, and to offer any suggestions for the 
proposed international agreement.
115
 Over four years after the TMC had published 
its controversial six points, this was the League‟s first attempt to survey 
government opinion on these issues.
116
 The newly-appointed Reduction and 
Limitation of Armaments (RLA) interdepartmental subcommittee of the CID, 
under Cecil‟s chairmanship, prepared Britain‟s response. It reiterated that that the 
government exercised adequate national control through the Firearms Act and 
Washington Treaties Act; that the British armaments industry was not open to 
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grave objections; and that the international objections to private manufacture were 
not exclusive to arms production. Furthermore, the subcommittee suggested that 
the international application of the Firearms Act would provide sufficient control 
of global manufacture but doubted if other states, which ostensibly possessed 
similar regulations, would loyally carry out these measures.
117
 To demonstrate the 
efficiency of British control, the Home Office pointed out that only three out of 
1,760 people arrested before 16 May 1926 in connection with the General Strike 
had been found in possession of illicit weapons.
118
 Moreover, while the Home 
Office supplied evidence that private dealers in wartime surplus arms had 
indulged in nefarious practices, it found little proof that the arms manufacturers 
engaged in such activity.
119
 Overseas, the Board of Trade argued that firms had 
probably held out secret financial inducements to those connected with the 
placing of government contacts, although it admitted it lacked hard evidence and 
pointed out that such practices were not confined to arms firms.
120
 
Without waiting to receive the answers to its questionnaire, the League of 
Nations appointed a committee of enquiry, consisting of Eduardo Cobian of 
Spain, Alberto Guani of Uruguay, and Ferdinand Ververka of Czechoslovakia, 
who produced a „Preliminary Draft Convention Concerning the Supervision of the 
Private Manufacture of Arms and Ammunition and of Implements of War and 
Concerning the Publicity of Such Manufacture‟ in April 1926. This drew upon the 
Temporary Mixed Commission‟s prior work and recommended a regime of 
licensing for private manufacture, with publicity for all arms produced, although 
similar obligations regarding state-owned factories were not clearly defined. The 
draft also contained an article which forbade parties from purchasing items listed 
in the first three categories of the 1925 arms trade convention from a non-party 
(see Appendix VII).
121
 The British representatives on the PAC initially suggested 
that this provision interfered with the government‟s right to purchase in the 
cheapest market but the services later agreed that it was necessary to prevent 
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The service representatives on the RLA subcommittee suggested that the 
preliminary draft‟s definition of a „private manufacturer‟ was too wide. Instead, 
they expressed their desire to only include firms mainly engaged in arms 
production rather than, for example, a pen manufacturing company which 
occasionally made fuses. In particular, they did not want to discourage ordinarily 
„commercial‟ firms from manufacturing parts of secret government weapons, 
including precision instruments. The assistant director of contracts at the War 
Office suggested that if such companies were forced to register, it could 
discourage them from accepting military orders and the country would be forced 
to rely more upon the „Armament Ring‟. In response, Arthur Locke, a civil 
servant at the Home Office, suggested that even Vickers could potentially avoid 
registration under such a system, as it could incorporate its genuine arms works 
(Vickers-Armstrongs) with the various commercial business concerns under its 
general control, thereby reducing the relative percentage of its overall activity 
dedicated to armament production.  Locke also pointed out that many non-
specialist firms had undertaken one-off orders for the services and had not 
previously objected to the existing licensing system.
123
 
Locke‟s arguments did little to assuage the service departments‟ concern 
that detailed international publicity would result in dangerous revelations about 
Britain‟s strategic position.  The British PAC representatives had earlier 
commented that the proposed publication of deliveries by private manufacturers, 
and of the stocks held by both private and state manufacturers was a „novel and 
unacceptable‟ development, which would cause weaker countries to panic and the 
world to „reverberate with ideas of threats of war.‟ In any case, the PAC 
representatives felt that other countries, particularly in eastern Europe, would 
never agree to such a provision.
124
 The Admiralty concurred that the publications 
of detailed information risked encouraging arms racing and aggression. Moreover, 
it suggested that such publicity would reveal changing stock levels which could 
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enable a prospective enemy to ascertain Britain‟s war plans.125 On the other hand, 
Cecil argued that if Britain could not agree to some level of publicity, it might as 
well openly state its opposition to the entire convention. In an attempt to reassure 
the services, Cecil presumed the League would agree to returns showing only the 
value of the goods under the main headings of the 1925 categories, given that the 
primary object of publicity was to ascertain an overall sense of the global 
manufacture of arms, and whether this was subject to annual increases.
126
 The 
Admiralty remained unconvinced and worried that the publication of value would 
provoke opposition from the arms firms by giving away business details. It also 
pointed out that Britain was much more dependent on private manufacture than 
France, Holland, Italy and Japan, and feared it would end up publishing more data 
than these countries. In an echo of the Foreign Office‟s attitude to the earlier arms 
trade negotiations, the Admiralty argued that the League of Nations‟ wide 
ambition would preclude success and suggested that, until all countries had joined 
the League, the most that should be attempted was for governments to tighten up 
their national arrangements.
127
 Interestingly, in November 1932 the Admiralty 
claimed its reliance on private manufacture had fallen to 50 percent, which made 
it less concerned about equality of publicity.
128
 
During the summer of 1926 the RLA subcommittee, following its earlier 
negative discussions, suspended its consideration of the Committee of Enquiry‟s 
convention to give the League time to incorporate the questionnaire results into 
the draft.
129
 In September the League Assembly gave fresh momentum to the 
issue by calling for a special conference on private manufacture if the Preparatory 
Commission had not completed its preparations for the general disarmament 
conference by the following year.
130
 On 16 November Cecil told the RLA 
subcommittee that opinion at Geneva had inclined towards accepting the 
Committee of Enquiry‟s draft as the basis for the proposed conference. As Britain 
could not simply ignore these developments, he asked the services to prepare a 
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„relatively harmless‟ convention themselves.131 Although the resulting document 
retained the League‟s categorisation of arms, the services‟ suggested provisions 
for regulating the manufacture of such items were far more limited: the 
convention applied only to firms „mainly or largely engaged‟ in arms 
manufacture, while aircraft were entirely removed from licensing. Most 
controversially, the publicity provisions were changed from the League‟s 
quarterly detailed returns on specific items to yearly returns giving only general 
descriptions of the war material for which licences had been granted, with similar 
returns for state manufacture.
132
 On 1 March 1927 Cecil expressed serious 
reservations about putting such a document forward at Geneva.
133
 The Home 
Office and Board of Trade subsequently amended the publicity provisions, 
although the subcommittee continued to debate whether these should give details 
of quantity, with negative implications for secrecy, or by value, which raised 
difficulties when applied to state production.
134
 
The services‟ unconstructive proposals reflected the RLA subcommittee‟s 
general unwillingness to engage in any meaningful way with the negotiations at 
Geneva. Indeed, the services‟ draft was only intended as a precaution in the event 
that Britain failed to obtain a postponement of the League‟s discussions. To this 
end, Locke suggested that the British delegate press for the inclusion of state 
manufacture in the convention, thereby generating further disagreement between 
the countries which relied on government factories and the non-producing states 
which relied on purchases from private foreign sources.
135
 Although the United 
States, which was heavily reliant on private manufacture, shared Britain‟s view 
regarding the insertion of state factories, the League‟s newly appointed Special 
Commission for the Preparation of a Draft Convention on the Private Manufacture 
of Arms and Ammunition and of Implements of War (SCPM) was unable to 
reconcile this dispute when it met for the first time between 14 March and 25 
April.
136
 Like Britain, the United States had little conviction that an international 
convention to control private manufacture would succeed, but took part in the 
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League‟s negotiations to at least show willingness to cooperate in an issue 
connected to disarmament and because the American delegate had signed the 
Final Act of the 1925 arms trade conference. However, in a worrying 
development for the publicity-shy British, Washington also aimed to promote the 




The 1927 League Assembly‟s Disarmament Committee suggested that a 
solution could be found in subjecting private manufacture to full supervision, with 
publicity extended to state production.
138
 The Assembly referred the question 
back to the Special Commission, which eventually met between 27 and 30 August 
1928 and agreed to this principle.
139
 In the meantime, Cecil had resigned from the 
Cabinet in protest at the government‟s handling of the Geneva Naval Conference 
in summer 1927.
140
  Lord Salisbury, the Lord Privy Seal and Cecil‟s brother, took 
over the chair of the RLA subcommittee, while Alexander Cadogan, the First 
Secretary at the Foreign Office, subsequently represented Britain on the SCPM. 
Progress remained elusive and the Special Commission‟s decision to include state 
manufacture merely provoked renewed argument on the form that publicity 
should take. In particular, France refused to give anything other than total value 
by category of state-produced weapons but demanded to know the number, value 
and weight of privately-made arms.
141
 Conversely, Britain only agreed to supply 
annual returns showing the value of war material produced by both forms of 
manufacture. Although the French delegate criticised this „childish‟ attitude, the 
Foreign Office argued that it was perfectly acceptable so long as France and Italy 
maintained the view that private manufacture be subjected to more detailed 
returns than state production. In this regard, it suggested the British delegate could 
emphasise that a comparable lack of equality had rendered the 1925 arms trade 
convention a dead letter. Yet, in reality, Britain championed the principle of 
equality not from any concern for the plight of the non-producers but more 
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because it was a convenient argument to support its defence-orientated refusal to 
give more than the value of the goods produced by the arms industry, particularly 
in view of its belief that France only manufactured 20 percent of its arms in 
private factories, compared to 80 percent in Britain.
142
 On the other hand, the 
Treasury, admitting it only had an indirect interest in the matter, suggested that if 
Britain did reveal more information than advised by the service departments, this 
concession would be balanced by the information gained about other powers, and 
it also supported the convention as a step on the road to disarmament.
143
  
Lengthy discussions at the SCPM‟s next meeting in December 1928 
revealed that no country had significantly altered its attitude towards state 
manufacture. Combined with the surprising announcement that Belgium refused 
to accept the existing categorisation of arms, the Special Commission produced 
little more than an unwieldy draft, burdened with complexities and reservations. 
At the close of proceedings, Hugh Wilson, the United States delegate, made an 
unexpected statement criticising the inadequacy of publicity by value, which 
contrasted with the views he had expressed to Cadogan in private.
144
 The SCPM 
met again in August 1929, but the British government, anticipating that „no useful 
purpose would be served‟, issued its representative with no fresh instructions. 
Cadogan described the resultant draft convention as a document „which does not, 
honestly, mark any real progress towards a solution of the problem‟ and conceded 
that the Special Commission had reached the end of its useful life.
145
 
As the RLA subcommittee had earlier implied, the entire matter hinged on 
the outcome of the wider disarmament negotiations. The arms trade convention 
could not be made operative until private manufacture was similarly regulated 
and, for equality‟s sake, this could not happen until state production was also 
controlled. However, the Covenant did not specifically mention regulation of 
government factories and the question of state manufacture also involved 
problems connected to general disarmament, such as the level of publicity to be 
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accorded to each country‟s armament levels.146  As a result, negotiations stalled 
until they received fresh momentum in December 1930 when the Preparatory 
Commission finally finished its labours and allowed the Council to subsequently 
summon the long-awaited disarmament conference. 
In January 1931 Philip Noel-Baker, the Parliamentary Private Secretary to 
the Foreign Secretary, suggested that the government had approached the problem 
from the wrong angle. He argued that the question was not one of equality, but 
rather that state production was inherently less liable to corrupt practices in the 
sale of arms to home and foreign governments.
147
 Noel-Baker was right that 
Britain never based its policy on the assumption that the alleged evils of private 
manufacture required international attention. Instead, policymakers were 
primarily motivated by a desire to preserve secrecy and to safeguard British firms, 
both specialist and general, from excessive interference. 
Ticklish Questions and Awkward Answers: The Disarmament Conference 
and the Royal Commission, 1932-36 
 
The Disarmament Conference opened on 2 February 1932, with most countries 
represented.
148
 Until its broader disarmament negotiations adjourned indefinitely 
in 1934, the questions of arms production and trade were largely relegated to the 
sidelines. For example, it took until 22 September for the conference to appoint a 
Committee for the Regulation of the Trade in, and Private and State Manufacture 
of, Arms and Implements of War (CTM). This committee only met for the first 
time in October and produced a preliminary report the following month, which 
recorded the existing fundamental differences of opinion and divided its work into 
separate manufacture and trade subcommittees.
149
 Despite this slow start, E. H. 
Carr, Britain‟s CTM representative and Second Secretary at the Foreign Office, 
wrote to Charles Howard Smith, the chairman of the Cabinet‟s Interdepartmental 
Disarmament Conference (DCI) committee and a Foreign Office Counsellor, that 
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he was faced with the „ticklish‟ questions of the arms trade and private 
manufacture earlier than he had expected.
150
 
The arms trade provoked relatively little discussion. Britain had largely 
agreed with the terms of the 1925 convention and was satisfied with its existing 
measures to prevent trafficking.
151
 Despite the India Office‟s concern over 
continued rifle smuggling to the North-West Frontier, the DCI committee decided 
to leave the matter alone and suggested that a successful general disarmament 
convention could lead to subsequent special agreements similar to the informal 
application of St Germain.
152
 Nonetheless, on 1 March 1933 the Admiralty made 
some proposals to bring the 1925 convention into line with the Disarmament 
Conference negotiations. In particular, it suggested new measures to facilitate the 
imposition of international embargoes.
153
 Although Carr questioned the operation 
of such a clause, he felt the proposal had some value, particularly in view of the 
controversy surrounding Britain‟s ongoing unilateral embargo against China and 
Japan: 
 
The risks of having such a system seems to me to be 
infinitely less than the risks of being compelled by 
public opinion to take sudden decisions without any 
system at all – which is what has been happening to 




At a DCI committee meeting on 19 April, Colonel F. G. Drew, the War Office 
representative, objected to Carr‟s remark that embargoes were not a matter for the 
services, and stated that they had a serious impact on the arms industry and, as a 
result, imperial defence. Drew also protested against the Admiralty view that 
Britain could be bound to accept an international embargo „agreed‟ by an 




 The negotiations surrounding arms manufacture unsurprisingly caused 
more controversy, although the discussion of publicity and the limitation of war 
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material was circumscribed pending the conclusions reached by other committees. 
Therefore, the bureau of the Disarmament Conference told the CTM to 
concentrate on supervisory arrangements.
156
 Reporting to the DCI committee in 
November 1932, the services expressed firm opposition to international inspection 
of both state and private manufacture, fearing that this would reveal secret 
manufacturing techniques. For example, the Admiralty pointed out that even its 
inspectors were not presently allowed to see the steel-hardening process used for 
shell at the Hadfield and Firth works.
157
 Furthermore, G. S. Whitham, the 
Assistant Director of Ordnance Factories and member of the PSOC, feared that 
the system suggested would facilitate foreign espionage. To meet these 
complaints, the committee proposed resisting „on the spot‟ verification until the 
exact arrangements whereby an investigation could be ordered were 
ascertained.
158
 Yet this overlooked the Cabinet‟s earlier support for the 
conference‟s resolution to establish a Permanent Disarmament Commission 
(PDC) to ensure the faithful execution of the convention‟s provisions.159 This 
meant that if somebody accused Vickers of building a prohibited gun and the 
majority in the PDC demanded an inspection, Britain could not refuse to allow a 
commission to visit the firm‟s works to ascertain the truth.160 The Cabinet‟s 
decision limited the DCI committee‟s room for manoeuvre, and its subsequent 
activity in this direction was mainly concerned with circumscribing the scenarios 
whereby an inspection could be ordered.
161
 
The British representatives also resisted proposals by „certain delegations‟ 
for a central international licensing authority, and instead recommended national 
licences combined with the submission of pertinent data to the PDC.
162
 Carr wrote 
from Geneva on 23 November that, while other countries supported this approach, 
the company of Italy and Japan was „not particularly reputable‟ while the United 
States was acting tentatively owing to domestic public opinion. Therefore, he 
requested some positive proposals to demonstrate the effectiveness of national 
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licensing to his fellow delegates.
163
  Yet the DCI committee could only stress the 
adequacy of the existing British system (i.e. the registration of manufacturers 
coupled with a system of export licensing) and rejected anything more extensive 
as likely to involve highly contentious legislation and a great deal of expense.
164
  
The committee‟s static position on national control ironically led to 
revelations about the inherent frailties of Britain‟s existing system. Indeed, as 
Captain V. H. Danckwerts of the Admiralty Plans Division admitted on 29 
November, 
 
we have not really anything like the supervision 
inside the country which we were actually inclined 
to make out, but we did keep a very tight hold on 




Further to this, Carr wrote on 2 December that the other delegates at Geneva had 
revealed the „nakedness‟ of the Firearms Act as a means of controlling 
manufacture: 
 
No licence of any kind is required to build 
battleships, submarines, tanks or aeroplanes, even 
when specifically fitted with apparatus for firing or 
bombing, though the manufacturer of the “firearms” 
eventually fitted to these engines of war would of 
course have to have a licence. Indeed, I am told it is 
very doubtful, though the case has never arisen, 
whether a licence is required to manufacture 
artillery, since big guns are not normally included in 
the term “firearms”.166  
 
Although the Washington and London Treaty Acts imposed regulations on the 
production of warships, no other legislation beyond these and the Firearms Act 
governed arms manufacture in Britain. Moreover, the DCI committee also heard 
that, beyond the requirement to obtain an export licence, „no record or control is 
exercised over the armament trade in any form‟, because the licences did not 
record what was actually exported, even though the Board of Customs had agreed 
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to obtain this information in future.
167
 On 8 December 1932 the government also 
faced criticism from Lord Marley, a Labour peer, during a House of Lords debate. 
As part of a general critique of the government‟s attitude at Geneva, Marley 
suggested that allowing the export of arms to China and Japan, despite the volatile 
situation following the Manchurian crisis, was „hardly a control with which this 
government should be satisfied.‟168 
The DCI committee recognised that Britain‟s existing regulations could 
appear „rather loose‟ but contended that they were generally adequate for national 
needs and accused other countries of lacking the desire to exercise similar 
restrictions. Nonetheless, the committee recognised that Britain would need to 
tighten up its system in order to fend off demands for international control at 
Geneva.
169
 However, efforts in this direction were constrained by the service 
departments‟ continued desire to exclude commercial firms capable of arms 
manufacture, estimated at between 10,000 and 12,000 concerns, from the 
convention‟s operation.170 Furthermore, the DCI committee, on the Board of 
Trade‟s advice, decided that the only British firms „chiefly or largely‟ engaged in 
the manufacture of arms were sporting arms manufacturers and state factories 
because even the largest private firms which manufactured armaments only 
dedicated a portion of their time and output to such work.
171
 Noel-Baker 
subsequently revealed that this attitude had prompted bemusement from a 
Frenchman who had thought that Vickers-Armstrongs was the largest arms firm in 
the world. Indeed, the Royal Commission revealed in 1936 that nearly 70 percent 
of Vickers-Armstrongs‟ business in 1932 was related to armament production.172 
The services also attacked the idea that quantitative disarmament should 
logically lead to quantitative licensing, suggesting that this would lower the value 
of competitive tendering, render the economical allocation of contracts almost 
impossible, and harass firms out of the arms business. Warship construction, 
which was similarly limited under the Treaties of Washington Act, was an 
apparent exception to this argument. In mitigation, Carr pointed out that the only 
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items so far proposed for quantitative disarmament were tanks, guns and military 
aircraft and that the idea was simply to prevent a country building beyond the 
limits set in the disarmament convention. The DCI committee also had difficulties 
deciding whether to specify definite conditions for refusing licences, which would 
allow manufacturers to know where they stood such as in the Treaties of 
Washington Act, or to retain the present flexibility to occasionally refuse arms 
exports for political reasons. Finally, the Admiralty added a caveat that it did not 
consider any licensing system necessary.
173
 Indeed, its representative commented 
that the ambitious measures proposed at Geneva would „worry the private 
armament firm off the face of the earth‟.174 
On 23 January 1933, as a result of the DCI committee‟s recommendations, 
the government‟s Ministerial Disarmament Committee rejected the licensing of 
arms manufacture as impracticable and urged tighter export control instead. Sir 
John Simon subsequently noted that this reversed the government‟s long-held 
policy, which it had reiterated in Parliament on 8 December 1932, that Britain 
should advocate national licensing in opposition to the French desire for 
international control. Moreover, Simon argued that the proposed draft convention 
seemed to apply only to factories producing finished articles and would not cover 
an excessively large number of manufacturers or a particularly extensive range of 
arms categories. Rather than reverse previous decisions and risk isolation, he 
suggested that British policy should aim to simplify the list of armaments 
involved.
175
 In this regard, the question of components was crucial, but posed a 
tricky dilemma: the inclusion of every part used in arms production would require 
an impracticable number of licences, unless the definition was confined to one 
essential and easily-recognisable element. However, if components were left out, 
it would facilitate the evasion of the convention, annoy the non-producing powers 
and would likely result in demands for more detailed returns of finished items. 
Moreover, by April 1933 the services‟ traditional resistance to excessive detail 
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had a deeper motivation: the desire to avoid exposing the „lamentable state‟ of 
Britain‟s reserves.176 
Faced with a number of dilemmas and a mountain of objections, the DCI 
committee could not develop a genuinely constructive policy and could only 
recommend that the British delegate „aim at securing agreement to some system 
which, besides being practicable, would not be likely to be detrimental to national 
security in any way.‟177 Yet a practical agreement was elusive because the 
assembled powers at Geneva proved unable to resolve the fundamental 
disagreements that had previously restricted the TMC and Special Commission. 
Indeed, besides the undecided issues surrounding supervision, quantitative 
limitation and publicity, the CTM reported in mid-1933 that even the vital 




The likelihood of the conference reaching any final answers was greatly 
diminished as 1933 progressed. In June attention drifted from Geneva to the 
London Economic Conference, while Nazi Germany‟s departure from both the 
Disarmament Conference and the League in October 1933 caused a sense of 
unreality to settle over subsequent proceedings.
179
 Yet the conference still hoped 
to achieve some positive result and, when its general commission met in May 
1934, it highlighted the manufacture and trade in arms for urgent consideration. 
Whereas these questions had previously occupied a secondary part of the 
conference‟s deliberations, they now became a more immediate objective, while 
general disarmament was relegated to private conversations between 
governments.
180
 Despite (and perhaps because of) the worsening international 
situation and the tendency to rearmament, the British government also faced 
mounting domestic criticism of the private armaments industry.
181
 Although 
policymakers had successfully protected the arms firms from undue international 
attention for most of the post-war era, they now faced intense pressure at a critical 
juncture to not only provide greater transparency but, if necessary, to take 
effective action to reign in the manufacturers. 
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Although the general Disarmament Conference disbanded with an air of 
gloomy finality on 11 June 1934, the question of the manufacture and trade of 
arms remained a controversial and popular topic. In summer 1934 the Nye 
senatorial enquiry opened in the United States and accused various British firms, 
including Vickers, of engaging in questionable behaviour such as bribery, 
profiteering and creating international trusts. These developments roused 
American public opinion to the extent that its government declared it was 
prepared to deal „drastically‟ with the problem. On the other hand, France 
appeared to moderate its previous calls to either entirely prohibit private 
manufacture or implement international control.
182
  The discussions at Geneva re-
started in mid-June 1934, when the United States put forward a memorandum 
proposing a future basis for the CTM‟s work. Commonly known as the „Geneva 
Articles‟ and optimistically designed to form part of the wider disarmament 
convention, this document advocated national responsibility for the control of 
arms manufacture and trade; equality of treatment for state and private 
production; international supervisory arrangements; and publicity for manufacture 
and export.
183
 General Birch of Vickers-Armstrongs watched these developments 
with interest, and wrote in September:  
 
Business is looking up a bit, but I fear very much 
that MacDonald is going to give way at Geneva and 
we shall have these infernal dagos coming and 
inspecting our factories and stopping our sale of 
armaments. We shall only have our own country to 
blame if it does occur, and it will be a disaster from 




These fears were misplaced. While British ministers recognised the „considerable 
volume‟ of public opinion against private manufacture, they simultaneously 
wished to protect the armaments industry, which they now generally accepted as 
„vital to the maintenance of our security.‟185 Although the Cabinet felt that the „ill-
informed‟ public criticism was largely based on „sentimental considerations‟, it 
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nonetheless admitted that domestic opinion was a „real and powerful‟ force which 
required a satisfactory response.
186
 Moreover, the government also faced calls 




On 23 October 1934 the Ministerial Disarmament Committee suggested 
that Britain could meet public criticism and seize the international initiative 
through the preparation of a self-contained convention for the supervision and 
control of armament manufacture and trading.
188
 Anthony Eden, the Lord Privy 
Seal, subsequently chaired an interdepartmental Committee on Trading in Arms 
(DCTA) which produced a seriously curtailed version of the Geneva Articles.
189
 
On 31 October the Cabinet unsurprisingly decided that Britain should not put this 
suggestion forward at Geneva at the „present moment‟ and instead finalised its 
position for the upcoming House of Commons debate. This asserted that the 
prohibition of private arms manufacture would lead to unacceptable political, 
security, financial and industrial consequences, and would have a detrimental 
impact on non-producing states. As a consequence, and given that a general 
disarmament convention appeared unlikely, the Cabinet viewed the „practical line‟ 
as increased international regulation and control of exports to prevent „ill effects‟ 
and facilitate embargoes, based upon existing British unilateral practice.
190
  
On 7 November, in view of Liberal demands for a „special commission‟, 
the Cabinet accepted the principle of an enquiry into the private arms industry, on 
the condition that this would not be a „roving or fishing‟ investigation along the 
lines of the Nye committee.
191
 However, Simon, representing the government, 
failed to make this offer during the crucial 8 November parliamentary debate, 
causing indignation on the opposition benches and earning rebuke from the 
press.
192
 On 22 November Simon reappeared before the Commons to announce 
the enquiry, which would investigate whether a state monopoly over arms 
production and greater export control would provide better regulation than the 
existing system. Rather ingeniously, he also decided that the enquiry would 
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investigate specific ways to reduce the „evils‟ of private manufacture (Simon 
believed that arms firms undoubtedly engaged in improper business conduct, but 
that they were not unique in this regard). Although an apparent departure from the 
government‟s previous attitude, this was actually a tactical move to prevent 
detailed scrutiny of the arms industry‟s affairs because, if the existence of 
potential evils was admitted at the outset, the enquiry therefore possessed no 
mandate to investigate particular examples. After a further delay, the government 
officially announced the formation of the Royal Commission on the Private 
Manufacture and Trading in Arms on 18 February 1935.
193
 
 At Geneva, the Disarmament Conference continued to fragment into 
smaller pieces. On 20 November 1934 the conference bureau finally decided to 
deal with arms manufacture and trade as part of a separate instrument from the 
disarmament convention. To facilitate the discussion, the United States submitted 
a composite list of draft articles, based on previous discussions.
194
 Eden‟s DCTA 
committee and the Cabinet subsequently examined these articles and, by January 
1935, British opposition was condensed to two fundamental points. First, the 
government, particularly the services and Board of Trade, refused to accept the 
proposed system of permanent and automatic supervision unless it formed part of 
a general disarmament convention. For the more limited agreement under 
discussion, the Cabinet instead suggested a system of documentary supervision. 
Second, ministers again worried that the level of publicity in the draft articles 
would reveal the state of Britain‟s reserves at a time when such information 
carried a significant premium. In a rare display of wishful thinking, the DCTA 
committee pointed out that Britain would also obtain this precious information 
about other states and that the underlying idea behind the draft convention was to 
end the secrecy and mutual suspicion surrounding arms production. However, the 
only positive proposal emanating from Whitehall was for an international 
prohibition on export credits for arms sales, an idea which had previously 
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On 14 February 1935 the CTM began discussing of the United States‟ 
composite articles and reached agreement on a number of points. This enabled it 
to produce a convention in April, which proved acceptable to all its members 
except Britain, Italy and Japan, who objected to the proposed method of 
supervision and level of international publicity.
196
 Although the committee 
subsequently adjourned indefinitely, its failure intensified the public‟s scrutiny of 
British policy when the Royal Commission began its proceedings at the 
Middlesex Guildhall in Westminster on 1 May. The Union for Democratic 
Control, appearing in July, specifically criticised the government for not accepting 
the April 1935 convention.
197
 Subsequently Dame Rachel Crowdy, one of the 
commissioners, revealed that she had gathered from opinion at Geneva that 
Britain had „rather scuppered international cooperation‟ by leaning away from the 
CTM‟s draft.198 On the other hand, in May 1936 the Foreign Office presented the 
Royal Commission with a detailed memorandum defending British policy. This 
criticised the over-complexity of the American and French supervisory proposals 
and argued that, for current purposes, publicity was only required to indicate 
general trends of production and movements of war material, rather than 
providing detailed returns pertaining to types of weapon.
199
 
The UDC‟s case also drew upon contemporary events and contended that 
greater international publicity and supervision would have exposed the 
accelerated arming of powers such as China and Japan at an earlier date. It also 
drew attention to the „notorious‟ Chaco war between Bolivia and Paraguay (1933-
35), because the combatants lacked indigenous capacity for arms production and 
had to obtain their war requirements from external sources. As a result, the UDC 
believed that the activities of private manufacturers had made the war possible.
200
 
Similarly, the Independent Labour Party suggested that British firms had helped to 
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prolong hostilities by sending arms and ammunition to both sides between 
January 1932 and June 1933, despite the League „outlawing‟ the war.201 In fact, 
the League had merely approved the imposition of an international embargo in 
autumn 1934, after Britain and the United States had imposed their own 
prohibitions the previous May.
202
 Nonetheless, few restrictions had operated on 
exports to the region before this. Indeed, despite skirmishing between Bolivia and 
Paraguay over the disputed Chaco region in 1927-28, the British government took 
no subsequent steps to prevent its domestic firms from supplying large quantities 
of arms to Bolivia. The United States and, to a lesser extent, the European 




Some months after the formal outbreak of war in May 1933, a League 
commission visited the area and described a „singularly pitiless and horrible war‟, 
fed by imports of modern armaments. This had a profound effect on international 
opinion and Anthony Eden energetically pressed for an embargo agreement at 
Geneva in May 1934.
204
 Although Britain subsequently held up the issue of new 
export licences for war material destined for Bolivia and Paraguay, it allowed the 
delivery of war material which had been ordered before the prohibition. In June 
General Birch grumbled that if Vickers could not provide its foreign customers 
with replacements, spare parts and ammunition during a war, it would lose its 
peacetime overseas business. He informed the War Office that France guaranteed 
wartime supply to its customers, and suggested that the French understood the 
„extreme importance of industrial mobilisation‟, whereas the British Foreign 
Office did not.
205
 Nonetheless, Vickers still exported £424,158 of arms to Bolivia 
between July 1932 and December 1934, while its exports to Paraguay during the 
same period comprised just £79. After the imposition of the embargo in May 
1934, Vickers received a single export licence for export 500 celluloid protractors 
ordered by Bolivia: these were hardly the most warlike items produced by the 
company, but they were undoubtedly useful in view of the large amounts of field 
                                                 
201
 Ibid., p.156. 
202
 Ibid., p.755. 
203
 Walters, History of the League, pp.527-28. 
204
 Ibid., pp.533-34. 
205
 CUL, VMF K619, Birch to Montgomery-Massingberd, 9 June 1934. 
 266 
 
artillery previously purchased by the Bolivians.
206
 Nonetheless, Bolivia‟s long-
term reliance on Vickers‟ weapons ultimately contributed to its defeat by the 
Paraguayan army in 1935. Bolivia had concluded a major deal with the British 
firm in 1926 for the supply of a wide range of items, but this arrangement was 
subsequently plagued by troubles regarding the poor quality and maintenance of 
the goods supplied, as well as various issues with delivery and payments.
207
 In 
1929 Birch rued the damage this had caused the firm‟s international reputation 
and resolved to „get things right‟; the following year he wrote that Vickers „had to 
go to Bolivia‟ to learn the lesson that it should not make weapons without first 
trying out its designs.
208
 On the other hand, Paraguay had sourced its armaments 
from a wide variety of American and European companies, which enabled it to 
play off different suppliers to get the best weapons at competitive prices, while its 
superior logistical arrangements enabled it to bring its weapons to bear more 
easily than the Bolivians.
209
  
At the Royal Commission in January 1936 Sir Philip Gibbs suggested that 
Vickers had helped supply „these primitive peoples with very modern forms of 
slaughter‟. In response, General Lawrence did not think that the Bolivians and 
Paraguayans „would admit that they are very primitive, really.‟210 Like the 
government, Vickers perceived a clear difference between the civilised trade in 
modern weapons between recognised governments and the „uncivilised‟ illicit 
arms traffic. In this regard, Lawrence pointed out that Vickers was unconnected to 
those „people who are quite immorally providing arms over a period to people like 
slave raiding countries [sic], and countries of that kind.‟211 Indeed, while many 
people found the firms‟ willingness to profit from the Chaco war equally immoral, 
the manufacturers‟ behaviour was neither illegal nor condemned by the 
government.  
Regardless of morality, the conflict clearly exposed the brutal reality and 
underlying logic of Britain‟s policy towards international arms trade control. For 
example, against Lord Cecil‟s criticism that selling to both sides in a war was 
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„very repulsive‟, Hankey suggested that it was better to buy from somebody than 
nobody, and pointed out that Britain had purchased vital supplies from 
Switzerland during the Great War, even though the Swiss had also sold to 
Germany. Furthermore, he argued that Bolivia and Paraguay were members of the 
League of Nations, and that the League had to pay due regard to their needs as 
non-producing states. He admitted that the existing system, which allowed private 
firms to sell to non-producers but with the possibility of concerted international 
action to prevent export if necessary, was imperfect; but he also argued that it was 
preferable to the nationalisation of the arms trade, which he predicted would cause 
embarrassment for the exporting government and a tendency to autarky amongst 
the non-producers.
212
 Finally, the Foreign Office observed that British firms could 
not export unlicensed armaments, and that any responsibility for allowing or 
prohibiting supply to combatant states ultimately rested with the government.
213
 
No wide-ranging international publicity arrangement was necessary to 
ascertain the trend of arms production in most countries by 1936. In March the 
government‟s latest Statement Relating to Defence referred to the undeniable „fact 
that the level of national armaments has been rising all over the world‟ and 
proposed a „far-reaching‟ scheme of improved defences for Britain. This plan was 
reliant on government factories, the private arms industry, and „other firms not 
normally engaged in armament work‟.214 Wider international developments had 
by now rendered the Royal Commission, and the last remnants of the 
Disarmament Conference, anachronistic. As a result, the Commission‟s report, 
despite recommending tighter national control over private manufacture, was 
subsequently given a quiet burial as the government sought to maintain the vital 





At the Royal Commission in May 1936, the Foreign Office argued that success in 
international negotiations could only be achieved „by slow degrees‟ and „modest 
steps‟. To illustrate the point, it compared the unsuccessful and unwieldy 
instruments on the arms trade and manufacture produced by the League with the 
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ratified 1930 Ethiopian Arms Treaty, by which Britain, France and Italy had 
agreed to cooperate in helping Addis Ababa to obtain legitimate arms and clamp 
down on illicit trafficking.
216
 Yet, during the same month, the Italian occupation 
of the Ethiopian capital demonstrated that the question of arms trading was only a 
small piece of the much wider puzzle of inter-war security. Nonetheless, the 
British attitude was undoubtedly correct in that smaller agreements to regulate 
smuggling in specific localities were far more likely to succeed than the League‟s 
ambitious attempts to regulate all global armament transactions. Beyond its 
colonial arrangements, Britain actively discouraged efforts to impose rigid 
limitations on the right of „civilised‟ states to buy and sell weapons from private 
sources, aiming to keep its own channels of supply open and retaining the 
flexibility to block arms sales for political reasons. 
The belief in the adequacy of its existing scheme of unilateral control 
formed the backbone of British policy whenever the League discussed arms 
manufacture and trading. Officials believed that any international regulations 
should be based upon a universal application of the national example set by 
Britain. Moreover, they raised administrative, defence and foreign policy 
objections to going beyond the provisions of the Firearms Act and export 
licensing system. Although subsequent discussions revealed these measures were 
far from watertight, policymakers argued that they were sufficient given the 
government‟s underlying desire to monitor arms flows. Conversely, Britain never 
trusted other states‟ good faith in this matter, nullifying any chance at an 
agreement that would have theoretically imposed the same regulations on foreign 
firms as applied to British manufacturers. Although such intransigent attitudes 
caused the League‟s negotiations to falter, Britain was unwilling to incur the 
odium of dropping out of the discussions. As a result, its participation was marked 
by an increasingly unsustainable level of subterfuge, while the ongoing 
negotiations increased, rather than diminished, international suspicions.  
In private correspondence unearthed by the Nye Committee, Sir Charles 
Craven of Vickers implied that the League of Nations was a „troublesome 
organisation‟ which aimed to produce a „fancy convention‟.217 Although the 
1930s opponents of the private armaments industry viewed such statements with 
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grave suspicion, any „subterranean conspiracy‟ on the part of the manufacturers 
was entirely unnecessary, given that most British policymakers appeared to view 
Geneva in much the same light. With rare exceptions, officials generally rejected 
the criticism that the private manufacture of armaments was „evil‟ or any more 
objectionable than other forms of business. Instead, they argued that calls to 
provide detailed international publicity of national arms production posed a much 
greater danger to British security than the alleged „merchants of death‟. Moreover, 
officials were concerned not to harass or discourage non-specialist engineering 
firms, who helped to produce certain types of armament and were a crucial part of 
wider industrial mobilisation planning: in this regard, British policy aimed at 
reducing the government‟s reliance on companies like Vickers. 
Although the League‟s negotiations had little direct impact on the arms 
firms, the suspicions outlined in the Covenant, subsequently expanded by the 
Temporary Mixed Commission, and eventually espoused by vocal sections of 
public opinion, generated an awkward backlash against the private manufacturers 
at precisely the same time as the government was trying to resurrect its 
relationship with what it now viewed as a vital industry for rearmament purposes. 
The critics alleged that a mysterious influence had worked against the Geneva 
negotiations and believed that the arms firms had helped to bring about failure. In 
the case of the League‟s attempts to control armaments manufacture and trade, the 
seemingly inexplicable force that precluded success was simply the hard realities 
of national self-interest, clouded by obfuscation and obstructionist tactics. These 






Alarming official reports and gloomy statements about the decline and weakness 
of Britain‟s military-naval armament firms in the 1930s reflected neither the 
actual condition of the industry nor the potential strength available to the 
government as it moved towards rearmament. Nonetheless, post-1945 scholars 
continued to repeat these misleading assertions, which often originated in 
correspondence between the service departments and the arms manufacturers 
themselves. The present study has undertaken a more comprehensive and 
multifaceted analysis of state-industry relations between 1918 and 1936, and has 
provided a new account of relative vitality in the British private armaments 
industry. It has also offered an original interpretation of the arms industry‟s 
position in several related areas, particularly the Bank of England‟s controversial 
role in domestic industrial reorganisation; the government‟s preparation of plans 
for industrial mobilisation; and the League of Nations‟ disarmament process. 
More generally, this thesis represents an important contribution to the wider 
revisionist historiography concerning the images and reality behind inter-war 
British power. 
Although individual companies undoubtedly faced significant external and 
self-inflicted challenges after 1918, a more streamlined and successful peacetime 
armaments industry eventually emerged out of these struggles. In particular, 
Vickers reorganised itself in the mid-1920s and subsequently experienced 
considerable success as a domestic and international supplier of defence products, 
mainly through its Vickers-Armstrongs subsidiary. The size and clear identity of 
Vickers as a world-class armaments manufacturer made it an obvious target for 
1930s critics, who argued that such firms were able to control governments. Yet 
while these commentators were correct in their assessment of the global strength 
of Britain‟s arms industry, Vickers‟ renewed vigour did not result from any 
sinister connections with the government. In fact, as demonstrated throughout this 
thesis, British armament firms were subject to real constraints after 1918 and 
state-industry relations were frequently marked by tensions rather than 
cooperation. At the executive level, the Cabinet consistently turned a blind eye to 
the industry‟s complaints and struggles, even if ministers did not consciously set 
 271 
 
out to abolish or weaken the manufacturers. While individual departments paid 
more attention to particular aspects of the industry‟s affairs, the prominent role of 
civil servants, combined with a perceived lack of constructive help, led the firms 
to occasionally suspect that they were victims of a Whitehall conspiracy, rather 
than vice versa. 
Of the principally interested ministries, the service departments were 
usually the most supportive, particularly the Admiralty, although the services‟ 
loyalties were divided between private and state-owned manufacturing facilities 
and their ability to help was limited by the close financial scrutiny imposed upon 
procurement by the Treasury. The Foreign Office offered some overseas 
assistance to firms but its primary interest was to safeguard Britain‟s diplomatic 
credibility. The Board of Trade had an important role in industrial mobilisation 
planning alongside the service departments and also administered the arms export 
licensing system. However, although the Board gathered and disseminated 
information on arms production and trade flows, it had little direct interest in the 
specialist firms beyond its general encouragement for legitimate British 
commerce. The Treasury was largely indifferent to the industry‟s specific 
problems although its influence soured state-industry relations. In particular, its 
adherence to orthodox liberal economics meant that the firms could expect little 
financial assistance at home, and its concern for European economic 
reconstruction made it unwilling to supply credit guarantees for overseas arms 
sales. 
Within and beyond Whitehall a number of individuals and smaller groups 
also investigated or discussed specific aspects of the armament business in the 
context of wider policymaking. For example, in the immediate post-war years, 
Rowland Sperling cultivated a specialist interest in arms trade control and applied 
his expertise in a useful advisory capacity at the Foreign Office. More 
significantly, Lord Weir, Sir James Lithgow and Sir Arthur Balfour formed a 
highly experienced and semi-official group of industrial advisors, who understood 
both the importance and workings of the specialist arms firms and complemented 
G. S. Whitham‟s long-term engagement with the broader subject of industrial 
mobilisation. The shadow factory scheme grew out of this collaboration and 
ultimately benefited both rearmament and industrial mobilisation for the Second 
World War. However, without an overarching executive authority, many of the 
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ideas and proposals that resulted from these kinds of initiative became dispersed 
across a large number of subcommittees and an ever-growing mountain of papers. 
Even Sir Maurice Hankey, Whitehall‟s administrative genius, only began to draw 
the disparate threads of departmental policy together when preparing evidence for 
his appearances before the Royal Commission on the Private Manufacture of and 
Trading in Arms in the mid-1930s.
1
 
The government‟s refusal to assist with the Vickers-Armstrongs merger in 
1927 demonstrated its apparent indifference to the struggles of these important 
specialist firms and even the service departments offered little encouragement for 
this project. Moreover, the Treasury believed that failing industries should not be 
artificially sustained but should either reorganise themselves independently or 
cease trading. The Treasury‟s liberal philosophy prevailed and, although this 
caused further damage to state-industry relations, it ultimately allowed Vickers‟ 
ruthless and independent vision to guide the arms industry‟s much-needed 
restructuring and subsequent renaissance in the late 1920s and early 1930s. 
Indeed, contrary to existing accounts, the Bank of England did not „rescue‟ the 
British arms industry. Rather, the Bank became involved in Armstrong‟s affairs in 
an attempt to cover up its connection to the firm‟s enormous financial problems, 
and its cautious intervention eased the way for Vickers‟ subsequent domination of 
the sector. The Bank certainly provided a psychological and financial crutch 
during this process but it proved increasingly unable to grapple with the political 
implications and intricacies of armaments production. Nonetheless, the City of 
London provided a number of valuable political, financial and legal connections 
for the arms industry, not least through Montagu Norman, the Governor of the 
Bank of England. Yet the Bank‟s activities, while unorthodox and secretive, were 
not inherently dubious. Despite this, when the Royal Commission threatened to 
expose the Bank‟s actions to public scrutiny, Norman swiftly disposed of his 
remaining armament interests. By this point, Vickers had been the dominant force 
in the British arms industry and a major global player for some years, having 
absorbed or neutralised its main rivals. Admittedly, the total number of armament 
firms had fallen away since 1918, but the evidence of Vickers‟ considerable 
industrial output and financial strength makes it impossible to sustain the 
                                                 
1
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traditional argument that the British armaments industry faced extinction between 
the wars. 
Although the government refused to help the over-expanded arms firms 
adjust to post-war demand, it did begin to consider supply preparations for the 
„next war‟ and developed a wide-ranging organisation to investigate and prepare 
plans for national industrial mobilisation. In this sense, Correlli Barnett‟s 
allegation that British officials were fundamentally antipathetic towards large-
scale peacetime industrial organisation does not stand up to scrutiny. On the other 
hand, these investigations perhaps did more harm than good, insofar as they 
generated and propagated distorted images of Britain‟s inadequacy compared to 
other countries. In particular, the Principal Supply Officers‟ Committee 
concentrated its limited resources on investigating the mass production 
capabilities of general industry and tended to overlook the specialist armament 
firms‟ unique nucleus capacity. Officials only looked at part of the overall picture 
and made exaggerated comparisons with the supposed efficiency of other states, 
particularly totalitarian regimes. As a result, they underestimated Britain‟s 
facilities for arms production, even though the PSOC was quietly confident that 
British industry could expand to meet emergency demand in many important 
areas such as naval shipbuilding. The committee certainly located some alarming 
deficiencies in productive capacity for certain land weaponry items, but these 
were usually based on a limited survey of firms. Moreover, the PSOC‟s 
investigations were mainly based on locating capacity for vaguely-defined future 
wartime requirements and not on whether the arms industry was sufficient to meet 
the armed forces‟ peacetime needs. Nonetheless, the committee‟s portrayal of 
British weaknesses in arms production was accepted by members of the 
Committee of Imperial Defence, who advised the Cabinet accordingly. Of course, 
this analysis only applies to armaments: there remains plenty of scope for further 
study into how Britain‟s inter-war supply organisation conceptualised other types 
of stores and raw materials, and how these affected the state‟s relationship with 
different industrial sectors and altered official perceptions of national strength.
2
 
The perceived connection between securing overseas defence contracts 
and increasing domestic capacity for industrial mobilisation meant that the 
                                                 
2
 In this direction, see Alan F. Wilt, Food for War: Agriculture and Rearmament in Britain 
before the Second World War (Oxford, 2001). 
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competition between Europe‟s private armament firms assumed an intense and 
quasi-national character. In this regard, Vickers‟ directors and a number of 
officers regularly suggested to ministers that overseas manufacturers worked 
hand-in-glove with their governments to secure as much foreign business as 
possible, in contrast to Britain‟s comparatively laissez-faire attitude. This 
reflected a more general tendency for officers, and occasionally service ministers, 
to accept and disseminate Vickers‟ alarmist depictions of decay and weakness, 
apparently without considering that such language was used as part of the firm‟s 
attempts to secure government orders and assistance. As the present study has 
shown, the less sensational material contained within business archives and the 
surviving arms trade statistics clearly demonstrate that Vickers was in a much 
healthier condition than suggested by the correspondence between the company‟s 
directors and the government. 
Historians have traditionally overestimated the negative effects of the 
inter-war quest for disarmament upon the private armaments industry, and have 
tended to treat „disarmament‟ as a homogenous concept.  In contrast, this thesis 
has applied recent scholarship on the different forms of inter-war disarmament 
and has presented a more nuanced interpretation of its impact. Some forms of 
disarmament certainly had negative economic consequences for the arms firms, 
such as the post-1918 reduction in the armed forces from their wartime levels, 
although this was hardly unanticipated by the manufacturers, and the state 
continued to order a significant percentage of its peacetime military-naval 
requirements from private sources. The naval disarmament treaties also caused a 
number of difficulties, but were not catastrophic for the arms industry. The 
League of Nations‟ quest for general disarmament had few tangible results and its 
most damaging impact was the Covenant‟s association of the manufacturers‟ 
activities with „grave objections‟ and „evil effects‟. Although this correlation was 
never substantiated, the implication that private firms started arms races and 
promoted conflict left an enduring stain on their reputation. Moreover, Britain‟s 
rather ambiguous „moral‟ commitment to disarmament occasionally proved 
problematic for the manufacturers, particularly during Arthur Henderson‟s pro-
League tenure as Foreign Secretary between 1929 and 1931 and throughout the 
subsequent Disarmament Conference. Yet although Vickers claimed that this 
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„atmosphere‟ of disarmament damaged its domestic and foreign business, the firm 
still managed to sell relatively large quantities of armaments at home and abroad.  
Even though the League occasionally antagonised Vickers‟ directors, they 
were never unduly worried by the disarmament process, let alone actively 
engaged in a campaign to undermine it.  In fact, the company was sceptical of the 
League‟s ability to conclude a successful general disarmament treaty and believed 
that governments would purchase Vickers‟ products as long as war remained a 
possibility. Such scepticism was not unusual and many policymakers, including 
Cabinet ministers, shared similar beliefs. Indeed, ministers and civil servants 
tended to view foreign governments with more suspicion than they did the 
domestic armaments industry. Britain‟s unilateral regulatory systems for arms 
manufacture and trading were not watertight, but officials believed that a uniquely 
British diligence made them effective. Conversely, the government did not trust 
other countries to fulfil loyally any international obligations connected to 
armaments. Ironically, such attitudes meant that the League‟s continued pursuit of 
a wide-ranging multilateral agreement exacerbated pre-existing suspicions rather 
than encouraging cooperation. This reflected both the League‟s general inability 
to reconcile differing national interests and its steadfast refusal to admit defeat: for 
example, even after the collapse of the general Disarmament Conference in 1934, 
it still attempted to secure an agreement concerning arms manufacture and 
trading. 
Despite the government‟s fear that its unilateral regulations were causing 
British firms to lose ground to overseas competitors, its attitude to international 
regulation remained cautious and resulted from a complex range of policy 
considerations beyond mistrust. This thesis has offered the first full analysis of 
these underlying motives, and has demonstrated how the interests of the private 
arms industry played a surprisingly small part in the government‟s calculations. 
To reduce the risk of imperial unrest, policymakers looked to secure multilateral 
agreements to prevent smuggling and the disposal of surplus rifles amongst 
„backward races‟ in Africa and Asia. On the other hand, Britain sought to protect 
its freedom to privately manufacture and trade arms with „civilised‟ states and 
resisted calls for international publicity, which officials perceived as an 
intolerable strategic threat. In this regard, British policy was less an attempt to 
safeguard the specialist arms firms than an effort to avoid excessive regulation 
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and the attendant danger that this would discourage general industry from 
undertaking occasional armaments work. In other words, this was an attempt to 
reduce the country‟s reliance on the private arms manufacturers and thereby 
improve overall capacity for industrial mobilisation. Britain also recognised that it 
would need to purchase armaments from foreign sources in the event of another 
war and did not want to interfere with the right of belligerents to trade with 
neutrals, although it also wished to retain its own ability to impose embargoes for 
political and strategic reasons. The hypocrisy of this approach was shamefully 
revealed by the British government‟s policy of non-intervention during the 
Spanish Civil War (1936-39) and its denial of arms exports to the legitimate 
Spanish republican government. Although Spain was traditionally a good market 
for new and surplus British armaments, the Conservative-dominated National 
government adopted this position of „malevolent neutrality‟ because it feared the 




The rapid changes in European international relations after 1936 forced the 
government to build up Britain‟s defences with equal speed and it purchased large 
quantities of arms from private firms. The arms industry‟s opponents, having 
failed to convince the Royal Commission of the general immorality of private 
manufacture, changed their approach and accused the firms of profiteering and 
inefficiency during rearmament.
4
 Certainly, ministers made various public 
statements of their desire to remove profiteering from arms production and the 
introduction of the National Defence Contribution in 1937 imposed a five percent 
tax on profits, much to the wider business community‟s displeasure. Yet the 
predominant view in Whitehall reflected the Treasury‟s desire to maintain 
economic incentives during rearmament, which it believed would encourage the 
cooperation of industrialists and, to a lesser extent, labour.
5
 However, rearmament 
was hampered by difficulties associated with locating sufficient skilled labour, a 
matter which the arms firms had periodically warned the government about since 
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the 1920s and which Lord Weir described in early 1936 as the most formidable 
bottleneck restricting the expansion of industrial output. Officials could 
theoretically divert skilled workers from the automobile and other industries, 
although this risked upsetting Britain‟s export markets and damaging its economic 
stability. On the other hand, the „dilution‟ of skilled labour through a 
simplification of the processes involved in armament work or by training new 
workers, threatened to upset trade union leaders who, like the specialist arms 
manufacturers, viewed rearmament as a potentially risky and ephemeral boom. 
Moreover, the unions remembered how the government had reneged on its 
previous promise to reverse wartime dilution after 1918.
6
 Interestingly, Sir 
Charles Craven, who was the chairman of the Engineers Employers‟ Federation as 
well as a senior Vickers director, had more success in discussing dilution directly 
with the company‟s employees than he did with the „pig-headed‟ unions.7 
Certainly, the development of inter-war labour relations within the armaments 
industry deserves closer consideration in its own right, not least because of the 
traditional left-wing hostility towards private arms manufacture. 
Both rearmament and industrial mobilisation planning were limited by 
fears about the economic and political consequences of excessive state 
intervention and a widespread desire to maintain „business as usual‟. On the other 
hand, the government‟s failure to help the arms firms adjust to peacetime 
conditions after 1918 meant that the manufacturers expanded with caution in the 
mid-1930s. After all, rearmament was initially intended as a temporary deterrent 
strategy, not a preliminary to general industrial mobilisation.
8
 Yet, despite 
bottlenecks and continued criticism, the arms industry played an active and 
important role in meeting the demands of rearmament and eventually achieved 
volumes of output during the Second World War which in many cases equalled or 
exceeded the height of war production in 1917.
9
 Indeed, Britain ultimately 
produced enough arms and possessed sufficient economic resources to „stand 
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alone‟ in Europe between 1940 and 1941.10 Nonetheless, the nature of British 
rearmament has provoked considerable and enduring controversy. The widely-
read 1940 polemic Guilty Men argued that Britain‟s political leaders could and 
should have rearmed sooner to meet the revisionist threat, reflecting the 
arguments put forward by Winston Churchill during the 1930s.
11
 On the other 
hand, several historians have since demonstrated that defence expansion was 
subject to real economic and industrial constraints.
12
 More recently, Talbot Imlay 
has challenged the predominant images of failure, restraint and missed 
opportunity and has argued that Britain undertook „notably advanced‟ economic 
preparations immediately prior to and after the outbreak of war. The increasing 
urgency of the international situation after 1938, culminating in war, allowed for a 
much greater degree of state activism which, combined with increased 
cooperation between trade unions and industrial organisations, enabled Britain (in 




While the present study has focused on the period prior to 1936, its 
analysis of state-industry relations in these earlier years has a significant bearing 
on this wider debate. Crucially, it has demonstrated that while the state began 
preparations in the 1920s for the mobilisation of national resources in the event of 
a future war, it made few plans for the peacetime expansion of armaments output 
until forced to by international events in the 1930s. As a result, the government 
possessed a certain degree of confidence in its eventual ability to bring Britain‟s 
considerable resources to bear during a war, but it had less faith in its short-term 
ability to rearm. While this apprehension was partly based on an erroneous 
assessment of Britain‟s dedicated arms-producing facilities, it nonetheless helps to 
explain why the government approached the problem with caution. Certainly, the 
peacetime arms industry did not – and could not be expected to – maintain 
sufficient capacity to meet the unusual demands of rearmament. Nonetheless, the 
specialist firms were a strong and important, albeit neglected, nucleus for 
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emergency expansion, while the shadow scheme showed how wider industrial 
mobilisation planning could benefit rearmament in practice.  
This thesis has explored the gap between the real strength of the inter-war 
private armaments industry and the popular images of decay and weakness. 
Furthermore, it has explained how the fragmentary nature of the state‟s 
relationship with the private manufacturers only allowed policymakers to see parts 
of the whole picture and thereby prevented them from fully illuminating the 
substantial resources at their disposal. Reporting in September 1936, the Royal 
Commission offered a possible remedy for this perilous inadequacy in British 
state-industry relations. Significantly, the commissioners accepted the traditional 
justification for the existence of the private armaments industry as a source of 
innovation and reserve productive capacity.
14
 However, in view of these important 
functions, they suggested that the government, upon the conclusion of the 
rearmament programme and resumption of „normal‟ conditions, adopt a more 
proactive and interventionist role in its relationship with the manufacturers, 
encompassing both the domestic and international aspects of the question: 
 
We recommend that the Government should assume 
complete responsibility for the arms industry in the 
United Kingdom and should organise and regulate 
the necessary collaboration between the 
government and private industry; that this 
responsibility should be exercised through a 
controlling body, presided over by a minister 
responsible to Parliament, having executive powers 
in peace-time and war-time, over all matters relating 
to the supply and manufacture of arms and 





These measures were partly intended to reduce the scope for any dubious activity 
on the part of individual firms and reassure the public that the government was 
keeping an eye on the industry. However, the commissioners also recognised that 
such collaboration was crucially important for the peacetime planning of 
industrial mobilisation and the „rapid and effective‟ wartime execution of these 
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 Yet in January 1937 a CID subcommittee, chaired by Hankey, rejected 
these recommendations and claimed that the government already possessed 
adequate machinery through the existing PSOC organisation, which had been 
strengthened by the appointment of Sir Arthur Robinson as the full-time chairman 
of the Supply Board in 1935 and Sir Thomas Inskip as the Minister for the 
Coordination of Defence in 1936. Moreover, the CID was reluctant to radically 
disrupt the existing system given the ongoing and urgent struggle to fulfil the 
deficiency programmes.
17
 At this stage, officials were rightly focused on the 
enormous challenges in front of them, but it is hard to escape the conclusion that 
their task might have been considerably easier had the state more effectively 
coordinated its relationship with the private armament industry after 1918. 
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British Private Armaments Firms in 1914 and 1933 
 
 
Firm Operating in 1914 Situation in 1933 
Vickers Limited 
Varied interests, predominantly in Vickers-
Armstrongs‟ armament and shipbuilding works. 
Coventry Ordnance Works Out of business. 
Birmingham Small Arms Not engaged on armament work. 
London Small Arms Co. Out of business. 
Armstrong Whitworth 
Absorbed by Vickers group. All armament work 
concentrated with much reduced capacity. 
Openshaw works dismantled. Erith closed. 
Cammell Laird 
Absorbed by Vickers group. All armament work 
concentrated with much reduced capacity. 
Beardmore 
Reduced to nucleus. Very small orders for naval 
guns etc. 
Firths 
Only small orders, mainly for hardened shell. A 
little other armament work. 
Hadfield Ditto. 
Projectile Co. (Limited) Relatively few orders. 
Darlington Forge Co. In liquidation. Works closed. 
John Brown and Co. No longer manufacture gun forgings. 
 
Source: TNA, CAB 4/22/1109-B, PSOC Report: Private Armaments Industry, 31 March 1933. 
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Appendix II  
Proportion of Productive Capacity Located in Relation to Certain 
Requirements for the First Year of a War (Position in 1935 and 1936) 
 
 
31 March 1935 31 March 1936 
Unhardened Shell (small) 61% 42% 
Unhardened Shell (medium) 9% 12% 
Unhardened Shell (large: forging) 20% 17% 
Unhardened Shell (large: machining) 14% 12% 
Hardened Shell (small) 31.60% 38% 
Hardened Shell (medium and large) 92.30% 91% 
Shrapnel (forging) 7.50% 20% 
Shrapnel (machining) 5.50% 15% 
Smoke (shell smoke, star and practice) 0% 2% 
Aircraft Bombs (practice) 59% 0% 
Aircraft Bombs (fragmentation) 0% 0% 
Aircraft Bombs (general purpose casting) 19.50% 18% 
Aircraft Bombs (general purpose body 
machining) 
11.30% 17% 
Aircraft Bombs (A.S.) 0% 0% 
Aircraft Bombs (S.A.P.) 41% 25% 
Aircraft Bombs ("B" forging) n/a 9% 
Aircraft Bombs ("B" machining) n/a 11% 
Mortar Bombs (Casting) 4% 5% 
Mortar Bombs (Machining) 1% 4% 
Fuses (Time) 32.10% 13% 
Fuses (Percussion) 21.70% 19% 
Fuses (Miscellaneous: small) 4.70% 8% 
Fuses (Base, time, mechanical aircraft 
bombs etc) 
19% 10% 
Primers 10.60% 11% 
Gaines 17.10% 14% 
Cartridge Cases (2pdr) 19.80% 54% 
Cartridge Cases (6pdr and 3pdr) 19.60% 0% 
Cartridge Cases (18 pdr and 3in, 20 cwt) 29.20% 17% 
Cartridge Cases (3.7in & 4.5in Howitzer, & 
3.7in mortar) 
13% 9% 
Cartridge Cases (5.1in, 4.7in and 4in) 63.40% 88% 
 
Sources: TNA, CAB 4/24/1200-B, SB Report: Appendix D, 9 October 1935; TNA, CAB 




Principal Activities and Centres of Armstrong's and Vickers' Operations, 
1927 
   Type of Trade Armstrong Vickers 
Naval mountings Elswick Barrow and Erith 
Admiralty and passenger shipbuilding Armstrong Naval Yard Barrow 
Engineering and large turbines etc. None Barrow 
Small turbines Elswick Barrow 
Marine oil engines Elswick Barrow 
Steel foundry Elswick Barrow 
Forgings for gun-mountings etc. Openshaw Sheffield 
Finishing and building guns Elswick Sheffield 
Armour Openshaw Sheffield 
Drop stampings Elswick Sheffield 
Tanks and dragons Elswick Sheffield 
Special steels Openshaw Sheffield 
Railway forging Elswick Sheffield 
Railway tyres, etc None Sheffield 
Springs None Sheffield 
Steel tubes None Sheffield 
Locomotives Scotswood None. 
Iron castings Close Foundry Barrow and Erith 
Tramp steamers Walker Yard Barrow 
Pneumatic tools Elswick None 
 




Articles Prohibited (Without Licence) Under the Arms Export Prohibition 
Order, 1921 
 
i. Cannon and other ordnance and component parts thereof; 
ii. Carriages and mountings for cannon and other ordnance and component 
parts thereof; 
iii. Cartridges, charges of all kinds, and component parts thereof; 















Super-Cliffite, No. 1; 
Super-Cliffite, No. 2; 
Super-Rippite; 
Tonite or Cotton Powder, No. 1; 
Viking Powder. 
v. Firearms of every description and component parts thereof; 
vi. Grenades and component parts thereof; 
vii. Machine Guns, interrupter gears, mountings for machine guns and 
component parts thereof; 
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viii. Projectiles of all kinds (except air-gun pellets) and component parts 
thereof; 
ix. Mines, land or sea, and component parts thereof; 
x. Depth charges and component parts thereof; 
xi. Bombs, bombing apparatus, and component parts thereof; 
xii. Flame-throwers and component parts thereof; 
xiii. Fuses (other than safety fuses) and component parts thereof; 
xiv. Torpedoes and component parts thereof; 
xv. Torpedo tubes, or other apparatus for discharging torpedoes. 
 
In 1931, a new Order made the provisions concerning items (ii) and (iv) more 
stringent, and added the following items: 
 
xvi. Fire-control and gun-sighting apparatus and component parts thereof; 
xvii. Appliances for use with arms and apparatus exclusively designed and 
intended for land, sea or aerial warfare; 
xviii. Bayonets, swords and lances, and component parts thereof; 
xix. Tanks and armoured cars and component parts thereof; 
xx. Aircraft, assembled or dismantled, and aircraft engines. 
 




Arms Export Licences Granted and Refused, 1929-1935 
 
 
A: Total Licences 
Granted [*] 
B: Licences Issued for 
Export of War Material 
C: Applications 
Refused  
1929 12,598 325 5 
1930 11,314 411 3 
1931 10,992 435 1 
1932 10,897 410 3 
1933 10,539 413 - 
1934 10,485 413 7 
1935 (until 30 
September) 
8,289 309 7 
 
* = includes sporting arms and industrial explosives. 
 





Prohibited Zones Defined By Article Six of the Convention for the Control of 
the Trade in Arms and Ammunition, 10 September 1919 
 
1. The whole of the Continent of Africa, with the exception of Algeria, Libya and 
the Union of South Africa (Within this area are included all islands situated within 
a hundred nautical miles of the coast, together with Prince's Island, St. Thomas's 
Island, and the Islands of Annobon and Socotra). 
 
2. Transcaucasia, Persia, Gwadar, the Arabian Peninsula and such Continental 
parts of Asia as were included in the Turkish Empire on 4th August, 1914. 
 
3. A maritime zone including the Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden, the Persian Gulf, and 
the Sea of Oman, and bounded by a line drawn from Cape Guardafui, following 
the latitude of that Cape to its intersection with longitude 57 deg. east of 
Greenwich, and proceeding thence direct to the Eastern frontier of Persia and the 
Gulf of Oman. 
 




Categories of Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War Established in the 
International Convention for the Supervision of the International Trade in 
Arms and Ammunition, 17 June 1925 
 
Category I. Arms, Ammunition and Implements of War exclusively designed and 
intended for Land, Sea or Aerial Warfare. 
 
A. Arms, ammunition and implements exclusively designed and intended for 
land, sea or aerial warfare, which are or shall be comprised in the 
armament of the armed forces of any State, or which, if they have been but 
are no longer comprised in such armament, are capable of military to the 
exclusion of any other use, except such arms, ammunition and implements 
which though included in the above definition, are covered by other 
Categories. 
 
Such arms, ammunition and implements are comprised in the following 
twelve headings:- 
1. Rifles, muskets, carbines. 
2.  
a. Machine-guns, automatic rifles and machine-pistols of 
all calibres; 
b. Mountings for machine-guns; 
c. Interrupter gears. 
3. Projectiles and ammunition for the arms enumerated in Nos. 1 
and 2 above. 
4. Gun-sightings, apparatus, including aerial gun-sights and 
bomb-sights, and fire-control apparatus. 
5.  
a. Cannon, long or short, and howitzers, of a calibre less 
than 5.9 inches (15 cm.); 
b. Cannon, long or short, and howitzers, of a calibre of 5.9 
inches (15 cm.) or above; 
c. Mortars of all kinds; 
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d. Gun carriages, mountings, recuperators, accessories for 
mountings.  
6. Projectiles and ammunition for the arms enumerated in No. 5 
above. 
7. Apparatus for the discharge of bombs, torpedoes, depth charges 




c. Land mines, submarine mines, fixed or floating, depth 
charges; 
d. Torpedoes. 
9. Appliances for use with the above arms and apparatus. 
10. Bayonets. 
11. Tanks and armoured cars. 
12. Arms and ammunition not specified in the above enumeration. 
 
B. Component parts, completely finished, of the articles covered by A above, 
if capable of being utilised only in the assembly or repair of the said 
articles, or as spare parts. 
 
Category II. Arms, Ammunition capable of use both for Military and other 
purposes. 
 
A. 1. Pistols and revolvers, automatic or self-loading, and developments of 
the same, designed for single-handed use or fired from the shoulder, of a 
calibre greater than 6.5 mm. and length of barrel greater than 10 cm. 
2. Fire-arms designed, intended or adapted for non-military purposes, such 
as sport or personal defence, that will fire cartridges that can be fired from 
fire-arms in Category I; other rifled fire-arms firing from the shoulder, of a 
calibre of 6 mm. or above, not included in Category I, with the exception 
of rifled fire-arms with a “break-down” action. 
3. Ammunition for the arms enumerated in the above two headings, with 
the exception of ammunition covered by Category I. 
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4. Swords and lances. 
 
B. Component parts, completely finished, of the articles covered by A above, 
if capable of being utilised only in the assembly or repair of the said 
articles, or as spare parts. 
 
Category III. Vessels of War and their Armament. 
 
1. Vessels of war of all kinds. 
2. Arms, ammunition and implements of war mounted on board vessels of 




1. Aircraft, assembled or dismantled. 




1. Gunpowder and explosives, except common black gunpowder. 
2. Arms and ammunition other than those covered by Categories I and II, 
such as pistols and revolvers of all models, rifled weapons with a “break-
down” action, other rifled fire-arms of a calibre of less than 6 mm. 
designed for firing from the shoulder, smooth-bore shot-guns, guns with 
more than one barrel or which at least one barrel is smooth-bore, fire-arms 
firing rimfire ammunition, muzzle-loading fire-arms. 
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